https://doi.org/10.37815/rte.v34n1.917
Original paper - English
Migr=
ation,
Human Rights & Sustainable Economies:
A Century 21 Agenda
Migración, derechos huma=
nos y
economías sostenibles:
Una
agenda del siglo XXI
Patrick Taran1 <=
/span>https://orcid.org/0000-0=
002-9442-5725 =
1
taran@globalmigrationpolicy.org
Sent: = 2022/02/22<= o:p>
Accepted: 2022/03/14
Published: 2022/03/15
Abstract
Summary: Introduction;
Methodology; A Context Review of Key Features of International Migrati=
on;
Main Law, Policy and Practical Challenges; and In Conclusion: an Imperative Agenda for Action. How
to cite: Taran, P. (2022). M=
igration,
Human Rights & Sustainable Economies: A Century 21 Agenda. =
Revista Tecnológica - Espol, 34(1), 193-217. http://www.rte.espol.e=
du.ec/index.php/tecnologica/article/view/917
This comprehensive brief identifie=
s a
range of key contemporary challenges for human rights, development, and
governance of international migration as an all-encompassing human, social,
economic, political, and environmental phenomena. It premises that m=
igration is fundamentally about development, human rights, and
social welfare, showing that labour and skills mobility is key to sustaining viability o=
f labour forces and economies and to obtaining return on
capital in a globalized economy. It notes that over 90 percent of migration
today results in employment and economic activity outcomes. Sustaining
development in all regions depends on migration. The article discusses the
structural and systemic imperatives for mobility of people worldwide and it
identifies 20 law, policy and practical challenges for economic and social
development, human rights, welfare of people, and for governance. The artic=
le
reiterates the comprehensive international legal framework for governance o=
f migration
and reviews especially relevant global policy frameworks: the UN 2030
Sustainable Development Agenda and the New Urban Agenda. Discussion address=
es
abusive exploitation of migrants versus lacuna in legal protection; content=
ions
between capital and labour in deregulation impacting migrant
workers; dangers of xenophobia; gender specificity in migration; restrictio=
ns
in access to social security for migrants; challenges to social and family
welfare; growing skills and training constraints, and impact of the COVID-19
pandemic and often inappropriate response measures. The trend of regime change towards deregulatory
migration control is raised, with mention of concerns on the Global Compact=
on
Migration. A comprehensive =
Agenda
for Action outlines policy lines and practical actions for rights-based,
economically sustainable, and socially responsible governance of
migration. This article and the ac=
tion
agenda build on the plenary address by the author to the Global Parliamentary Consultation on International
Migration held in Rabat, Morocco in December 2018.
=
Keywords: migrants, labour mobility, skills, susta=
inable
development, globalisation, employment, rights-=
based
approach, governance, migration policy, normative framework.
Resumen
Este exhaustivo informe identi=
fica
algunos desafíos contemporáneos clave para los derechos humanos, el desarro=
llo
y la gobernanza de la migración internacional como un fenómeno humano, soci=
al,
económico, político y ambiental. Parte de la premisa de que la migración ti=
ene
que ver fundamentalmente con el desarrollo, los derechos humanos y el biene=
star
social, y muestra que la movilidad laboral y de habilidades es clave para
mantener la viabilidad de las fuerzas laborales y las economías y para obte=
ner
el rendimiento del capital en una economía globalizada. Señala que más del =
90
por ciento de la migración actual genera resultados en el empleo y la activ=
idad
económica de los migrantes. El desarrollo sostenible en todas las regiones,
depende de la migración. En el artículo se discute los imperativos
estructurales y sistémicos de la movilidad de las personas en todo el mundo=
e
identifica 20 desafíos legales, políticos y prácticos para el desarrollo
económico y social, los derechos humanos, el bienestar de las personas y la
gobernanza. El artículo reitera el amplio marco legal internacional para la
gobernanza de la migración y revisa los marcos de políticas globales
relevantes: la Agenda de Desarrollo Sostenible 2030 de la ONU y la Nueva Ag=
enda
Urbana. La discusión aborda la explotación abusiva de los migrantes frente a
las lagunas en la protección legal; las disputas entre el capital y el trab=
ajo
en la desregulación que afecta a los trabajadores migrantes; los peligros d=
e la
xenofobia; la especificidad de género en la migración; las restricciones en=
el
acceso a la seguridad social para los migrantes; los desafíos para el biene=
star
social y familiar; las crecientes limitaciones en materia de habilidades
Introduction
Migration is about people, and in a globalized world dominated by capitalist economic relations and ownership, = is about sustaining economies and development, about human rights and about so= cial welfare. Governance of migration i= s thus about ensuring protection of people, about decent work for all, about social protection, and about justice a= nd human development for all people, whether they are working or not.
Migration today is international
skills and labour mobility that sustains the world of work in the Twenty-First
Century. It is key to employment and labour mar=
kets
worldwide and to obtaining return on capital in a globalized economy. Sustaining development depends on migra=
tion
in every region: Africa, the Americas, Asia-Pacific, Eurasia, Europe, and t=
he
Middle East. Migration has become a key factor in maintaining the
viability and productivity of agriculture,
construction, health care, hotel, restaurant and tourism and other sectors.
International migration meets growing demand for skills; it dynamizes
workforces and productivity; and mobility promotes entrepreneurship across
every region. Remittances, transfer of skills and investments by migrants, =
as
well as trade growth spurred by migration, enhance economic activity and
well-being in many countries North and South.
However, just as the needs for skil= ls and labour mobility increase to buttress viability, sustainability, and productivity of both labour forces and entire economies, the world seems to be getting it wrong on migration with intensified restrictions and barriers to mobility coupled wi= th maligning of migrants and migration. These contradictions are highlighted by current unmet needs for work= ers at all skills levels in many industrialized countries that constrain econom= ic recovery and appear to be a contributing factor to rising inflation.
This article = seeks to identify the main global economic, social and governance challenges raised = by international migration today and factors driving it in an anti-migration environment. It pursues to subsequently articulate the normative and policy lines of a global ‘law and policy agenda’ for effective, rights-based governance of migration that sustains economic vi= ability and societal welfare broadly. This article an= d the action agenda were inspired by and build on the plenary address by the auth= or to the Global Parliamentary Consultation on International Migration held in Rabat, Morocco in December 2018 (Taran, 2018). =
Meth=
odology
This article = is built on a wide review and summary of contemporary literature, applicable law discourse, and practice following a 'Qualitative method' with reflexive and critical comparison approach combining broad, multidisciplinary literature review; monitoring of promotion, application, = and treaty review of international standards; direct participation in policy processes in all regions; summation of executive experience in international organizations; and assessment of empirical research.
The literature review included a sw= eep of works on migration, human rights, international relations, social protectio= n, international labour and skills mobility, development, and related topics. The normative review covered elaboration, promotion and monitoring of the international legal/framework and specific instruments concerning migration, regarding application of and status of realization of norms and rights. The review included country reporting to, treaty body observations on, and independent monitoring of international conventions and labour standards. The study drew on ongoing monitoring of international institutional and political processes addressing migration, migration governance and treatment of migrants and refugees. It also drew on direct experience in and knowledge gained from participation in international organizations such as = ILO and IOM and in intergovernmental dialogues and consultations, some of which were not accessible to academics or other 'outsiders.' It took into accoun= t design and oversight for large scale multi-country empirical testing on dis= crimination in migrant/migrant-origin worker access to employment in twelve cities in Europe. The resulting article interfaces positions, analysis, findings, pol= icy lines, and recommendations among these different bases utilizing the author= 's approach in compiling distinct as well as overlapping knowledge and perspec= tive to prepare international conference resolutions and rapporteur reports.
Revi=
ew and
analysis
The qualitati=
ve study
drawing also on empirical research was a sequel to four decades of reviewing
and contributing to literature across multiple disciplines as well as
migration-specific papers, briefs, reports and o=
ther
documents. It built on participatory engagement in development, promotion,
reporting and monitoring of international legal standards and policy framew=
orks
combined with direct engagement in regional, national
and local policy development, technical cooperation, and advisory and train=
ing
activities with concerned institutions and organizations in all regions of =
the
world. This long-term combination of research and practice allowed for
developing broad multi- and interdisciplinary knowledge, and analysis and,
deriving from these, comprehensive policy formulations. The current review =
of
literature, evolving policy, and practice refined contextual understanding =
of
international migration, assessment of main challenges for governance and h=
uman
welfare, and for updating law, policy and practi=
ce
lines. Formulated to serve as a briefing for stakeholder-actors in governme=
nt,
civil society and migrant organizations, this article reviews context and drivers of international migration, follow=
ed by
an identification of main law, policy and practice issues with brief
elaboration on several salient concerns. It concludes with a comprehensive
agenda for action addressing main issues identified in both the study review
and practice.
A Co= ntext Review of Key Features of International Migration<= o:p>
Migration, Economic Activity and Developm=
ent
Over 90 percent of migration today –whether for reaso=
ns of
employment, family reunification, immigration, education, or due to refugee
flight—is bound up in employment and economic activity outcomes. ILO calcul=
ated
that 169 million of the 272 million people –including refugees – living out=
side
their countries of birth or origin in 2019 were active migrant workers (ILO,
2021), meaning economically active – employed, self-employed or otherwise
engaged in remunerative activity. Economically active/employed migrant work=
ers
in 2019 were 70.1 percent of
all working age international migrants (ILO, 2021).
Nearly all the total migrant stock population of 15+ =
age
(245 million in 2019) would be migr=
ant
workers by international convention definition: “intending to be engage=
d,
engaged or having been engaged in remunerative activity”, including
self-employment
In 2020 an estimated 281 million foreign-born people
resided in countries other than where they were born (UNDESA, 2020a).[2] 73 per cent of international migrants
worldwide were between the ages of 20 and 64 years compared to 57 percent f=
or
the total world population (UNDESA, 2020a).
International migrants comprised 14 percent of the
population in 2019 across all high-income countries; that proportion was
significantly higher in several countries in Europe, North America, and Oce=
ania
(UNDESA, 2019).
Foreign-born people comprise large portions of popula=
tions
across ‘Western’ industrialized countries (see Table 1).
Table 1
Foreign-born as a share of population in some
OECD countries, %, 2019
|
Switzerland |
29.7 |
Ireland |
17.8 |
|
Australia |
29.1 |
Belgium |
17.2 |
|
New Zealand |
26.8 |
Germany |
16.1 |
|
Israel |
21.2 |
Norway |
15.6 |
|
Canada |
21.0 |
Estonia |
14.9 |
|
Sweden |
19.5 |
United Kingdom |
14.0 |
|
Austria |
19.3 |
Spain |
14.0 |
|
Iceland |
18.1 |
United States |
13.6 |
Source: OECD, 2019a.
Migrants are also growing portions of populations in
countries across Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, Eurasia, and
the Middle East.
The UN migrant estimate accounts for refugees and
asylum/seekers who comprise 10.9 percent of the global international migrant
population: 20.7 million refugees, 5.7 million Palestinians registered by U=
NRWA
(UN Relief and Works Agency), and 4.1 million asylum seekers at the end of =
2020
(UNHCR, 2021). UNHCR also estimated that there may be 10 million Stateless
People worldwide.
However, the global migrant stock figures above are
under-counts; many other foreign
persons in temporary, short-term, or seasonal employment and/or residence
situations are not counted in the UN statistics on international migrants when their sojourn is less than a year
and/or if they retain residency in their home or another country. Commercia=
l or
transportation workers who have not changed their place of established
residence and itinerant commercial traders, hundreds of thousands of whom
retain residence in one country but circulate much of the time across numer=
ous
countries in regions such as Eastern, Southern and Western Africa are not f=
ormally
counted as international migrants. However, many of these mobile workers fit
the definition of international mig=
rant
worker, as do itinerant, offshore, posted and cross-border “frontalier”
workers, so are concerned by this discussion.
Migration occurs as populations age and workforces de=
cline
and even as unemployment remains high in some immigration countries. The gl=
obal
dichotomy is threefold: a significant proportion of unemployment is
structurally inherent to jobless growth approaches by finance and industrial
capital –North and South. Secondly, technological evolution results in many
workers left with obsolete skills or simply without skills relevant to toda=
y's
employer needs. Thirdly, education and training lag beh=
ind
evolving economic and labour market needs, both=
in
numbers and in content of training; often training and education do not add=
ress
‘youth bulges’ in population.
Development is often simplistically equated with grow=
th of
GDP –increased economic growth measured by domestic production of goods and
services. However, a more adequate definition of development is:
the elaboration of productive means, for=
ces,
capacities, organization and output that provide
goods, services, technology and knowledge to meet human needs for sustenance
and well being.
Development comprises building the material and technological means =
for:
extraction and transformation of resources; production of goods, services and knowledge; constructing infrastructure for
extraction, production, transportation and distribution; reproducing capital
and labour and skills; and providing for human
welfare/well-being in terms of housing, nutrition, healthcare, social
protection, education, and culture in its broad sense (Taran, 201=
1, p.1).
Viable economic activity and thus development require bringing together capital, labour power, skills, resources, and technology. Economies are not sustainable and will not be sustained in developed or developing countries without the labour and skills to conduct economic activity and provi= de for human welfare. The viability of developed economies today depends on migrat= ion, even more so their future.
Human Mobility for Regional Integration a=
nd
Development
Development requires bringing together and integrating
material and human resources, capital, technological capacities, and doing =
so
in larger market spaces across groups of states that combined can obtain the
diversity of resources, scale of production, and market size necessary for
viable economies in a highly competitive globalized world.
Free movement with rights to residence and establishment of employment or entrepreneurial activity is the means to ensure availability of skills and = labour where needed to spur investment and economic development. Free movement is essential to mobilize the breadth and diversi= ty of professional and technical competencies as well as = labour power across groupings of countries in RECs, sometimes referred to as common markets. It likewise provides for expanding free trade and commerce throughout those regional spaces, spurring production and distribution of locally-produced = goods and services as well as increasing local employment.
Eleven regional integration processes involving in total more than 100 countries h= ave operational free movement regimes for at least some community member nation= als:
· Pact= o Andino – the Andean Pact (South A= merica)
· CARICOM – the Caribbean Community
· =
CEMAC – Commu=
nauté
économique et monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale
· COMESA – Common Market of Eastern and Southern Africa
· EAC – East Africa Communi= ty
· ECCAS – Economic Communit= y of Central African States
· ECOWAS – Economic Communi= ty of West African States
· EAEU – Eurasian Economic = Union
· EU – European Union
· GCC – Gulf Cooperation Co= uncil
Additionally, IGAD –Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (Horn of Africa area) is finalizing a free movement Protocol while SADC –Southern African Development Community, has drafted a regime for flexible movement.
Commonly used terms to characterize migration, such as
–South-North and South-South– do not accurately convey the reality that nea=
rly
half or more of all international migrants reside in the region from which =
they
originated; notably 70 per cent of migrants born in Europe reside in another
European country and 63 per cent of m migrants originating in sub-Saharan Africa remai=
n in
that region (UNDESA, 2020a). In Africa, Europe, and Eurasia the larger part=
of
migration is within the RECs with formal regimes of free circulation=
of
persons. For example, more than 80 per cent of
migration originating in West Africa goes to other member countries of ECOW=
AS;
the proportion is similar in the Eurasia Economic Union. It is 45 to 50 per
cent for the East Africa Community, the European
Union, and Mercosur.
Economic Importance of Migration
Recent figures indic= ate that the annual flow of remittances to low-and middle-income countries was 540 billion US dollars in 2020 –a drop of only 1.6 pe= r cent from 2019, despite predictions last year of a much h= igher decline due to the COVID-19 pandemic (Ratha et = al, 2021). Preliminary indications suggest that total remittances to low- and middle-income countries in 2021 increased by 7 percent over 2020, making them modestly higher than in pre-COVID 2019. However, the true volume of remittances, including unrecorded flows through both formal and informal channels, is believed to be significantly larger than recorded figures.
In comparison, the reported figure of pers=
onal
remittances to low- and middle- income countries in 2020 was more than three times larger than total of=
ficial
development assistance (ODA) by OECD member countries of the Development
Assistance Committee (DAC) that amounted to USD 161.2 billion, an amount
Often missed in the 'migration-development'
narrative is the huge value of personal remittances sent to developed
countries. Total global remittances including to
developed countries were 706 billion US dollars in 2020, indicating that
remittances to high-income countries totalled 1=
57
billion, nearly a quarter of the total (Ratha, =
Ju
Kim, Plaza, Seshan et al, 2021).
Overall, the 27 member countries of the Eu= ropean Union received 109.9 billion euros equivalent in 2020 in personal remittanc= es, while 110.7 billion euros were remitted from EU member countries, 58.1 bill= ion euros of which to other EU countries, a figure greater than the 52.6 billion remitted outside the EU including to other non-EU European countries (Euros= tat, 2021). Note that total intra-European personal remittances significantly ex= ceed extra-EU remittances. For reference, in 2020, France received 22 billion eu= ros, Germany 15.7 billion and Italy 8.5 billion in total personal remittances, according to Eurostat data (2021).[3]
Despite pessimistic predictions during ear= ly months of the pandemic in 2020, personal remittances from EU countries to t= hird countries in 2020 declined only by 3.5 percent from 2019, while inflows from third countries declined by 4.1 percent (Eurostat, 2021). 2021 data was not available at time of publication. Personal remittance outflows from EU countries to other EU countries in fact declined more in 2020 over 2019, by= 15 percent. (Eurostat, 2021) Nonetheless, total remittance inflows to EU count= ries from other EU countries and from third countries were a= ctually slightly higher in 2020 than in 2018, albeit by a modest 1.3 percent (Eurostat, 2021).
Remittances, however important, are an indirect indicator of the far larger economic val= ue generated by the labour and economic activity of migrants/immigrants in their countries of employment. That total value may = be 4.7 trillion dollars worth globally in 2020, wh= en worldwide remittance flows were estimated to have exceeded $704 billion (ju= st 2.4 per cent less than in pre-COVID 2019), extrapolating from an IFAD calculation. The UN Secretary-General’s 2018 report on Making Migration Work for All highlighted an estimate by the UN International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) that “Migrant workers typically send home about 15 percent of their earnings as remittances. The remaining 85 percent [...] stays in host countries, and is mostly spent on housing, food, transportation, taxes and other necessities.” (United Nations, 2018; IFAD, 2017).
That figure does not indicate the value added by migrants’ = labour not returned to workers in remuneration or benefits but that adds to the wo= rth of employers, private and public, in formal and informal sectors.
In Europe, using a similar calculation, remittance figures for 2020 suggest the far larger overall value of migrant skills and labour<= /span> to the EU and its member countries' economies, could be 738 billion euros t= hat year, when EU member country remittance outflows were 110.7 billion euros, = 52 percent of which went to other EU countries.
Furthermore, migrants contribute to the health of national social security systems, in s= ome cases without ever obtaining benefits or use of their contributions. The acknowledged subsidy that undocumen= ted migrant workers provide to the US Social Security system was estimated to be near 50 billion dollars over a recent five-year period: this subsidy compri= ses the contributions by undocumented migrant workers that they will never be a= ble to collect or benefit from.
Remaining un-measured is the value of training and social reproduction cost transfers made by migrants moving usually from less to more developed countries. In aggregate terms, that represents a s= ort of foreign aid primarily from Sout= h to North. Assuming that each migrant with tertiary education represents $40,000 in cost of usually State-financed higher educa= tion, migration of 100,000 skilled workers represents an aggregate transfer of tertiary educational investment equivalent to 4 billion US dollars. This fi= gure is indicative, no research on costings and aggregate values has been widely done.
Greater Mobility Anticipated
Over the next decade, most of the world's countries and populations will face significant work-force decline. The German labour market will lack up to 6 million people in 2040 compared to 2018; even with relatively high immigration, the decline amounts to 4.5 million persons in the workforce (9 percent) by 2024 (Schatten= berg and Bräuninger, 2019). The number of working-age Poles will fall by 28% between 2015 and 2050, the overall population will decline by 10 percent but half of Poland’s popul= ation will be aged 50 or more by mid-century (Fleming, 2019). The Japanese labour force will shrink by 20 per cent in 2040 from = what it was in 2017, a projected workforce reduction of more than 12 million per= sons (ibid). China's workforce declined= by 40 million in the decade 2000 to 2010 and is currently projected to decline by another 35 million in just the next five years (Teng, 2021). Smaller countries are proportionately similarly affected. The Swiss national employers’ orga= nisation recently estimated that Switzerland may need 700,000 additional workers by = 2030 (Swissinfo, 2020).
More than 100 of 224 countries and political territor=
ies
are at or well below zero population
growth fertility rates[4],
according to data in multiple world population projections including the UN=
World Fertility and Family Planning 20=
20 report (UNDESA, 2020b) and the 2021 CIA =
World Factbook. Examples of countries at or below replacement rate fertility, by reg=
ion
are presented in Table 2.
=
Table 2
Countries curren=
tly at
or below fertility rate of population replacement, by region
|
Africa=
|
Djibouti, Libya,
Mauritius, Seychelles, Tunisia, South Africa.
|
|
Asia |
Bangladesh, Bhutan,
Brunei, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Malaysia, South and North Korea,
Malaysia, Mongolia, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, Thailand, Vietnam. |
|
Americas |
Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico<=
/span>,
Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, USA, nearly all Caribbean
countries. |
|
Europe |
All 27 EU member
countries; Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, Serbia,
United Kingdom. |
|
Eurasia |
Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Russian Federation, Ukraine, Uzbekistan |
|
Middle East |
Bahrain, Iran, Lebano=
n,
Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates (UAE) |
Table
by author
Over the next years, if not already, all these countries face increasing departu= res from their native workforces while new entrants of young people born in the country decline. In effect, all these countries need immigration as a key measure to retain viable workforces, despite political discourse to the contrary. In reality, this means intensifying international competition for a most crucial economic resource: people with skills at all levels. The consequence for many countries is an increasing d= rain of skilled and educated human resources. It also means crises for contributory-based social security systems = when declining work-force numbers face increasing numbers of retired workers.
Unmet demand for workers at all skills levels has surged in many industrial count= ries in the second year of the corona-virus pandemic, portending increased international migration. Meanwhile, particularly in Africa, the absence of = jobs and decent work remains in countries with growing youth populations. Job creation has been consistently flat while youthful populations are adding millions of new workers each year to labour mar= kets in which new jobs created only at best matched numbers of jobs lost.
The Governance Framework
There is indeed a comprehensive international legal framework for governance of migration despite academic literature and political discourse to the contra= ry. It is essentially designed to support good governance, regulation, and effective administration at national and local levels, where most migration issues and responsibilities are concentrated. The international governance framework comprises mandates and responsibilities in a range of international and regional agen= cies and organizations. The framework includes globally applicable policy recommendations elaborated in formal, authoritative international conferences over the last three decades.=
The legal framework is provided by complementary legal standards in several are= as of international law: 1) the nine main Human Rights Conventions; 2) all up-= to-date International Labour Standards; 3) the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol on the Status of Refugees, 4) the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations; and 5) the two Protocols on trafficking in persons and smuggling of migrants to the Convention against transnational organized crime.
Three complementary, sequential international conventions on migration and migrant workers provide the core foundation for rights based, regulatory and cooperative governance of migratio= n: ILO Convention 97 on Migration for Employment (1949), ILO Convention 143 on mig= rant workers (Supplementary Provisions) of 1975, and the 1990 International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Membe= rs of Their Families (ICRMW).[5] These three instrum= ents contain a comprehensive set of legal norms for governance and administratio= n of migration, for international dialogue and cooperation, and for recognition = and protection of universal human rights including labour<= /span> rights that apply to all migrant workers and members of their families, and= in effect to all migrants.
Protection of rights of all migrants cannot be realized nor enforced without recogniti= on in national law and practice. Ratification of these instruments and incorporation of their provisi= ons in national legislation is the necessary foundation for national and local governance and regulation of migration under the rule of law. In reality, 93 States (nearly half of the UN membershi= p) have ratified at least one of these three instruments; 15 Council of Europe participating States, 32 African Union Member States and nearly all States = in Central and South America have ratified one or more of these three conventions. Counting in the addit= ional signatories of the ICRMW that have not ratified any of these Conventions, 1= 05 countries worldwide are legally committed to uphold legal standards governi= ng migration and protecting rights of migrants.
The international institutional structure mirrors the multitude of concerns in governing large populations, whether within a particular state or spread ac= ross many. A number= of specialized UN and other international institutions address relevant aspect= s of migration in their mandates, competencies and activity. These include the international agencies addressing labour and employment, health, secur= ity, development, education, human rights, criminal justice, etc. No single agency could possibly address= with necessary competence the range of concerns of governing populations, each r= equiring specialized knowledge, law, technical approaches, and functions, in the same way that no national government could do away with distinct ministries – of= ten 20 or more– covering specific areas of governance to instead function with a sole super-ministry.
Global policy frameworks: Sustainable
Development and New Urban Agendas
The Declaration and Programme of Action of the International Conference on Population and Development at Cairo in 1994[6] was the first global development policy framework to emphasize the role of migration and its con= tributions to development. The UN 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development with its Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) adopted in 2015 and the New Urban Agen= da adopted in Quito in October 2016 are the main contemporary policy framework= s.
The
2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development covers
most topics and issues concerning development and human welfare and is rele=
vant
at local, national, regional and global levels.<=
span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'> While explicit reference to migration i=
s made
in Sustainable Development Targets 8.8 and 10.7,
more than 44 SDG Targets across the 17 SDGs apply to migrants, refugees,
migration and/or migration-compelling situations (GMPA,
2017).
The Sustainable Development Agenda Targets relevant to
migrants, refugees and migration include: social protection; empower and
promote the social, economic and political inclusion of all; universal heal=
th
protection; retention of health workforce in developing countries; equal ac=
cess
for women and men to affordable and quality technical, vocational and terti=
ary
education; substantially reduce the proportion of youth not in employment,
education or training; development that supports productive activities, dec=
ent
job creation, entrepreneurship, creativity and innovation; valuing unpaid care and domestic work; prohibition and elimination of the worst
forms of child labour, eradicate forced labour; protect labour ri=
ghts and
promote safe and secure working environments for all workers, including mig=
rant
workers; orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of
people; inclusive and sustainable urbanization; climate change-related planning and management; achieving a
land-degradation-neutral world; and others.
The New Urban Agenda -NUA (2016) gives explicit attention to people-cent= ered migration and development linkages. It constitutes the guidance framework f= or cities and urban settlements worldwide –where most migrants and refugees reside. The NUA commits “to strengthening synergies between international migration and development= at the global, regional, national, subnational and local levels.” (New Urban Agenda, 2016, art 3). It calls for all cities to adopt law, policy and prac= tice “promoting, as appropriate, full and productive employment, decent work for= all and livelihood opportunities in cities and human settlements, with special attention to the needs and potential of women, youth, persons with disabilities, indigenous peoples and local communities, refugees, and internally displaced persons and migrants, particularly the poorest and tho= se in vulnerable situations, and to promote non-discriminatory access to legal income-earning opportunities” (article 7).
Main Law, Policy and
Practical Challenges
Increasing systemic and structural need for mobility of people with skills and work capacities underlies 20 key law, policy and practical challenges for development and welfare and thus for governance worldwide (see Table 3). These challenges = have been consistently signalled in international conferences, parliamentary consultations, specialist meetings and civil soc= iety events over the last ten years. These all concern migration, espe= cially migrant workers, also in many situations’ refugees, asylum seekers, statele= ss persons and mobile cross-border workers. Beyond the first point, the order below implies no order of hierarch= y or sequence; they are all essential and inter-related concerns overall, particularly for migrants and refugees as w= ell as international, regional, national, and local entities directly concerned= .
Brief reflections on some of these follows, several are elaborated in other artic= les in this special issue on international migration.
=
Table 3
20 key law, policy and
practical challenges for governance of migration 1=
. Lack of legal protection and
non-recognition of human rights including labour
rights of migrants under law. 2=
. Utilitarian instrumentalization of
migrants and migration subordinating human rights. 3=
. Xenophobic hostility and violence=
against
migrants worldwide. 4=
. Prevalence of sub-standard, abusi=
ve
employment relations and conditions of work for migrants, in context of
deregulation with diminishing application of labour<=
/span>
and occupational safety and health (OSH) standards. 5=
. Systematic/structural discriminat=
ion and
exploitation of migrant women. 6=
. Lack of healthcare and workplace =
health
protection for migrants and refugees; denial of their health rights. 7=
. Absence of access to and non-port=
ability
of social protection/social security for many migrants. 8=
. Social exclusion and absence of
participation of migrants and refugees in associations and unions. 9. Migrant and refugee family separa=
tion and
family decomposition coupled with social disruption for separated family
members –particularly children—remaining 'at home' in places of origin. <=
o:p> 10. =
Growing gaps between skills needs=
and the
numbers and types formed worldwide. 1=
1. =
Barriers and restrictions for mig=
rant and
diaspora entrepreneurs and for migrant SMEs 12. =
Increasingly restrictive policies=
and
attitudes towards migrants and refugees, threatening current and future
economic viability of countries. 13. =
Instrumental=
isation
of development aid to extend migration control and repression. 14. =
Non-implementation of agreed free
circulation regimes and increasing restrictions on free circulation were
existent. 15. =
Concentration of migration management in security and policing institutions,
contrasted with absence of policy and administrative responsibility by
employment, labour, and social protection
institutions. 16. =
Criminalization of migrants, asso=
ciation
of migrants with criminality, particularly by emphasis on (counter)
trafficking and smuggling of migrants and refugees. 17. =
Criminalization of solidarity with
migrants, repression of migrants’ rights defenders 18. =
Obtaining comprehensive, rights-b=
ased
national policy frameworks on migration consistent with human rights
conventions, labour standards, and the 2030
Sustainable Development Agenda. 19. =
Implementation of city/urban poli=
cy and
practice welcoming migrants and
refugees in line with the New Urban Agenda. 20. =
The dearth of accurate and reliab=
le data,
analysis and knowledge about migration and development. Table
by author Abusive Exploitation versus Protection Abusively
exploitative conditions are experienced by many migrants. They are structur=
ally
driven. An excerpt from the executive summary o=
f a
report on the UK sums up treatment today of many migrants in other
industrialized countries as well (Cook, 2011, p.4): “Migrants, especially those from outside the EU-15 wh=
o have
limited access to social security provisions, face the paradoxical position=
of
being welcomed by businesses and the state due to their high flexibility and
minimal utilisation of the welfare state on the=
one
hand, whilst facing increasing unease and hostility from anti-immigrant gro=
ups,
the same state that welcomes them, and large numbers of the general
public on the other. The highly unregulated and flexible economy has allow=
ed
many migrants to easily find work and businesses to remain competitive whil=
st
simultaneously creating the conditions for widespread exploitation and
producing divisions amongst workers, both between (native) born/migrant and
between different groupings of labour migrants.=
” Global
competition, free trade, and the economic race
to the bottom push against costs of labour =
and
provision of social services; they challenge the very social function of St=
ates
(Taran, 2015). For
many enterprises in many countries and for some entire economic sectors,
low-cost foreign labour is the only ticket to
survival. Lab=
our
dependent agriculture would not be viable in many countries in Africa, the
Americas nor in Europe nor could a part of the population afford to eat wit=
hout
cheap immigrant labour. Health, homecare and
schooling for children and care for populations of aging people today depen=
d on
migrants in many countries in all regions. So are hotel, restaurant, and
tourist sectors prior to the COVID pandemic, and those sectors will be depe=
ndent
on migrant workers for recovery and beyond. Keeping
migrant workers cheap, docile, flexible, and removable without social costs=
is
imperative to keep jobs at home and maintain the viability of entire
economies. Despite rhetoric about
controlling migration, migrant workers falling into or remaining in irregul=
ar
situations are often selectively tolerated because they provide the cheap,
flexible labour needed to sustain enterprises a=
nd in
doing so, retain employment and competitiveness. At the same time, =
labour
standards are generally little or not at all applied in migrant-dependent
sectors and industries, while labour inspection=
is
often left with no capacity or competence to reach workplaces where migrant
workers are prevalent. Protection
of human rights and of decent work is an essential pillar of good governanc=
e to
international labour mobility, especially the
application of international labour standards a=
nd
their application and enforcement in all workplaces formal or informal,
particularly where migrants are employed. Contention and convergences between Econo=
mic
Actors Migration
is a key terrain of contention between capital and lab=
our:
between the employers/private sector versus workers/especially organized
unions. It is where the division of
wealth is fought out-- how much of what is generated is returned to capital
versus how much goes to working people as remuneration. Migrants are also the pawns in contenti=
on
over conditions of work and investment in safety and health protections ver=
sus
lowering labour and related costs to obtain hig=
her
returns on capital. Capital, managed t=
oday
mostly by private sector employers and labour represented by worker trade unions, are incontest=
ably
the core actors of economic activity, the key actors to advancing regional
integration in fundamental economic and social dimensions. Capital
–embodied in private and public sector enterprise-- and labour
in its aggregate are primary beneficiaries of liberalizing international
circulation of capital, goods, services, technology
and labour. They most immediately suffer the lo=
sses
engendered by restrictions on circulation –whether of capital, goods or people. Migration,
however, also raises challenges to the extent working people remain organiz=
ed
to defend their interests. Migrant workers are key to whether workers freely
associate and organize to collectively bargain for fair remuneration and de=
cent
work conditions; freedom of association of migrants or restrictions on it c=
an
make or break unionization. The Danger of Xenophobia An
especially urgent concern is the generalized rise of discriminatory practic=
es
and of cist and xenophobic behaviour against mi=
grants.
Events in countries in all regions show that hostility towards migrants is
rising—worldwide. Reported incidents in all regions include shootings of
migrant workers at or near workplaces; individual or mob attacks on and
killings of migrants; firebombing of migrant and refugee residences,
businesses, and religious places. In situations of civil conflict, foreigne=
rs
have been targeted with deadly hostility. The
concern is aggravated by the absence of vigorous responses by governments to
anticipate, discourage, and prevent manifestations of xenophobic hostility
against foreigners and to prosecute perpetrators. To the contrary,
anti-foreigner hostility is aggravated by discourse by certain political
leaders and by actions of some governments that tacitly encourage or direct=
ly
engage in public brutality and violent repression against migrants. That includes police roundups and mass
detention of migrants. A common re=
frain
of “dignified deportation” and “return” as the solution to the (irregular)
migration problem frighteningly resonates with deportation as the solution to Europe’s “Jewish problem” in the
last century. Social
cohesion can only be maintained by deliberate legal, institutional, and
practical measures. Demonstrable proof is that in the few countries such as
Ireland and Finland where discrimination and xenophobia were vigorously
discouraged by government and civil society, there have been few racist
killings of migrants nor burnings of businesses, homes<=
/span>
or places of worship of foreigners while anti-immigrant politicians and
political parties have gained little support or sympathy. Gender Specificity The
feminization of migration is not about the gender proportions of migration.
Female participation has been above 45% for decades and is over 48% today
(UNDESA, 2020a).
In a global context of stratification of employment and segmentation of labour markets, women migrants hold particular appeal for employers as they are sought after for 'women's work' tha= t, not coincidentally, is usually low paid and unprotected: domestic work, healthcare, agriculture, hotel and restaurant, semi-skilled manufacturing in export processing zones. Common ac= ross these sectors is that while some workplaces may be highly socialized, they = are not organized, meaning no unions or associations for mutual defence and solidarity, nor any bargaining power to press for decent work condition= s.
Women and girl migrants are at high risk of sexual and gender-based abuse, exploitation and violence to a greater or lesser degre= e in all countries of residence and employment. Adoption of ILO Convention 189 on Decent Work for Domestic Workers brought attention to a sector of activity that is almost entirely comprised= of women workers, while the most recent ILO Convention 190 on harassment at wo= rk is especially pertinent to the high risk and often unreported rates of harassment and abuse faced by women migrants. Promotion of ratification of these conventions should be springboards to highlight and address the generalized lack of effective protection faced by women migrant workers in agriculture, in textile sweatshops, in services, and elsewhere as well as in domestic work in industrialized countries across the global North as well a= s in the South. Testimony abounds of wo= men working in these sectors subject to abusive working conditions, sexual harassment, unprotected exposure to dangerous pesticides or chemicals, and other risks.
Social Protection
Effective social security systems provide income secu=
rity, prevent and reduce poverty and inequality, and promote
social inclusion and dignity. Soci=
al
security enhances productivity and employability and supports sustainable
economic development, contributing to decent living conditions for all and
making extension of social security coverage for migrants vital to workers,=
the
economy and society.
Although migrant workers contribute to the economies of both destination and origin countries, they are not usually taken into account in national social security schemes. Migrants often lose entitlement to social security benefits in their country of origin due to absence. They face restrictive conditions or non-access to social security in the country of employment. Even when they can contribute in host countries, their contributions and benefits often are not portable to origin countries.
Migrants and migration are today key terrain for global contention over social protection: who is responsible for it, who is covered and with what benefits. The intent in internatio= nal law is universal coverage, as laid out in ILO Convention 102 on social security. The ILO and UN have established the notion of a social protection floor as a universal expectation. But asserti= ons abound that social protection for migrants is today a question of finding a median between two “extremes,” one being full coverage, the other none at all.
In contrast, progressively extending social security to migrant workers is imperative to ensure welfare and social cohesion in every country and across regions. However, it can only be achieved with political will to obtain necessary legislative acts, administrative mechanisms, and practical measures.
Family welfare
Many migration regimes other than long term or permanent immigration, essentially require family separation, only calling for and admitting workers –whatever= skills levels-- alone, without family, at least initially.
In
situations of civil warfare, men heads of family may leave first to find
In both cases, the absence of breadwinner and family adults and role models of= ten has devastating consequences for the socialization and education of childre= n, left in care of less able grandparents or otherwise overwhelmed relatives. Little or no compensatory social and schooling support is available in most countries experiencing large emigration, that correlates with higher rates = of school leaving, delinquency and psycho-social pathology among children with= one or both parents abroad.
Skills and Training Constraints
No country today can form or train the entire range and number of evolving ski= lls needed to perform the ever more complex work done on its territory. It is widely observed that institutions and educational systems in many countries= are producing graduates with inappropriate, inadequate, or obsolete skills and knowledge. In consequence, fast changing technology and skills needs drive a constantly increasing, international mobility of skills, competences, and <= span class=3DSpellE>labour at all skill levels. Globally, Manpower predicts that “the global talent shortage is expe= cted to result in 85 million unfilled roles by 2030”, citing its own research (Manpower Group, 2021).
At the same time, educational, vocational, and technical training systems are = not accessible to many youths seeking employable skills and qualifications. The development cost is huge, skills are absent where they are needed to spur investment and support economic and infrastructure development. Impedi= ments to mobility and absence of recognition of skills and experience compound the lack of training for current and future needs.
The Global COVID-19 Pandemic and Migration
The global situation has changed radically since March 2020. The global COVID-19 pandemic, its human= consequences, generalized recession in 2020, and often ill-considered anti-coronavirus measures changed migration patterns –but did not reduce economic and development dependency on migration of skills and labo= ur. While globalized travel bans, ‘stay in = place’ confinement and work stoppage under the COVID-19 pandemic emergency meant t= hat migrant workers everywhere were temporarily out of work –and some remain so= -- renewed demand for foreign skills and labour has surged since mid 2021. While a severe decline in remittances to developing countries was predicted for 2020 as national economies abruptly contracted and jobs disappeared, in the end the actual decline was only about 1.6 per cent vis-a-vis 2019 (Ratha et al, 2021). = Foreign workers appear to be needed now as much as ever in industries, services and health care. Nonetheless, increasing restrictions on immigration combined with difficult economic and employment situations in some primarily migrant worker-origin countries make for a “buyer’s market” with some labour demand-side countries proposing de-regulatory terms, while origin countries face econom= ic and social pressures to offer workers for jobs abroad at any price –whatever the human costs. (See article on CO= VID-19 and migrants and refugees in this issue as well as a previous research article in Spanish La Pandemia de Covid y Los Migrantes: = una Agenda de Diez Puntos Para Mitigar el Desastre en Curso (Taran and Solorzano, 2021)).
Restructuring Governance: Redefining a New
Regime for Labour?
The governance structure for migration –as well as ideology and practice of governing migration – has changed in both old and new immigration countries. The locus of migration regulation in immigration/migrant-receiving States o= ver previous decades was generally in labour and employment ministries. That reflected the primacy of needs to protect both migrant and national workers as well as oversee employment relations and so= cial dialogue. Those ministries retaine= d key competences in labour market administration, in= supporting and mediating negotiation between social partners, and in taking account of interests of the key migration actors: employers –public and private –and worker unions –the latter often inclusive of migrant workers. Those ministries supervise vital regula= tory and administrative functions of labour inspecti= on and social security.
Today, security and control institutions of States predominate in managing migrati= on and controlling migrants: ministries of interior or home affairs now hold l= ead responsibilities on migration in many countries. Assertion by home affairs/interior ministries of hegemony on migration management and control= is concurrent with broad redefinition and deregulation of conditions for labour. The treatment imposed on what are growing mig= rant components of workforces in turn influences treatment of the workforce broa= dly.
Administration
of increasing foreign components of work forces by control institutions has
consequences in shifting emphasis of law enforcement regarding work from
In parallel, enhanced border and movement control measures within regional economic community spaces in Africa, the Americas and Eurasia have large implications in impeding and slowing mobility as well as raising costs, contrary to facilitating free movement of labour, skills and services. The longstanding existence of control posts by multiple police, arme= d forces and intelligence entities as well as customs and immigration agencies along land routes in each country across much of Afric= a, each post with obligatory inspections of buses, trucks, and cars and paymen= t of 'fees' by passengers and drivers, continues to restrict and slow down, rath= er than facilitate circulation of people as well as goods and services. In Europe, the increasing surveillance = of some internal borders and incidents of muscled expulsions of migrants across borders from one EU member country to another are, unfortunately, consistent with global trends.
Movement control measures also undermine exercise of freedom of association rights in internationalized labour markets and employer s= upply chains. Tightened control on movement facilitates tightened control on work= ers and work forces, restricting realization of rights to change employers or workplaces to escape exploitative, oppressive conditions. Tightened control= and restricted mobility also impede union organizing across sectors and industr= ies as well as in production chains that themselves are increasingly organized across borders.
Meanwhile, advocates of expanded 'circular migration' (a misnomer for short term, temporary, and seasonal migration regimes) characterize it as the solution = to both employment needs and to protecting 'national cohesion and cultural integrity' of nation states needing foreign labour. Many temporary migration regimes impose explicitly restricted labour rights, notably exclusion of freedom of associ= ation, while permitting reduced application of labour standards.
Of immediate and direct concern to application of human rights for all is the enactment of the 'delit de solidarite' (the “offence of solidarity”), that criminalizes provision of assistance and support –includ= ing provisions food, housing or transportation– to migrants in unauthorized, irregular, or undocumented situations, and also rescue of migrants at sea; such laws mandate prosecution of individuals and organizations for engaging in acts of humanitarian assistance.
Coincidentally to these trends is consolidation of the IOM as the hegemonic global agency = on migration and its inaccurate identification as the UN migration agency when it remains a related organization to the United Nations, the same status as = that of the World Trade Organization - WTO. The formal IOM-UN Agreement explicitly states that the IOM “shall function as an independent, autonomous and non-normative international organization in the working relationship with t= he United Nations...” (United Nations, 2016, Article 2, para 3).= As such, it is not subject to the UN Charter nor to compliance= with United Nations normative conventions. Reporting to the UN by the related ag= ency is discretionary: the IOM “may, if it decides it to be appropriate, submit reports on its activities to the General Assembly through the Secretary-General” (Ibid, Article 4).
A discourse justifying these initiatives posits that the level of rights protections for migrants is negotiable. The terminology of rights ve= rsus numbers and the price of rights= is used to show the advantages of trade-offs where wider access by migrant workers to higher wage labour markets would be obtained by accepting reductions in application of lab= our rights. The long-disproved argumen= t that lowering wages instigates creation of more jobs is not infrequently invoked= .
A fundamental premise in this discourse –and in policy initiatives-- is that foreigners are not equal, nor are they equally entitled to protection or inclusion under law or ideology of the nation State. In practical terms, the notion of limit= ing rights of migrants presumes incentivizing greater migrant access to labour markets in higher income countries, and consequently, greater “development gains” through purportedly more jobs cre= ated if at lower wages and consequently, more remittances returned to migrant or= igin countries.
Consistent with the above is international regime change from a global framework of normative regulation, binding legal obligations and the accountability of formal public reporting on compliance, to a discursive process of meetings = and review of good practices taken up by States to implement non-binding commitments to general policy options and practice recommendations. The Glo= bal Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) (UNGA, 2018) adopted = at an intergovernmental conference in 2018 does not enhance the normative rights-based approach to governance and regulation of migration. While providing assertively comprehensive guidance on all aspects of migration, it diverges from upholding binding standards of human rights protection and the legal accountability of States under international law by establishing a non-binding set of policy recommendations, many of which articulate lower a= nd more narrower expectations than those in existing human rights Conventions = and International Labour Standards.
Furthermore, as a pact of guidelines explicitly addressed to executive migration management, the Compact undermines= the participation in formal governance by the legislative branch of government = and dismisses the review and supervisory role of the judiciary; indeed, by omis= sion it relegates these to sidelines while posing migration as primarily a matter for the executive branch of government, with the latter’s arbitrary discret= ion unfettered by legislative definition and judicial review.
The GCM also incorporates for the first time in a UN policy framework, language and policy notions of repressive control of mobility. It commends measures that effectively criminalize irregular migra= tion as well as migrants in irregular situations and, in contrast, legitimize deportation and involuntary return and reintegration as seemingly UN-consen= ted approaches. The GCM calls on States to strengthen surveillance and control = over national borders, objectively constraining universal rights to leave and re= turn freely to one's own country and undermining free movement essential for development across regional communities in Africa, the Americas and elsewhe= re.
In
Conclusion: an imperative Agenda for Action
As the context for and features of migra=
tion
summarized above show, internationalized mobility/migration of people is
essential to sustaining economies and maintaining development worldwide, an=
d in
doing so providing for human well-fare everywhere. That mobility of people, notably labour at=
all
skills levels, is as essential to our common future as is mobility of
resources, capital, goods, services, knowledge, and technology. However, as emphasized above, migration=
is
people who have economic, labour, social, cultu=
ral, civil and political rights that must be respected, pro=
tected
and realized for all people in all situations. To accomplish this requires
effective rights-based, participative governance and regulation under the r=
ule
of law at all levels.
All of= the concerns evoked in this brief must = be addressed to ensure effective and just governance of migration that realizes human rights, equality and basic well-fare for all concerned, ‘locals’ and migrants and refugees alike= . No concern can be left unaddressed if no-one is to be left behind. Only the comprehensive agenda outlined below at regional, national, and local levels will resolve the immense challenges of sustaining development and maintaini= ng inclusive societies in the context of globalization. Enactment and implementation of all the elements in the agenda is essential; they are interrelated and interdepen= dent.
The following agenda comprises legislative action, policy line=
s and
practical measures for rights-based, economically sustainable, and socially
responsible governance of migration. It combines and synthesizes the princi=
ples
of international Conventions, global policy frameworks, and recommendations
from international, tripartite, and civil society conferences around the wo=
rld
over the last 30 years. A fundamental challenge is mobilizing the political w=
ill
and popular support to implement this agenda to realize inclusive communiti=
es,
sustainable economies, universal respect for human rights, and well-being f=
or
all.
1.
a) &n= bsp; Promote ratification and implementation = of the international legal standards recognizing and protecting rights of all migrants: the ICRMW, ILO C-97, ILO C-143 and ILO C-189.
b)&n=
bsp;
Ena=
ct and
assist in regularization of migrants and refugees in unauthorized situation=
s.
2.
a) Identify migrants as people and rights-h=
olders
first and foremost.
b) Call for respect for rights and dignity =
of and
solidarity with all migrants and refugees.
c) Advocate for inclusion of, participation=
by, and
integration with migrant and refugee persons and their communities.
3. Decent Work for all migrants: Vigorous
enforcement of labour standards
a)&n=
bsp;
Ado=
pt, apply and enforce International L=
abour
Standards, particularly in places and conditions where migrants are working=
.
b)&n=
bsp;
Ext=
end labour inspection in sectors and workplaces where mig=
rants
are working.
c)&n=
bsp;
Ful=
ly
'fire-wall' labour inspection from immigration
control.
4.
a)
Rep=
eal
discriminatory legislation and reinforce non-discrimination/equality of
treatment law and its implementation.
b)&n=
bsp;
Def=
ine and
implement national action plans against discrimination, xenophobia, and racism.
c)&n=
bsp;
Den=
ounce
and repudiate any and all acts of xenophobic vio=
lence.
d) &n= bsp; Demand anti-discrimination, anti-xenophobia political discours= e, media reporting and school curricula.
5.
a) &n= bsp; Ensure equality of rights, opportunities and protection for all migrant women and girls.
b) &n= bsp; Obtain gender specific policy, measures and practices recogniz= ing gender-based risks and ensuring equality in outcomes as well as intent.
c) &n= bsp; Protect rights and provide appropriate support measures for LB= GTQIA+ migrants and refugees.
6.
a)&n=
bsp;
Ens=
ure full
access by migrants to quality and appropriate health education, disease
prevention and health care and treatment services and facilities.
b)&n=
bsp;
Pro=
vide for
specific, full and equal inclusion of all migran=
ts in
COVID prevention, protection, vaccination and treatment everywhere.
c)&n=
bsp;
Ela=
borate
specific national and local public health and safety and health at work
policies inclusive of migrants and refugees.
d)&n=
bsp;
Uph=
old and
monitor occupational safety and health (OSH) protection for migrants in all
workplaces.
7. Social Security for migrants
a) &n= bsp; Implement unilateral measures to extend social security covera= ge and portability to migrants in both origin and employment countries.
b) &n= bsp; Incorporate and harmonize social security access in regional integration spaces.
c) &n= bsp; Obtain wider ratification and implementation of ILO C-102 on s= ocial security and ILO C-118 on portability of social security.
8.
a)&n=
bsp;
Ens=
ure
freedom of association and collective bargaining rights for migrants and
refugees
b) &n= bsp; Support migrant workers organizing in unions and by unions.
c)&n=
bsp;
Eng=
age
migrant and refugee participation and membership in community associations,
worker unions, and CSOs.
9. Family Unity and family support
a) &n= bsp; Provide for family unity and family reunification in all immig= ration and migration regimes.
b) &n= bsp; Ensure immigration law facilitates family reunification.
<= span style=3D'mso-list:Ignore'>c)&n= bsp; Sustain socialization and education for children and adolescents remaining ‘at home’ in places of ori= gin.
10.<=
span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'> Training youth for employment; overcomi=
ng
skills shortages
a) Reform, renovate and expa= nd technical and vocational education and training for all youth
b) Promote migrant access to schooling, higher education and vocational and technical education and trai= ning (VTET), without discrimination.
c) Harmonize qualifications = and training standards across regions and in regional economic communities in particular.
11.<=
span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'> Facilitate migrant and diaspora
entrepreneurship and their establishment of SMEs
a)&n=
bsp;
Pro=
vide
comprehensive training and coaching to migrant/diaspora entrepreneurs in
conception, organization, product/service development, legal registration,
fiscal matters, start-up and management of
enterprises.
b)&n=
bsp;
Pro=
vide
access to start-up cost financing for qualified migrant entrepreneurial
initiatives.
c)&n=
bsp;
Sup=
port
migrant entrepreneur/employer participation in employer and business
associations.
12.<=
span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'> Re-frame the narrative on migration tow=
ards
inclusive, rights-based, mobility-facilitating discourse, policy, practice and institutional behavi=
our.
Key points in=
clude:
·
mig=
ration
is people, with universal, inalienable human rights and dignity;
·
int=
ernational
mobility/migration is structurally necessary for current and future economic
viability and welfare worldwide;
· mig= ration supports integrated human developme= nt in all societies and countries;
·
mig=
rant
workers support and sustain economies and development w=
orldwide;
· mig= ration is about freedom of movement as well as the right to remain where people are.
13.<=
span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'> Engage in development cooperation that
supports jobs-rich approaches.
= a)&n= bsp; Ens= ure that development aid supports: jobs rich building up of industry, agriculture, and infrastruct= ure; local, national and regional transformation of resources; local and regional production and consumption of goods, services, and knowledge; regional econ= omic integration; and fair trade, especially of value-added local resources employing people within their own regions.
b)
Pre=
vent any
linking of development aid to migration control policies and measures or to
enhancing repressive capacities of control and policing institutions in
recipient states.
14.<=
span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'> Promote full implementation of free
circulation regimes
a)&n= bsp; Advocate political will by governments to implement and maintain free circulation of people.
= b)&n= bsp; Promote ratification of f= ree movement protocols by regional community member States and their parliament= s.
c)&n= bsp; Promulgate national implementing legislation and regulations for free movement protocols.
d)&n= bsp; Harmonize labour codes and recognition of qualifications across REC member countries.=
e) &n= bsp; Derogate legal, administrative and control measures that thwar= t labour circulation.
15.
Consolidate migration policy and administrative responsibility, capacity and coordination by labo=
ur
and social protection institutions:
a)&n= bsp; Concentrate labour migration governance responsibilities in labour= /employment ministries
b)&n= bsp; Designate focal points or= units in labour institutions on = labour migration/mobility
c)&n= bsp; Encourage engagement on migration by social partner organizations.
d)&n= bsp; Training and capacity bui= lding for labour institutions and social partners.
e)&n= bsp; Engage tripartite consult= ation and coordination at national, regional and conti= nental levels.
16.
Decriminalize migrants, refugees, and migration:
a)&n=
bsp;
De-=
criminalize/non-criminalization
of immigration law and infractions to it.
b)&n=
bsp;
Non=
-detention/end
detention of migrants for non-criminal offences.
c) &n= bsp; Treatment of all minors according to the best interests of the child= .
d)&n=
bsp;
Rep=
eal of
generalized migrant/traveller identify control,=
surveillance and restriction measures.
e)&n=
bsp;
Lif=
t border
controls and eliminate in-country travel/transport inspection-control posts
within established areas of REC free circulation of persons.
17.<=
span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'> End repression of solidarity with migra=
nts
and of migrants’ rights defenders
a) &n= bsp; Repeal any existing 'delit de solidarité' legislation and prevent enactment if proposed.
b)&n=
bsp;
Dem=
and that
social protection, human/social services and CSO solidarity reach all migra=
nts
and refugees without discrimination of any kind, including on basis of stat=
us.
c)&n=
bsp;
Ens=
ure that
service organisations and other civil society
entities concerned attend to all migrants and refugees without discriminati=
on.
d) &n= bsp; Offer legal and political advocacy for a= nyone prosecuted or persecuted for defence of migrant= s' human rights including labour rights and social protection.
18.<=
span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'> Establish national –and local-- poli=
cy
frameworks on migration, with “whole of government' consultation and “w=
hole
of society” participation including social partners and civil society:
a)
Inv=
olve all
concerned government ministries, agencies, and authorities as well as
legislators/parliamentarians, social partners, civil society, and migrant
organizations.
b)
Add=
ress
comprehensively concerns, issues, and challenges of international migration,
including human rights, labour standards, and
humanitarian protection responsibilities.
c)
Ens=
ure that
policy and practice respond to short-, medium-, and long-term consideration=
s of
domestic economic and social development, demographic trends and labour and skills needs.
d)
Ins=
ist that
national and local policy on migration is rights-based and socially respons=
ible
in line with international normative standards.
e)
Add=
ress
development cooperation, public and private foreign investment, and migrati=
on
consequences of arms and munitions exports and international military
engagements.
f)
Con=
sider
displacement consequences of global warming and mitigation approaches that
protect rights and facilitate remaining in place or close to places of orig=
in.
19.<=
span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'> Support welcoming migrants and refug=
ees’
policy and practice by cities
a) &n= bsp; Support city elaboration of values-based, inclusive welcoming migrants and refugees’ narrative, policy, administration = and practice.
b)&n=
bsp;
Adv=
ocate
for city policy and practice that upholds and promotes inclusion,
non-discrimination/equality of treatment and full participation of migrants=
and
refugees.
c)&n=
bsp;
Eng=
age whole
of city/urban government administration on formulating and implementing act=
ion
on reception, settlement, inclusion and integration of migrants and refugee=
s.
d)&n=
bsp;
Pro=
mote
involvement of local community associations, unions, employer and business
groups, civil society organizations and migrant/refugee associations.
20.<=
span
style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'> Obtain gender & age disaggregated d=
ata
and knowledge on migration, including migrant characteristics, situations, =
and
conditions.
a)
Ado=
pt and
utilize international statistical standards for all migration and migrant d=
ata.
b)
Acc=
ount for
all migrants intending to work, working, and/or having been engaged in the
world of work, including in informal, unregistered, or unseen economic
activity, self-employed, temporarily non-working, long term unemployed, etc=
.
c)
Obt=
ain data
on employment, education and qualifications, health and health care, social
protection, rights protection and discrimination, services, etc. re migrant=
s, refugees and migration.
d)
Est=
ablish
data sharing and coordination among national institutions concerned.
e)
Int=
erface
data with relevant international labour market =
and labour migration databases.
= f)&n= bsp; Pro= vide competencies, training and appropriate data hardware and software to the institutions, agencies, and personnel responsible for data and knowledge.
Acknowledgeme=
nts
The author expresses appreciation to the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU) for the opportunity to articulate the inspiration for this work as a plenary addres= s at the Global Parliamentary Consultati= on on International Migration and the Global Compact on Migration, hosted by = the Parliament of the Kingdom of Morocco in Rabat, December 2018. He wis= hes to thank Olga Kadysheva and Nayeth Solorzano for their solidarity and editorial support = in refining this article.
Refe=
rences
Arezki<=
/span>, R., Yuting Fan,
R. and Nguyen, H. (2020). Coping wi=
th
COVID-19 and oil price collapse in the Gulf Cooperation Council. World =
Bank
Blog published on Arab Voices. April 21, 2020.
https://blogs.worldbank.org/arabvoices/coping-covid-19-and-oil-price-collap=
se-gulf-cooperation-council
CIA (2021). Total Fertility Rate. The World Factbook. https://www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/field/total-fertility-rate/cou=
ntry-comparison
Cook, I. (2011). Hierarchies of Vulnerability: Country report United Kingdom;
Crowhurst, P. (2019) How important was Migration to the British Empire? http://www.britishempire.me.uk/migration.html
Ernst & Young (2013). Six global trends shaping the business
world: Demographic shifts transform the global workforce. http://www.ey.com/GL/en/Issues/Business-environment/Six-global-trends=
-shaping-the-business-world- Demographic-shifts-transform-the-global-workforce<=
span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>
Eurostat (2021). Personal
remittances statistics. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=3D=
Personal_remittances_statistics
Fleming, S. (2019). Japan’s
workforce will be 20% smaller by 2040. World Economic Forum. 12 February
2019. https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2019/02/japan-s-workforce-will-shrink-=
20-by-2040/
GMPA (2017). The Sustainable Development Goals and Migrants/Migration Regarding =
the
UN 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda: Relevant SDGs and Targets, Rational=
es
for Inclusion, Implementation Actions, and Realization Measurement Indicato=
rs.
Global Migration Policy Associates (GMPA) contribution to the Fifteenth
Coordination Meeting on International Migration. New York: UN DESA, Populat=
ion
Division. https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/events/co=
ordination/15/documents/papers/20_GMPA.pdf.
IFAD (2017). Sending Money Home: Contributing to the SDGs, One Family at a Time<=
/i>.
International Fund for Agricultural Development. =
https://www.ifad.org/documents/38714170/39135645/Sending+Money+Home+-=
+Contributing+to+the+SDGs%2C+one+family+at+a+time.pdf/c207b5f1-9fef-4877-93=
15-75463fccfaa7 =
ILO (2021). Global Estimates on International Migrant Workers, Results and
Methodology. Third edition. Executive summary. June 2021. https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_p=
rotect/---protrav/---migrant/documents/publication/wcms_808939.=
pdf
Manpower Group (2021). Top 21 Trends for 2021: Transforming Talent and the Future of Work.=
The
Manpower Group. https://workforce-resources.manpowergroup.com/workforce-trends/top-21=
-trends-for-2021
National Archives (UK). (n.d.). “Fo=
rced Labour” in Bl=
ack
Presence, Asian and Black History in Britain 1500-1850, India. The National Archives, UK. n.d. http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/pathways/blackhistory/india/forced=
.htm
OECD (2019a). Compare Your Country data. Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development (OECD).
OECD (2019b). International Migration Outlook 2019. https://doi.org/=
10.1787/c3e35eec-en
OECD (2021). COVID-19 spending helped to lift foreign aid to an all-time high in
2020: Detailed Note. Paris, 13 April 2020. https://www.oecd.org/dac/financing-sustainable-development/developmen=
t-finance-data/ODA-2020-detailed-summary.pdf
Ratha, D., Ju Kim, E., Plaza, S. and
Ratha, Dilip=
, Eung Ju Kim, Sonia Plaza, Ganesh Seshan,
Elliott J Riordan, and Vandana Chandra. (2021). Migration and Development B=
rief
35: Recovery: COVID-19 Crisis through a Migration Lens.” KNOMAD-World Bank,
Washington, DC. November 2021. https://www.knomad.org/sites/defa=
ult/files/2021-11/Migration_Brief%2035_1.pdf =
Schattenberg, M. and Bräun=
inger,
D. (2019). Marked decline in the German labour =
force
despite substantial immigration. Deutsche Bank Research. July 5, 2019 =
https://www.dbresearch.com/servlet/reweb2.ReWEB;REWEBJSESSIONID=3DC75=
4EA601B1A8D9B98CE5271DDAE963E?rwsite=3DRPS_EN-PROD&rwobj=3DReDisplay.St=
art.class&document=3DPROD0000000000496399
Swissinfo (2020). “Switzerland could ‘lack 7=
00,000
workers’ in decade’s time” SWI Swissinfo, Swiss
Broadcasting Corporation. January 24, 2020.
https://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/labour-market_switzerland-could--lack-70=
0-000-workers--in-decade-s-time/45515066
Taran, P. (2011). Rethinking Development and Migration; Some Elements for Discussion<=
/i>.
Taran, P. (2015). Migration, Globalization and Economic Viability: Challenges and
Opportunities for Russia & Eurasia. Conference Paper. Russian
International Affairs Council. Mosc=
ow. October
6, 2015. https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/migrats=
iya-globalizatsiya-i-ekonomicheskaya-zhiznesposobnost/
Taran, P. (2016) Migrant Women, Women Mi=
grant
Workers: Crucial challenges for Rights-based Action and Advocacy. Presentat=
ion
at OHCHR-UNWOMEN side event, UN Committee on the Elimination of Discriminat=
ion
Against Woment (CEDAW) 64th Session.
Geneva, 21 July, 2016. https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/CMW/SideEvent2016/PatrickTar=
an.pdf
Taran, P. (2018). Migration, Development, Integration & Human Rights: Global Chal=
lenges
in the 21st Century, Global Migration Policy Brief. Global Parliamentary
Consultation on International Migration and the Global Compact on Migration,
Inter-Parliamentary Union and Parliament of the
Kingdom of Morocco. Rabat, Morocco, 6-7 December 2018. https://www.ipu.org/event/parliamentary-conference-migration-in-lead-=
up-adoption-global-compact-migration#event-sub-page-documents/
Taran, P. and Solorzano, N. (2021). La
Pandemia de Covid y Los Migrantes: una Agenda d=
e Diez
Puntos Para Mitigar el Desastre en Curso. Revista =
Compendium:
Cuadernos de Economía y Administración. Vol. 8 Núm. 1, pp. 1-24. http://www.revistas.espol.edu.ec/index.php/compendium/article/view/93=
3
Teng, Frank (2021). China
population: workforce to drop by 35 million over next five years as demogra=
phic
pressure grows. South China Morning Post. 1 July 2021. https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3139470/china-popu=
lation-workforce-drop-35-million-over-next-five
UNDESA (2019). International Migration 2019: Report. United Nations Department=
of
Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division =
https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/publicati=
ons/migrationreport/docs/InternationalMigration2019_Report.pdf
UNDESA (2020a). International Migration 2020 Highlights. United Nations Departm=
ent
of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/news/international-migration-2=
020
UNDESA (2020b). World Fertility and Family Planning 2020: Highlights.
UNHCR (2021, 18 June). Figures at a Glance. http://ww=
w.unhcr.org/figures-at-a-glance.html
United Nations (2016). Agreement
concerning the Relationship between the United Nations and the International
Organization for Migration. UN General Assembly Resolution A/70/976, New
York, 8 July 2016. http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=3DA/70/976=
United Nations (2018). The UN Secretary-General’s 2018 report “Making Migration Work for A=
ll”.
https://refugeesmigrants.un.org/sites/default/files/sg_report_en.pdf<=
/span>
United Nations Conference on Housin=
g and
Sustainable Urban Development (2016). The New Urban Agenda. Habi=
tat
III, Quito, Ecuador. http://uploads.habitat3.org/hb3/NUA-English.pdf
United Nations General Assembly (20=
15). Transforming our world: 2030 Agen=
da
for Sustainable Development. UN General Assembly Resolution 70/1.
United Nations General Assembly (20=
18). Global Compact on Safe, Orderly and Re=
gular
Migration. UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/73/195 adopted on 19
December 2018. (final text issued 11 January 201=
9) New
York: United Nations. https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=3DA/RES/73/195
World Bank=
(2020).
COVID-19 Crisis Through a Migration=
Lens.
Migration and Development Brief no. 32. World Bank, Washington, DC. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/33634 =
[1] Definition, Article 2,
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Wor=
kers
and Members of Their Families.
[2] As noted in DESA estimates, “The estimates are based on official statistics on= the foreign-born or the foreign population, classified by sex, age and country = of origin. Most of the statistics utilised to estimate the international migra= nt stock were obtained from population censuses. Additionally, population registers and nationally representative surveys provided information on the number and composition of international migrants.”
[3] Eurostat figures on ag=
gregate
remittances to/from EU member countries differ from World Bank figures for =
the
Europe-Central Asia region due to differing accounting methodologies.
[4] 2.1 to 2.2 children pe=
r woman
is considered the ‘replacement rate’ of zero population growth, below which
population declines.
[5] Texts, ratification status and rel=
ated
information available respectively at: http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=3D1000:12001:::NO:::
and http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CMW.aspx
[6] The ICPD was the biggest conferenc= e ever held on population, migration and development with 11,000 delegates from 179 countries and some 4,000 participants in the parallel NGO Forum. The ICPD Declaration and Programme of Action continues to serve as a comprehensive g= uide to progress in people-centred development. See https://www.unfpa.org/fr/node/9038
5
Migration, Human Rights & Sustainable Economi=
es:
A Century 21 Agenda