https://doi.org/10.37815/rte.v34n1.899
Original paper - English
Global Warming and Displacement: Challenges and Solutions in the
Maldives
Calentamiento
global y desplazamiento: desafíos y soluciones en Maldivas
Roma Beke1 <=
/span>https://orcid.org/0000-0=
001-6106-7864
1
Sent: = 2021/12/30<= o:p>
Accepted: 2022/01/11
Published: 2022/03/15
Abstract
For Small Island Developing States such as the Maldives, climate cha=
nge
poses an existential threat to the future and welfare of their countries’
populations. The effects of global warming, such as rising sea levels and
increased flooding, have forced countries to consider different measures
=
Keywords: migration, climate, relocation, mitigation, adaptation, population,
sovereignty, culture, development.
Summary: Introduction,
Methodological apparatus, Clarification of Terminology, Coverage in
Relevant International Legal Frameworks, Other Challenges with Current
Terminology, Mitigation Measures, Adaptation Measures, Planned Relocat=
ion
and Its Challenges, Further Recommendations, Main Priority and Conclus=
ions. How
to cite: Beke, R. (2022). Global Warming and Displacemen=
t:
Challenges and Solutions in the Maldives. Revista Tecnológica - Espol, 34(1), 75-91. http://www.rte.espol.e=
du.ec/index.php/tecnologica/article/view/899
Resumen
Para los pequeños Estados
insulares en desarrollo como las Maldivas, el cambio climático representa u=
na
amenaza existencial para el futuro y el bienestar de las poblaciones de sus
países. Los efectos del calentamiento global, como el aumento del nivel del=
mar
y el aumento de las inundaciones, han obligado a los países a considerar
diferentes medidas para adaptarse, y algunos incluso están preocupados por =
una
posible migración forzada climática como resultado de estos peligros.
Desafortunadamente, la falta de reconocimiento de los migrantes climáticos =
bajo
el derecho internacional significa que los estados insulares deben decidir =
por sí
mismos el mejor curso de acción. Esto plantea una pregunta importante: ¿Cuá=
les
son los posibles desafíos y soluciones para los Pequeños Estados Insulares =
en
Desarrollo [PEID], como Maldivas, que están planificando la migración forza=
da
climática de sus poblaciones? Utilizando un estudio de caso de Maldivas, es=
te
documento explora las medidas de mitigación y adaptación que el gobierno de
Maldivas ha considerado para desarrollar su resiliencia climática. También
argumenta que, en lugar de planificar la reubicación, las Maldivas y otros =
SIDS
deberían priorizar mantener unidas a sus poblaciones, mantener la integridad
cultural e implementar iniciativas que apoyen el desarrollo sostenible.
Introduction
In an opening speech given at the most recent United Nations C= limate Change Conference, the COP26, held in Glasgow, Scotland, the president of t= he small island nation of the Mald= ives, Ibrahim Mohamed Solih, began his address by describing the existential threat that global warming poses to his country: “Our islands are slowly being eaten by= the sea, one by one. If we do not reverse this trend, the Maldives will cease to exist by the end of the century...Please, please do not let this opportunit= y go to waste” (Meredith, 2021).
For Small Island Developing States [SIDS] like the Maldives, F=
iji,
Tuvalu, and other island nations, the COP26 represented a pivotal moment to
show the world, and in particular nations that
are high emitters
of carbon dioxide
[CO2] such as the United States of America and the People’s Republic of=
China
(Blokhin, 2021), how crucial taking global clim=
ate action is before rising sea levels f=
orce
the displacement of hundreds of millions of people across the world by the =
end
of the century (Brown, 2008). Bodies such as the International Organization for Migration [IOM] and=
the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC] predict that environmental degradation resul=
ting
from factors such as rising sea levels and flooding (B=
aillat,
2021) will not only worsen humanitarian issues like poverty and war (Podest=
a,
2019), but could also result in changes to migration that will fundamentally
affect human mobility (Kälin and Weerasinghe, 2=
017).
According to IOM, in SIDS such as the Maldives, where it is predicted that
rising sea levels will overtake all of its islan=
ds by
2100, temporary or “permanent migration may be the only option[s] for those=
who
anticipate their homes becoming permanently uninhabitable as a consequence =
of
environmental changes” (Kälin and Weerasinghe, 2017). In addition, the “permanent relocatio=
n of
populations – whether initiated or supported by governments – is increasing=
ly
considered as a solution of last resort” due to the costs and complexities
involved with planning for such scenarios (Kälin and Weerasinghe, 2017). Moreover, if=
these
migrants are not provided with sufficient assistance, they may be more at r=
isk
from “exploitation, discrimination, and [even] human rights” abuses (Kälin
and Weerasinghe, 2017), forcing governments to intervene as they find ways =
to manage their populations’ needs. =
In
addition, for many islanders, the land they live on is considered a “part of their identity”=
, and
making the decision to leave the place of their ancestors is often a trauma=
tic
experience which brings physical and psychological hardships (Borsa, 2020). All of these
concerns raise an important question: What
are possible challenges and
solutions for Small Island Developing States [SIDS], such as the Maldives, =
who are planning for the climate forced
migration of their populations?=
Using the Maldives as a case study, this paper explores the phenomenon of climate migration, first by contextualizing the terminology u= sed in such discussions and then identifying relevant existing international regulations and frameworks. It will then explore potential mitigation and a= daptation measures developed by the Maldives and subsequently provide policy recommendations for SIDS’ governments whose countries’ futures are threaten= ed by the realities of climate change.
Meth=
odological
apparatus
The purpose of this paper is to provide a literature review of existing analysis on the climate action measures planned by the Maldives and other SIDS. This sweep of the literature will be used as a means of identif= ying the appropriate next steps that such states can take to tackle the long-term effects of climate change on their population.
The literature used was first identified through searches on s= earch engines such as Google Scholar = and JSTOR, as well as previous background reading done in an undergraduate course on international migration. The materials analyzed were also authored by renowned experts in the topic, suc= h as Ilan Kelman, Johann= es Luetz, Sumudu Atapattu, A= lex Arnall, and Uma Kothari.=
Such secondary sources were also chosen for their relevance to= the study of climate change impacts on international migrat= ion, and were used to examine the phenomenon of climate migration from several perspectives, including environmental viewpoints, international leg= al frameworks, and governance. The literature cited in this analysis also incl= udes the work of several international organizations, including the International Organization for Migration [IOM], World Bank, European Commission, United Nations Development Programme [UNDP], United Na= tions High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], National Aeronautics and Space Administration [NASA], and the World Refugee and Migration Council.<= /p>
In order to ensure the quality and accuracy of the information in this pa= per, the editorial process was followed with an anonymous peer review which prov= ided feedback and recommendations for revision. A further virtual meeting of peer researchers was conducted in order to provide a = space for questions and comments relevant to the feedback.
Clar=
ification
of Terminology
Firstly, it is important to clarify the terminology relevant to the
context of migration and climate change, as the lack of any globally recogn=
ized
or international legal definitions for migrants as a re=
sult
of environmental degradation (International Organization for Migrati=
on,
2020) means that different organizations and groups utilize a variety of te=
rms
to describe the issues involved. One term developed by IOM in 2007 is the
phrase “environmental migration” to denote any type of migration in which
environmental disasters are the drivers of human movement (Kälin
and Weerasinghe, 2017). Furthermore, IOM defines =
environmental
migrants as “persons or groups of persons who,
predominantly for reasons of sudden or progressive change in the environment
that adversely affects their lives or living conditions, are obliged to lea=
ve
their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently,
and who move either within their country or abroad” (International Organiza=
tion
for Migration, 2020).
However, for the Maldives and other SIDS, another, narrower term has
also been used as a way to better represent the
realities of forced migration from the effects of climate change: =
climate migration. According to
IOM’s guide to international migration law, “Glossary on Migration”, climate
migration is a specific “subcategory of environmental migration” and is def=
ined
as the “movement of a person or groups of persons who, predominantly for re=
asons
of sudden or progressive change in the environment due to climate change, a=
re
obliged to leave their habitual place of residence, or choose to do so, eit=
her
temporarily or permanently, within a State or across an international borde=
r”
(International Organization for Migration, 2020). Similar to environmental
migration, the term ‘climate migration’ is not a recognized one in
international law; however, it has appeared in several international legal
instruments in the past few decades, including the =
binding “Cancún
Agreements on Climate Change Adaptation” adopted by countries at the COP16
conference in 2010, an agreement which recognized three types of human move=
ment
exacerbated by climate change: “displacement, migration, and planned
relocation” (International Organization for Migration, 2020). These terms a=
lso
indicate specific patterns or forms of migration; for example, =
displacement is used to
discuss people who flee their homes as a result of
“sudden-onset events in the environment” (International Organization for
Migration, 2020). Moreover, planned relocation is, “in the
context of disasters or environmental degradation, including when due to the
effects of climate change, [refers to] a planned process in which persons or
groups of persons move or are assisted to move away from their homes or pla=
ce
of temporary residence, are settled in a new location, and provided with the
conditions for rebuilding their lives” (International Organization for
Migration, 2020). Thus, unlike displacement, which is a consequence of a
climate related disaster, planned relocation is a more deliberate course of
action which seeks to provide relief to migrants over a long
term period.
Although all the terms mentioned above may connect to each other in
some way, it should be emphasized that the nature of their utility truly li=
es
within their specificity. Why? Well, using the correct terminology is criti=
cal
to a comprehensive understanding of the issues involved in migration result=
ing
from environmental degradation. For example, =
climate
forced migrants who have been assisted with planned relocation =
from
their homes due to rising sea levels are facing very different circumstances
than, perhaps, environmental emergency migrants who have had =
to
flee due to a tsunami or earthquake. The consequences of either group’s
situation should not be minimized in any way, but for the former, the rising
sea levels may pose a threat to the very survival of their country. In shor=
t,
for all the aforementioned reasons, it may be mo=
re
appropriate to refer to the people living in [SIDS] like the Maldives as
‘climate forced migrants’ rather than an alternative, broader term such as
‘environmental migrants’.
Secondly, recognizing the correct terminology is an important step =
in
an analysis of this issue, particularly because the terms used to describe
climate migrants often connect to the lack of existing =
binding international
legal frameworks or agreements that are relevant in this area. For example,=
there
is a popular misconception that environmental migrants, or even specifically
climate migrants, may also be referred to as ‘climate refugees’; however, t=
his
term is inappropriate, for a variety of reasons. One is that in
order to be considered a refugee, a person must be, as defined by the
1951 Refugee Convention, “unable or unwilling to return to their country of
origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political
opinion” (UNHCR, 2017). Refugees cannot simply be used to describe people w=
ho
are fleeing their home; there must be an extreme factor such as war, armed
violence, or persecution (UNHCR, 2017) that makes it particularly unsafe for
that person to return. To call environmental or climate migrants ‘refugees’=
is
not only misleading and holds “no legal basis in international migration la=
w”,
but also “could potentially undermine the international legal regime for the
protection of refugees” (Olsson, 2015). Although climate migrants face their
own unique struggles, it appears that most are not in immediate danger or
afraid that they will be targeted for belonging to a specific group. As a
result, binding international legal treaties which recognize and serve to
protect refugees, such as the 1951 Refugee Convention, or principles under
international human rights law, such as the principle of non-refoulement, do
not acknowledge migrants facing environmental degradation as holding refugee
status. Thus, environmental or climate migrants are not protected under
international law or afforded the same rights, i.e.
the ability to seek asylum.
Coverage in Relevant International Legal Framework=
s
Of course, this isn’= t to say that climate migrants are not recognized at all in international migration policy or law. Indeed, there are a few relevant non-binding agreements, i.e. the Glo= bal Compact for Migration [GCM], an international agreement which highlighted global warming and other phenomena of climate change as drivers “of forced migration through calls for building community resilience and adaptation capacity as well as for relocation schemes and commitments that ‘enhance the availability and flexibility of pathways for regular migration’” (McCarney, 2021). However, even within the GCM, the terminology used effectively conce= als the circumstances of people living in SIDS such as the Maldives, as the lack of meaningful solutions for migran= ts fleeing uninhabitable lands due to the effects of climate change [for example, rising = sea levels] are not properly addressed. T= he agreement instead favors policies such as ‘migration with dignity’ and connecting migration guidelines to the Sustainable Development Goals (McCarney, 2021), which are not extensive enough to deal with the complexities of climate displacement issues.
Moreover, other non-binding frameworks, such as the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC]’s Task Force on Displacement [TFD], wh= ich was developed by the Paris Climate Accords [2015], are restricted to provid= ing recommendations (McCarney, 2021) that are not yet enforced by an internatio= nal body, making it difficult for climate migrants to be supported = in practical ways. In fact, a report made to the TFD in 2018 highlighted a frustrating lack of meaningful leadership and collaboration in this area, b= oth in the United Nations and within international legal frameworks (McCarney, 2021). Worse still, not only ha= s the UN failed to develop applicable solutions, but often even when mechanisms w= ere created to support frameworks for climate migrants, the political will to a= ct was so weak that there would b= e no follow through on the course of action. For example, in 2005 a resolution titled “The legal implic= ations of the disappearance of States…for environmental reasons, including the implications for the human rights of their residents…” was adopted by the United Nations Sub-Commission = on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in order to request the appoi= ntment of a Special Rapporteur, who would create an inclusive study on the legal consequences of the disappearances of countries due to environmental degradation (McAdam, 2011). However, this study was never performed, and the resolution remains unfulfilled until today for unknown reasons.
In addition to the above-mentioned lack of protections, another gap in the legal protection of climate forced migrants is the lack of an acknowledgement of de facto statelessness, or persons who may enjoy the protections of a government currently, but may not be protected i= n the future if their governments don’t exist or hold the capacity to provide needed assistance (Olsson, 2= 015). The reason for such a concern might be the following: if states such as SIDS might eventually have to consider measures such as planned relocation, an soluti= on explored later in this paper, due to the disappearance of islands from rising sea levels, the respective governmen= ts could perhaps be unable to serve their citizens and provide them with the services typically coordinated by national officials. Just because these is= land populations are protected by their governments currently does not guarantee that the authorities can meet those commitments following a climate forced = migration. Unfortunately, modern international law on statelessness, as derived from t= he 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, is “premised on the denial of nationality through the operation of the law of a particular state…despite the fact that a diversity of human rights are affected by environmentally induced migration” (Olsson, 2015).
In short, the combin= ation of a lack of existing legally binding<= /i>, enforceable migration policies for climate migrants, and little political w= ill to create such policies, means that potential climate forced migrants from states such as the Maldives are st= uck in a sort of ‘legal limbo’ that unfortunately provides them with little protection or even recognition in international governance.
Other
Challenges with Current Terminology
According to Dr. = Ilan Kelman, a renowned e= xpert in risk and disaster reduction at the University College London in the U.K., there are two fundamental issues in current discourse on climate migration: the difficulty in establishing how many cli= mate migrants there are in the world, and misunderstandings on what the basic causes of forced climate migration are.= In his paper titled “Imaginary Numbe= rs of Climate Change Migrants?”, Kelman explains these issues in = order to assert the following: there isn’t any meaningful evidence to back up that climate change is a direct cause of any migration patterns (Kelman, 2019). While some intergovernme= ntal organizations or agencies may point to statistics of climate migrants in different countries, Kelman argues that no such numbers are accurate. There are many possible reasons for such a claim, one= of which is that theoretically, the best way for researchers to count climate migrants in populations would be to wait until after the deaths of the migrants i= n order to record their status, as it cannot be definitive until it is known= if the migrant would ever return, or whether their migration was a more perman= ent phenomenon (Kelman, 2019). However, this would = never work in practice because human beings are not stationary; most don’t stay in one place for their entire lives (Kelman, 2019). People can move away from their homelands and return in the future. As a result, when migrants do move = away from their native countries and such movements are recorded, “inconsistency might emerge if people purport to move due to climate change impact”, even = if those migrants move back to their homelands in the future without consideri= ng possible threats from climate = change (Kelman, 2019). This is an interesting view, as agreeing with Kelman’s assertion means that experts can never be too sure about whether climate migrants exist at all, at least if they continue to use the same methods to calculate such populations.
Similarly, Kelman’s second issue, = which asserts that climate migration is generally the result of a “lack of support mechanisms to deal with climate cha= nge impacts, rather than climate ch= ange” itself, also highlights that current statistics of clim= ate migrants may not be helpful (Kelman, 2019). The= se groups may not have been forced to move due to the effe= cts of climate change, such as risi= ng sea levels, but instead have faced the consequences of their governments’ failu= re to implement feasible adaptive measures. Subsequently, the term ‘climate migrants’ may not be the appropriate name for this grou= p, but could potentially be a distract= ion to solving the challenges presented by national development. Kelman argues that if countries stop blaming their issues on climate change and instead focus on their preparedness for threats to security, they can be successful in improving the quality of life for their populations. One exam= ple of a successful country to model after its disaster reduction structure is, according to Kelman, Bangladesh (Kelman, 2020). The southasian country, which is vulnerable to climate disasters such as tsunamis and flooding, has for decade= s experienced high migration levels, but through its national planning on cyclone preparation, Kelman contends that Bangladesh has “indicated what can and what should be achieved regarding weather, irrespective of climate…change” (Kelman, 2020). In short, climate migra= tion may not be an issue if countries are adequately prepared for natural disast= ers, which is why having strong mitigation measures and adaptation measures is so crucial to ensuring people aren= ’t forced from their homes in the first = place.
Mitigation
Measures
Ergo, all these considerations lead to a crucial question: If climate forced migrants are not protected under international law, then what can countries like the Maldives, Fiji, Tuvalu, or oth= er Small Island Developing States [SIDS] that fear the disappearance of their islands do to protect the futu= re of their peoples? Although global warming is of course a problem which can’t be solved by the SIDS alone, there are practical measures that countries like = the Maldives are already taking in the interests of their populations’ welfare.= In the context of climate action, these= types of measures are often divided into two categories: mitigation and adaptatio= n. Mitigation refers to measures that help maintain or lower carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions, while adaptation refers to adjusting to the current consequences of climate change (National Aeronautics and Space Administration, n.d.). Over the past few decades, the Maldives has implemen= ted several mitigation and adaptat= ion measures with the purpose of overcoming the effects of climate change, and = in particular global warming, in order to protect Maldivians from rising sea levels and flooding.
Subsequently, one major focus of the Maldives' mitigation meas= ures has been promoting “low carbon development” as a means = to help decrease carbon emissions (Climate and C= lean Air Coalition, 2015). According to information gathered by the Global Climate Change Alliance Plus Initiative, a climate focused project funded by the European Union, the Maldives has prioritized “leveraging public-private partnerships” in order to manage energy efficiency and support further development of renewable energy sources [i.e. wi= nd, solar, hybrid, etc.] on the islands (Climate = and Clean Air Coalition, 2015).
In addition, the government has collaborated with local private
resorts to create new finance frameworks which would help decrease carbon
emissions produced by the country’s popular
tourism sector (Global Climate Change Alliance Plus (Climate
and Clean Air Coalition, 2015). Moreover, in 2019, the Maldives
introduced its National Action Plan=
on
Air Pollutants, a comprehensive scheme that details twenty-eight differ=
ent
mitigation measures “across three priority source sectors: waste, electrici=
ty
generation, and transport” (Climate <=
/span>and
Clean Air Coalition, 2015). According to the United Nations Development
Nevertheless, how do these mitigation measures connect to migr= ation, and more specifically, climate forced migrants? According to the United Nat= ions Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s report on Mitigation of Climate [2014], the aim of mitigation is to ensure that development is consistent w= ith sustainability (National Aeronautics and Space Administration, n.d.). Beari= ng this aim in mind, it is important to reiterate that if the world continues = to follow an unsustainable path through development, which then increases carb= on emissions, the consequences would be severe for people living in SIDS, which are dramatically affected by rising sea levels. Thus, countries like the Maldives enact mitigation measures because while they unfortunately can’t always influence other more powerful states to take climate action, they can take their own steps to reduce their likelihood of climate forced migration= in the future.
Adaptation
Measures
Naturally, mitigation measures are often not sufficient for countries to prepare for the effects of climate change, which is why the Maldives has also implemented adaptation measures. Such efforts are not only designed to help the Maldives adjust to climate change, but to also “take advantage of any positive opportunities that may arise” (The European Climate Adaptation Platform Climate-AD= APT, 2020). There are different types of adaptation techniques which have been grouped into the following classifications by the European Climate Adaptation Platform: “gray, green, and soft measures” (The European Climate Adaptation Platform Climate-ADAPT, 2020). Gray meas= ures are “technological and engineering solutions” designed to generate new type= s of infrastructure and land management in order to a= dapt to climate change challenges (The European Cl= imate Adaptation Platform Climate-ADAPT, 2020). Green measures strengthen = the “resilience” and “adaptation capacity” of a country through an “ecosystem-b= ased approach”, and soft measures may include “legal, social, financial” or governmental policies which can reinforce adaptation capacity as well as mobilize awareness on the effects of climate change (The European Climate Adaptation Platform Climate-ADAPT, 2020).
Wetl=
and
Conservation
One green measure which constitutes a significant feature of t= he Maldives’ Climate Change Adapt= ation Project [CCAP] has been conserving the country’s wetlands (Ali, 2018). The importance of protecting = these areas cannot be understated, as wetlands “can store several tens of million= s of cubic meters of water”, providing a powerful flood management tool which ac= t as natural “barriers against rising sea levels” (Ali, 2018). Wetlands also help to purify the groundwater flowing through the ecosystem and manage erosion of shorelines = (Ali, 2018). Thus, in order to protect these important areas, the Maldives has begun carry= ing out new solid waste management projec= ts to safeguard the wetlands from illegal waste dumping practices (Ali, 2018). The purpose of such initiatives is to bolster already occurring phenomena in the hydraulic cycle like groundwater recharge, which can “restore groundwater levels and store water for later use” as well as “reduce flood risk” (Escriva-Bou et al., 202= 1).
Moreover, such a project can also be considered a soft measure= for its boost to the wider populat= ion’s awareness of climate change. In the interest of “biodiversity conservation”, the Maldives is using the protection of the wetlands to increase its nature based tourism by making the areas more enticing to tourists (Ali, 2018). This wil= l be achieved by defining spaces as nat= ional parks for hiking activities, building bird observatories for bird-watching enthusiasts, and building more pathways along the coast for visitors who wish to experience the Maldives’ = grand views (Ali, 2018). The revenue generated from this development in the touri= sm sector can then be used to renovate infrastructure for climate change resilience, while simultaneously bringing attention to a new feature of the= country, notwithstanding its beaches or coral reefs (Ali, 2018). More importantly, though, these developments will not only benefit tourists but Maldivians too, as protecting the wet= lands will also support their livelihoods. One of the plants native to the Maldives’ wetlands, taro, is considered = both an important source of food, but is also used as a “medicinal herb” and a material used in traditional “embroidered handicrafts” such as mats and bas= kets (Ali, 2018). Safeguarding the wetlands means that the supply of taro will be protected against illegal cutting of the plants, which is a growing concern among the islands’ artistic communities. It also provides visitors with an opportunity to view first-hand how protecting the islands from the effects of climate change is crucial to maintaining the locals’ way of life and why it is fundamental for the world to invest in SIDS such as the Maldives.
Sea =
Wall
Infrastructure
However, protecting the wetlands is only the ‘tip of the icebe= rg’ in terms of the Maldives’ adaptation measures. One adaptation measure which is= not only a possible solution for the Maldives, but one which the island state is actively implementing, is the building of sea walls to deal with rising sea levels (Kapoor, 2020). Sea walls are defined by the National Maritime Foundation as “heavily engineered inflexible structures which…prevent slidi= ng of the soil” and are helpful in acting as a defensive barrier against flood= ing (Kapoor, 2020). The Maldives has been exploring the use of sea walls for decades, but it recently began increasing production of the barriers, which= are usually made of concrete or mortar (The European Climate Adaptation Platform Climate-ADAPT, 2020), following the El Niño phenomenon in 2016, a “warming = of the equatorial Pacific Ocean” that led to one of the most damaging losses to coral life via “mass bleaching” in the Maldives since 1950 (Stockdale et al= ., 2017). Sea walls are incredibly useful to coastal communities for several reasons: they are designed to be storm-resistant; they preserve eroding cli= ffs and other rock structures; and they shield the land from “wave overtopping”= as their heights can secure the distance between the mainland and the beach le= vel, also called the dune (The European Climate Adaptation Platform Climate-ADAP= T, 2020). According to the Maldives’ current Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abdu= lla Shahid, building more sea walls is fundamental to protecting the country’s coasts from the ravaging effects of climate change, as highlighted by his q= uote in an interview with the Reuters news agency in 2020: “In order to protect = the islands, we need to start building sea walls…It’s expensive, but we need [them]. We can’t wait until all of [the islands]= are being taken away” (Pal & Ghoshal, 2020).
Fortunately, some larger states have already stepped up to help develop the Maldives’ sea walls. For instance, Japan had finished construct= ing a six kilometer long sea wall in 2002 along the Maldivian capital of Malé which ended up protec= ting the city considerably “from the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami” (Kapoor, 2020), = one of the deadliest underwater earthquakes ever documented. Such a sea wall is= not only useful for protection against natural disasters in the short-term, but perhaps long term defense as well, particularly against rising sea levels and increased flooding resulting from global warm= ing.
Nevertheless, it is important to note that the building of sea=
wall
infrastructure does have disadvantages, some of which may arguably outweigh=
any
previously referenced benefits. One disadvantage is that focusing too much =
on
building sea walls or other types of =
“hard
infrastructure” might divert attention and resources away from soft adaptat=
ion
measures which can be just as critical for building a climate resilient cou=
ntry
and economy,
i.e. training policymakers or supporting
climate action education for local communities (Kapoor,
2020). Another disadvantage is that sea walls are not completely
sustainable in the long term for the preservation of the local environment,
especially in relation to beaches. Although sea walls serve as excellent de=
fensive
barriers, they have been “reported to=
aggravate
the problem of beach erosion” (Kapoor, 2020),
a process which has severe consequences on the animals who have made the
beaches their home. For example, sea =
walls may
block sea turtles from “nesting sites” and can even be trapped by them (
Floa=
ting City
Model
Another innovative adaptation measure the Maldives has begun implementing is the development= of waterfront residences for the purpose of building a “floating city” (Marchant, 2021). The project is being design= ed by the Maldivian government in collaboration with the Netherlands to develop “thousands of waterfront residenc= es and services floating along a f= lexible, functional grid across a 200-hectare lagoon” (Marchant, 2021). These residences will form the basis of an “island city” that will be located in a “warm-water lagoon” about ten minutes from Malé by boat (<= span style=3D'color:#1B1C1D'>Marchant, 2021). The reasoning behind such a design is rooted<= span style=3D'mso-spacerun:yes'> in a focus on sustainabil= ity and protecting the islands from rising sea levels. The Maldives is hoping t= hat by modeling the Netherlands’ innovative production of “floating social housing”, it can create unique aquatic, urban grids which can meet the grow= ing needs of its population (Marchant, 2021).
One reason why the floating city model might be preferable to = the production of sea wall infrastr= ucture is that it has “minimal impacts” on the local environment in that it doesn’t contribute to beach erosion or destruction of the coral reefs (Marchant, 202= 1). The waterfront residences can also be created independently, meaning that no existing land needs to be used for the model to work. More importantly, tho= ugh, rising sea levels would not be as great of a concern as the residences would rise along with the waves (Marchant, 2021). Such an outcome could be groundbreaking for the Maldives, as the presumptio= n of climate forced migration from the country is generally based on rising sea levels making the lands uninhabitable in the future. However, if the floati= ng city model allows the state to adapt w= ith the sea while maintaining the popula= tion’s quality of life, this migration would not have to take place.
Another benefit to the floating city model is that the interconnectedness inherent in= the model’s plan would not only help Maldivians deal with issues from climate change, but could also propel the country further towards more sustainable development. The idea is to con= struct a chain of connecting water channels, bridges, and docks that would make it easy for locals to go to businesses, houses, and other facilities across the floating city (Marchant, 2021). Moreov= er, the city would run on energy derived from renewable resources such as solar, wind, and aquatic power, making the country less reliant on fossil fuels or other sources contributing to = the climate crisis.
Arti=
ficial
Islands
Likewise, a third adaptation measure which could be a powerful solution for the Maldives if further developed is the construction of artificial islands. This plan goes a step further beyond the floating city model, as building new islands means physically raising the height of the existing land to make the environment more= flood-resistant. While the plan might seem difficult to execute at a first glance, the Maldives had already begun building such an island in 1997. Known to the locals as Hulhumalé, this artificial island was built in order to “re= lieve overcrowding in Malé”, and today it is the “fourth-largest island” in the country with a population of over 50,000 peo= ple (Voiland = & NASA Earth Observatory, 2021). Hulhumalé was constructed by “pumping sand from the seafloor onto a submerged coral platform”, allowing it to rise about two meters above sea level, which is a= bout twice the height of Malé (Voiland & NASA Earth Observatory, 2021). While the island had not initially been developing with climate-resilience in mind, Hulhumalé has the capacity to inhabit or house ot= her groups of the population who might need to evacuate there in case of natural disasters such as earthquakes or tsunamis (Voiland & NA= SA Earth Observatory, 2021), prov= iding the government to with an opportunity to already begin moving people from smaller islands which are more vulnerable to flooding.
In addition, locals who now inhabit Hulhu= malé prefer living on the raised island for the following reasons: it “has wide = sand beaches instead of a concrete sea wall” (Hami= lton, 2008), due to the lack of a need for a physical barrier; there is mo= re space for individuals and families, alleviating the congestion that locals previously living in Malé had to deal with; and= it’s clean because the government could already build modern sanitation systems = from the initial phase of the development.
Following these positive reactions, one recommendation for the
Maldivian government would be to not only help more locals move to Hulhumalé, but to focus on the expanded development of
artificial islands. Further land raising would help protect the Maldives against rising sea level=
s and
could be a long-term climate-resilient solution combined with the floating =
city
model. It would also support urbanization and greater sustainable developme=
nt
in the country. Of course, there are some considerations which need to be
accounted for in such planning. For example, the extent of “the height
allowance over time” would need to be thought through in relation to variab=
les
such as “flood hazard e.g=
.
sea levels, waves, surges, tide=
s, and
exposure e.g. land use and defenses” (=
Brown
et al., 2020). Naturally, the higher the allowance for sea level r=
ise,
the better, as the higher the islands =
rise in height, the lower the chance woul=
d be
of those islands having to face flooding (Brown
et al., 2020). There are also some
challenges which arise from this practice; for instance, even if the rising sea levels do not direc=
tly
impact the raised islands, the “secondary effects of sea level rise such as groundwater stal=
inization”
would still have to be dealt with (Bro=
wn et
al., 2020). A more significant challen=
ge,
moreover, would be the costs involved in such a project. The following ques=
tion
remains: Who would be paying to build these raised islands? Well, according
to the Maldives, other countries, particularly those which are higher emitt=
ers
of carbon dioxide and thus larger contributors to global warming, should be
responsible for contributing the
funds (Hamilton, 2008). While these countries would be hesitant to help, =
it is arguably in their best interests t=
o do
so, as the lack of long-term solutions like the floating city model and
artificial islands could mean that planned relocation, albeit a gradual,
Futu=
re
Floating
Although it has already begun implementing various mitigation = and adaptation measures, the Maldiv= es is not the only island state which has developed new ways of tackling the effe= cts of climate change. One method which Maldivians or other SIDS could learn fr= om, and possibly apply to their own populations, is the ‘future floating’ model created in Bangladesh. According to Johannes Luetz, a social scientist specialized in human climate migration, Bangladesh’s “revolutionary solution” to intense annual floods involves a “flat-bottomed= fleet of 42 boats that are school bus= and schoolhouse in one, providing education and other services to more than 1,5= 00 students in nearly 400 villages…” (Luetz, 2008)= . The main benefit of this model is that the students who live in coastal areas w= ould not be forced to relocate to urban communities to pursue their secondary education [or even basic schooling, in many cases].
Nevertheless, there are numerous other advantages which not on= ly protect these students from the impacts of rising sea levels, but even increase accessibility and promote sustainable development. For instance, many Bangladeshi students in coastal communities would drop out during monsoon season because taking a flooded r= oute to school for a couple months was extremely dangerous (Luetz, 2008). However, the boats created for the ‘future floating’ model allowed t= hese students to continue their education during monsoon season, preventing disruptions which would have otherwise limited their opportunities in the <= span style=3D'letter-spacing:-.15pt'>future. In addition, the Bangladesh government worked with indigenous communities to ensure that the production= of the boats was done by indigenous manufacturers, supporting local developmen= t.
What is important to take away from the ‘future floating’ mode= l, and other innovations similar to its design, is that mitigation and adaptation measures should not only be focused on climate action. As well, governments should consider how= to implement policies which incre= ase sustainable development and make the lives of their peoples better than bef= ore.
Planned
Relocation and Its Challenges
However, why might planned relocation =
be
considered a last resort option for the Maldives? Firstly, it is important =
to
explain what exactly the term implies. Planned relocation does not mean mov=
ing
to a new island within the Maldives as the artificial island developments a=
re
trying to achieve, but instead refers to moving to an entirely different country or territory. Thus=
, the
reasons for the hesitance to implement such a system are varied, but one
significant factor lies with the hardships associated with the moving process itself. For islanders in the
Maldives, the land they live on is often considered a natural extensio=
n of
their cultural identity. To le=
ave
their home behind as a result of climate change disruption would arguably b=
e a
traumatic experience, and would mean that commun=
ities
formed over generations in ancestral lands would have to ‘start over’ in a
place they’ve never been to before. Another challenge would be the “=
extent to which the needs of affected populations and the impa=
ct of
planned relocations on them are taken into account” (Gallo,
2019). Moving an entire country’s population to another territory wo=
uld
have significant impacts on the lives of the population already living ther=
e,
and if the relocation is not planned out carefully, the possibility for
violence, xenophobia, discrimination, and perhaps even armed conf=
lict
between the two groups could be high. Moreover, a relevant concern would be
“land tenure issues in terms of evacuated areas, land acquisition, [and]
relocation sites” (Gallo, 2019). Not o=
nly
would finding available land to house such a large population be difficult but obtaining that land
legally and ensuring that the relocated population is recognized under domestic laws, as well as public
international law, would be a <=
span
style=3D'letter-spacing:-.15pt'>major challenge. An
additional challenge would relate to governance; for instance, how would
Subsequently, in such discussions about the challenges of plan=
ned
relocation, it is critical to point out that current international law is o=
ften
insufficient to resolve such issues, as the scope is neither large enough n=
or
fully developed. For example, according to international
environmental lawyer Sumudu Atapattu, the appli=
cation
of international legal principles, such as the right to self-determination,=
to
contexts of planned relocation has never been thoroughly investigated,
especially on such a large scale with regards to entire populations from SI=
DS
(Atapattu, 2014). In her paper titled Climate
Change: Disappearing States, Migration, and Challenges for International La=
w published
by the Washington Journal of Environmental Law and
How, then, is the Maldives planning to exec= ute planned relocation? And how should SIDS implement this process in order to account for the needs of all populations involved? First, the Maldivian government has been considering which countr= ies are prime locations for planned relocation for over a decade, with Australia, India, and Sri Lanka having <= span style=3D'letter-spacing:-.25pt'>been considered due to proximity and similarity in culture (Ramesh, 2008). In fact, the government has already “set up a sov= ereign savings account, funded by revenue from tourism” to purchase a new homeland= in one of these countries (Burgess, 2012). Although other SIDS such as Kiribati and Tuvalu have held talks with the Au= stralian government to “discuss the poss= ibility of immigration assistance”, the Maldives has created their fund with the ho= pe that by owning their land, the govern= ment will not “require the bureaucratic generosity of other nations” (Bur= gess, 2012). However, such a solution is not feasib= le for all countries considering planned relocation.
Further
Recommendations
In addition, a recommendation for SIDS=
who
don’t have the funds to purchase land =
in another
country and are also facing bureaucratic resistance to requests for future humanitarian assistance, woul=
d be
to propose setting up an autonomous state, similar to the governance structure of First Nat=
ions
in Canada and Native American tribal reservations in the United States. In both countries mentioned, all member=
s of
the autonomous states living in these territories, i.e.
Navajo Nation in southwestern U.S., Métis
Nation in eastern Canada, etc., pay federal income taxes to the respective
government (United =
States
Department of the Interior Bureau of Indian Affairs, 1991). By following a similar model, island nations could be contributing to the economy=
of
the host country while maintaining their own sovereignty. Naturally, though,
binding agreements would need to be developed between the two countries that meet the requirements=
of
human rights and other cornerstones of international law. Protecting the SIDS’ government’s sovereignty would be
vital to the success of such a process,
however, meaning that political and social considerations would need to
Finally, it cannot be overemphasized t= hat a planned relocation should be implemented in phases, and that it should only= be considered if all other initiatives fail as adaptation measures. If countri= es such as the Maldives find planned relocation to be necessary, groups in the smallest or most vulnerable islands should be prioritized in a gradual move= ment towards the host country’s territory. This phased relocation should be spre= ad out over every couple of years in order to sufficiently take care of the needs of each group. This will not only reinf= orce the host government’s effort to properly welcome the new inhabitants, but will allow the respective SIDS government to identify how much l= and and resources are required to support the growing populations.
Main Priority=
Firstly, it is important to emphasize that when discussing initiatives such as planned relocation, the priority should be preparing for realistic outcomes. For instance, some scholars might argue that the best solution for SIDS would be to collaborate with th= e United Nations, or perhaps other intergovernmental organizations to produce new and/or binding frameworks for climate forced migrants within international law. Realistically, though, small states such as the Maldives will have to confront the fact that more powerful states might not feel responsible for providing territory or aid with relocation, regardless of any prior commitments expressed in climate framew= orks like the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC] (Atapattu, 2014). Moreover, even if land has already been bought for a plan= ned relocation, concerns relevant to cost, governance, and naturally the maintenance of cultural integrity remain.
Furthermore, it is also crucial to recognize the dangers of al= lowing panic to influence major public policy making, rather than focusing on pragmatic solutions. Throughout the sphere of media, and even in discussions amongst politicians and environmental scientists, there is often a tendency= to adopt an alarmist perspective “by invoking a policy discourse of immediacy = and urgency” (Arnall and Kothari, 2015). These representations of a “climate apocalypse” are problematic for two reasons. First, they create a notion th= at developing states are helpless without the support of the Western World, adding to stereotypes of victi= mhood and reinforcing the idea that SIDS lack the independence required to solve = such problems (Arnall and Kothari, = 2015). Second, these representations portray climate threats with such a strong sense of “immediacy” that ma= y distract governments from their populatuon’s more pressing concerns, such as the economy, healthcare, or political freedoms (Arnall and Kothari, 2015).
However, the alarmist voice often used in the media and politi= cs isn’t necessarily the right one. Planned relocation is not the only solutio= n to climate change for SIDS, and subsequently, should not be considered unless = all other viable alternatives have demonstrably failed. Adaptation measures suc= h as artificial islands and floating cities won’t be easy to implement, but they will support the sovereignty of SIDS as well as the cultural integrity of t= he populations living there. As such, these types of measures need to be prioritized over planned relocation schemes which may only serve as distractions from the current issues that islanders are facing. Of course, = this doesn’t mean that adaptation measures should be implemented in place of planned relocation; th= is scenario isn’t necessarily an ‘either-or’ situation. Unfortunately, not eve= ry project can be invested into, and therefore, governments would be more proactive by investing in initiatives that further develop their economies.=
Conclusions
In conclusion, the Maldives is one of many countries whose sur= vival is being threatened by climate change. As the global temperature increases and sea levels rise, many state= s, particularly SIDS, must confront the possibility of planning for a future w= here their islands may be submerged in one hundred years. Fortunately, there are several measures used by the Maldives that can be duplicated by other count= ries to protect populations from flooding and natural disasters. Mitigation meas= ures such as developing the use of renewable energy sources, and adaptation meas= ures such as the construction of floating cities and raised, artificial islands = can be used in conjunction with phased planned relocation to serve populations’ short-term as well as long-term needs. However, what is most important to <= span style=3D'letter-spacing:-.2pt'>take away from this analysis is that SIDS considering a planned relocation need to primarily focus their attention and resources on adaptation measures.
While planned relocation is an option, its feasibility is questionable, and such an initi= ative would upend the lives of populations who may feel a strong cultural connect= ion to their native homelands and would require national restructuring on a massive scale. Moreover, adaptation measures support countries in maintaining their sovereignty, and offer a current alternative to supporting sustainable development while tackling the effects of climate change. If po= licy officials work together now to protect their nations from the effects of climate change, they may prevent = forced climate migration from occurring and ensure a more sustainable and hopeful future for all islanders.
Acknowledgmen=
ts
This work was written with support from Patrick A. Taran
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5
Global Warming and Displacement: Challenges and
Solutions in the Maldives