https://doi.org/10.37815/rte.v34n1.899

Original paper - English

Global Warming and Displacement: Challenges and Solutions in the
Maldives

Calentamiento
global y desplazamiento: desafíos y soluciones en Maldivas

Roma Beke1 https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6106-7864

1Geneva School of Diplomacy and International Relations, Pregny-Chambésy, Switzerland

[email-masked]

Sent:               2021/12/30

Accepted:       2022/01/11

Published:      2022/03/15

Abstract

For Small Island Developing States such as the Maldives, climate change
poses an existential threat to the future and welfare of their countries’
populations. The effects of global warming, such as rising sea levels and
increased flooding, have forced countries to consider different measures in order to adapt, and some are even worried about a
possible climate forced migration as a result of these dangers. Unfortunately,
a lack of recognition of climate migrants under international law means that
island states are left on their own to decide the best course of action. This
raises an important question: What are possible challenges and solutions for
Small Island Developing States [SIDS], such as the Maldives, who are planning
for the climate forced migration of their populations? Using a case study of
the Maldives, this paper explores both mitigation and adaptation measures that
the Maldivian government has considered to develop its climate resilience. It
also argues that rather than plan for relocation, the Maldives and other SIDS
should prioritize keeping their populations together, maintaining cultural
integrity, and implementing initiatives which support sustainable development.

Keywords: migration, climate, relocation, mitigation, adaptation, population,
sovereignty, culture, development.

Summary: Introduction,
Methodological apparatus, Clarification of Terminology, Coverage in
Relevant International Legal Frameworks, Other Challenges with Current
Terminology, Mitigation Measures, Adaptation Measures, Planned Relocation
and Its Challenges, Further Recommendations, Main Priority and Conclusions.

How
to cite: Beke, R. (2022). Global Warming and Displacement:
Challenges and Solutions in the Maldives. Revista Tecnológica - Espol, 34(1), 75-91. http://www.rte.espol.edu.ec/index.php/tecnologica/article/view/899

Resumen

Para los pequeños Estados
insulares en desarrollo como las Maldivas, el cambio climático representa una
amenaza existencial para el futuro y el bienestar de las poblaciones de sus
países. Los efectos del calentamiento global, como el aumento del nivel del mar
y el aumento de las inundaciones, han obligado a los países a considerar
diferentes medidas para adaptarse, y algunos incluso están preocupados por una
posible migración forzada climática como resultado de estos peligros.
Desafortunadamente, la falta de reconocimiento de los migrantes climáticos bajo
el derecho internacional significa que los estados insulares deben decidir por sí
mismos el mejor curso de acción. Esto plantea una pregunta importante: ¿Cuáles
son los posibles desafíos y soluciones para los Pequeños Estados Insulares en
Desarrollo [PEID], como Maldivas, que están planificando la migración forzada
climática de sus poblaciones? Utilizando un estudio de caso de Maldivas, este
documento explora las medidas de mitigación y adaptación que el gobierno de
Maldivas ha considerado para desarrollar su resiliencia climática. También
argumenta que, en lugar de planificar la reubicación, las Maldivas y otros SIDS
deberían priorizar mantener unidas a sus poblaciones, mantener la integridad
cultural e implementar iniciativas que apoyen el desarrollo sostenible.

Palabras
clave: migración, clima, reubicación, mitigación,
adaptación, población, soberanía, cultura, desarrollo.

Introduction

In an opening speech given at the most recent United Nations Climate
Change Conference, the COP26, held in Glasgow, Scotland, the president of the
small island nation of the Maldives,
Ibrahim Mohamed Solih, began his address by
describing the existential threat that
global warming poses to his country: “Our islands are slowly being eaten by the
sea, one by one. If we do not reverse this trend, the Maldives will cease to
exist by the end of the century...Please, please do not let this opportunity go
to waste” (Meredith, 2021).

For Small Island Developing States [SIDS] like the Maldives, Fiji,
Tuvalu, and other island nations, the COP26 represented a pivotal moment to
show the world, and in particular nations  that
are high emitters
of carbon dioxide
[CO2] such as the United States of America and the People’s Republic of China
(Blokhin, 2021), how crucial taking global climate action is before rising sea levels force
the displacement of hundreds of millions of people across the world by the end
of the century (Brown, 2008). Bodies such as the International Organization for Migration [IOM] and the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [IPCC] predict that environmental degradation resulting
from factors such as rising sea levels and flooding (Baillat,
2021) will not only worsen humanitarian issues like poverty and war (Podesta,
2019), but could also result in changes to migration that will fundamentally
affect human mobility (Kälin and Weerasinghe, 2017).
According to IOM, in SIDS such as the Maldives, where it is predicted that
rising sea levels will overtake all of its islands by
2100, temporary or “permanent migration may be the only option[s] for those who
anticipate their homes becoming permanently uninhabitable as a consequence of
environmental changes” (Kälin and Weerasinghe, 2017). In addition, the “permanent relocation of
populations – whether initiated or supported by governments – is increasingly
considered as a solution of last resort” due to the costs and complexities
involved with planning for such scenarios (Kälin and Weerasinghe, 2017). Moreover, if these
migrants are not provided with sufficient assistance, they may be more at risk
from “exploitation, discrimination, and [even] human rights” abuses (Kälin
and Weerasinghe, 2017), forcing governments to intervene as they find ways to manage their populations’ needs. In
addition, for many islanders, the land they live on is considered a “part of their identity”, and
making the decision to leave the place of their ancestors is often a traumatic
experience which brings physical and psychological hardships (Borsa, 2020). All of these
concerns raise an important question: What
are possible challenges and
solutions for Small Island Developing States [SIDS], such as the Maldives, who are planning for the climate forced
migration of their populations?

Using the Maldives as a case study, this paper explores the
phenomenon of climate migration, first by contextualizing the terminology used
in such discussions and then identifying relevant existing international
regulations and frameworks. It will then explore potential mitigation and adaptation
measures developed by the Maldives and subsequently provide policy
recommendations for SIDS’ governments whose countries’ futures are threatened
by the realities of climate change.

Methodological
apparatus

The purpose of this paper is to provide a literature review of
existing analysis on the climate action measures planned by the Maldives and
other SIDS. This sweep of the literature will be used as a means of identifying
the appropriate next steps that such states can take to tackle the long-term
effects of climate change on their population.

The literature used was first identified through searches on search
engines such as Google Scholar and
JSTOR, as well as previous background reading done in an undergraduate course on international migration. The
materials analyzed were also authored by renowned experts in the topic, such as
Ilan Kelman, Johannes Luetz, Sumudu Atapattu, Alex
Arnall, and Uma Kothari.

Such secondary sources were also chosen for their relevance to the
study of climate change impacts on international migration,
and were used to examine the phenomenon of climate migration from
several perspectives, including environmental viewpoints, international legal
frameworks, and governance. The literature cited in this analysis also includes
the work of several international organizations, including the International
Organization for Migration [IOM], World Bank, European Commission, United
Nations Development Programme [UNDP], United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees [UNHCR], National Aeronautics and Space
Administration [NASA], and the World Refugee and Migration Council.

In order to ensure the quality and accuracy of the information in this paper,
the editorial process was followed with an anonymous peer review which provided
feedback and recommendations for revision. A further virtual meeting of peer
researchers was conducted in order to provide a space
for questions and comments relevant to the feedback.

Clarification
of Terminology

Firstly, it is important to clarify the terminology relevant to the
context of migration and climate change, as the lack of any globally recognized
or international legal definitions for migrants as a result
of environmental degradation (International Organization for Migration,
2020) means that different organizations and groups utilize a variety of terms
to describe the issues involved. One term developed by IOM in 2007 is the
phrase “environmental migration” to denote any type of migration in which
environmental disasters are the drivers of human movement (Kälin
and Weerasinghe, 2017). Furthermore, IOM defines environmental
migrants as “persons or groups of persons who,
predominantly for reasons of sudden or progressive change in the environment
that adversely affects their lives or living conditions, are obliged to leave
their habitual homes, or choose to do so, either temporarily or permanently,
and who move either within their country or abroad” (International Organization
for Migration, 2020).

However, for the Maldives and other SIDS, another, narrower term has
also been used as a way to better represent the
realities of forced migration from the effects of climate change: climate migration. According to
IOM’s guide to international migration law, “Glossary on Migration”, climate
migration is a specific “subcategory of environmental migration” and is defined
as the “movement of a person or groups of persons who, predominantly for reasons
of sudden or progressive change in the environment due to climate change, are
obliged to leave their habitual place of residence, or choose to do so, either
temporarily or permanently, within a State or across an international border”
(International Organization for Migration, 2020). Similar to environmental
migration, the term ‘climate migration’ is not a recognized one in
international law; however, it has appeared in several international legal
instruments in the past few decades, including the binding “Cancún
Agreements on Climate Change Adaptation” adopted by countries at the COP16
conference in 2010, an agreement which recognized three types of human movement
exacerbated by climate change: “displacement, migration, and planned
relocation” (International Organization for Migration, 2020). These terms also
indicate specific patterns or forms of migration; for example, displacement is used to
discuss people who flee their homes as a result of
“sudden-onset events in the environment” (International Organization for
Migration, 2020). Moreover, planned relocation is, “in the
context of disasters or environmental degradation, including when due to the
effects of climate change, [refers to] a planned process in which persons or
groups of persons move or are assisted to move away from their homes or place
of temporary residence, are settled in a new location, and provided with the
conditions for rebuilding their lives” (International Organization for
Migration, 2020). Thus, unlike displacement, which is a consequence of a
climate related disaster, planned relocation is a more deliberate course of
action which seeks to provide relief to migrants over a long
term period.

Although all the terms mentioned above may connect to each other in
some way, it should be emphasized that the nature of their utility truly lies
within their specificity. Why? Well, using the correct terminology is critical
to a comprehensive understanding of the issues involved in migration resulting
from environmental degradation. For example, climate
forced migrants who have been assisted with planned relocation from
their homes due to rising sea levels are facing very different circumstances
than, perhaps, environmental emergency migrants who have had to
flee due to a tsunami or earthquake. The consequences of either group’s
situation should not be minimized in any way, but for the former, the rising
sea levels may pose a threat to the very survival of their country. In short,
for all the aforementioned reasons, it may be more
appropriate to refer to the people living in [SIDS] like the Maldives as
‘climate forced migrants’ rather than an alternative, broader term such as
‘environmental migrants’.

Secondly, recognizing the correct terminology is an important step in
an analysis of this issue, particularly because the terms used to describe
climate migrants often connect to the lack of existing binding international
legal frameworks or agreements that are relevant in this area. For example, there
is a popular misconception that environmental migrants, or even specifically
climate migrants, may also be referred to as ‘climate refugees’; however, this
term is inappropriate, for a variety of reasons. One is that in
order to be considered a refugee, a person must be, as defined by the
1951 Refugee Convention, “unable or unwilling to return to their country of
origin owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political
opinion” (UNHCR, 2017). Refugees cannot simply be used to describe people who
are fleeing their home; there must be an extreme factor such as war, armed
violence, or persecution (UNHCR, 2017) that makes it particularly unsafe for
that person to return. To call environmental or climate migrants ‘refugees’ is
not only misleading and holds “no legal basis in international migration law”,
but also “could potentially undermine the international legal regime for the
protection of refugees” (Olsson, 2015). Although climate migrants face their
own unique struggles, it appears that most are not in immediate danger or
afraid that they will be targeted for belonging to a specific group. As a
result, binding international legal treaties which recognize and serve to
protect refugees, such as the 1951 Refugee Convention, or principles under
international human rights law, such as the principle of non-refoulement, do
not acknowledge migrants facing environmental degradation as holding refugee
status. Thus, environmental or climate migrants are not protected under
international law or afforded the same rights, i.e.
the ability to seek asylum.

Coverage in Relevant International Legal Frameworks

Of course, this isn’t to say
that climate migrants are not recognized at all in international migration
policy or law. Indeed, there are a few relevant non-binding agreements, i.e. the Global
Compact for Migration [GCM], an international agreement which highlighted
global warming and other phenomena of climate change as drivers “of forced
migration through calls for building community resilience and adaptation
capacity as well as for relocation schemes and commitments that ‘enhance the
availability and flexibility of pathways for regular migration’” (McCarney,
2021). However, even within the GCM, the terminology used effectively conceals
the circumstances of people living in SIDS such as the Maldives, as the lack of meaningful solutions for migrants
fleeing uninhabitable lands due to the effects of climate change [for example, rising sea
levels] are not properly addressed. The agreement
instead favors policies such as ‘migration with dignity’ and connecting
migration guidelines to the Sustainable Development Goals (McCarney, 2021),
which are not extensive enough to deal with the complexities of climate
displacement issues.

Moreover, other non-binding frameworks, such as the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC]’s Task Force on Displacement [TFD], which
was developed by the Paris Climate Accords [2015], are restricted to providing
recommendations (McCarney, 2021) that are not yet enforced by an international body, making it difficult for climate migrants to be supported in
practical ways. In fact, a report made to the TFD in 2018 highlighted a
frustrating lack of meaningful leadership and collaboration in this area, both
in the United Nations and within international legal frameworks (McCarney,
2021). Worse still, not only has the
UN failed to develop applicable solutions, but often even when mechanisms were
created to support frameworks for climate migrants, the political will to act
was so weak that there would be no
follow through on the course of action. For example, in 2005 a resolution titled “The legal implications
of the disappearance of States…for environmental reasons, including the
implications for the human rights of their residents…” was adopted by the United Nations Sub-Commission on the
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in order to request the appointment
of a Special Rapporteur, who would create an inclusive study on the legal
consequences of the disappearances of countries due to environmental
degradation (McAdam, 2011). However, this study was never performed, and the
resolution remains unfulfilled until today for unknown reasons.

In addition to the
above-mentioned lack of protections, another gap in the legal protection of
climate forced migrants is the lack of an acknowledgement of de facto
statelessness, or persons who may enjoy the protections of a
government currently, but may not be protected in the
future if their governments don’t exist or hold the capacity to provide needed assistance (Olsson, 2015).
The reason for such a concern might be the following: if states such as SIDS
might eventually have to consider measures such as planned relocation, an solution explored
later in this paper, due to the disappearance of islands from rising sea levels, the respective governments
could perhaps be unable to serve their citizens and provide them with the
services typically coordinated by national officials. Just because these island
populations are protected by their governments currently does not guarantee
that the authorities can meet those commitments following a climate forced migration.
Unfortunately, modern international law on statelessness, as derived from the
1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, is “premised on
the denial of nationality through the operation of the law of a particular
state…despite the fact that a diversity of human rights are
affected by environmentally induced migration” (Olsson, 2015).

In short, the combination of
a lack of existing legally binding,
enforceable migration policies for climate migrants, and little political will
to create such policies, means that potential climate forced migrants from states such as the Maldives are stuck
in a sort of ‘legal limbo’ that unfortunately provides them with little
protection or even recognition in international governance.

Other
Challenges with Current Terminology

According to Dr. Ilan Kelman, a renowned expert in
risk and disaster reduction at the University
College London in the U.K., there are two fundamental issues in current
discourse on climate migration: the difficulty in establishing how many climate
migrants there are in  the world, and
misunderstandings on what the basic causes of forced climate migration are. In his paper titled “Imaginary Numbers of
Climate Change Migrants?”, Kelman explains these issues in order to
assert the following: there isn’t any meaningful evidence to back up that
climate change is a direct cause of any migration patterns (Kelman,
2019). While some intergovernmental
organizations or agencies may point to statistics of climate migrants in
different countries, Kelman argues that no such
numbers are accurate. There are many possible reasons for such a claim, one of
which is that theoretically, the best way for researchers to count climate
migrants in populations would be to wait until after the deaths of the migrants in order
to record their status, as it cannot be definitive until it is known if
the migrant would ever return, or whether their migration was a more permanent
phenomenon (Kelman, 2019). However, this would never
work in practice because human beings are not stationary; most don’t stay in
one place for their entire lives (Kelman, 2019).
People can move away from their homelands and return in the future. As a
result, when migrants do move away
from their native countries and such movements are recorded, “inconsistency
might emerge if people purport to move due to climate change impact”, even if
those migrants move back to their homelands in the future without considering
possible threats from climate change
(Kelman, 2019). This is an interesting view, as agreeing with Kelman’s
assertion means that experts can never be too sure about whether climate
migrants exist at all, at least if they continue to use the same methods to
calculate such populations.

Similarly, Kelman’s second issue, which
asserts that climate migration is generally
the result of a “lack of support mechanisms to deal with climate change
impacts, rather than climate change”
itself, also highlights that current statistics of climate
migrants may not be helpful (Kelman, 2019). These
groups may not have been forced to move due to the effects
of climate change, such as rising sea
levels, but instead have faced the consequences of their governments’ failure
to implement feasible adaptive measures. Subsequently, the term ‘climate
migrants’ may not be the appropriate name for this group, but
could potentially be a distraction to
solving the challenges presented by national development. Kelman
argues that if countries stop blaming their issues on climate change and
instead focus on their preparedness for threats to security, they can be
successful in improving the quality of life for their populations. One example
of a successful country to model after its disaster reduction structure is,
according to Kelman, Bangladesh (Kelman,
2020). The southasian country, which is vulnerable to climate disasters such as
tsunamis and flooding, has for decades experienced
high migration levels, but through its national planning on cyclone
preparation, Kelman contends that Bangladesh has
“indicated what can and what should be achieved
regarding weather, irrespective of climate…change” (Kelman,
2020). In short, climate migration
may not be an issue if countries are adequately prepared for natural disasters,
which is why having strong mitigation measures and adaptation measures is so
crucial to ensuring people aren’t
forced from their homes in the first place.

Mitigation
Measures

Ergo, all these considerations lead to a crucial question: If
climate forced migrants are not protected under international law, then what can countries like the
Maldives, Fiji, Tuvalu, or other
Small Island Developing States [SIDS] that fear the disappearance of their islands do to protect the future of
their peoples? Although global warming is of course a problem which can’t be
solved by the SIDS alone, there are practical measures that countries like the
Maldives are already taking in the interests of their populations’ welfare. In the context of climate action, these types
of measures are often divided into two categories: mitigation and adaptation.
Mitigation refers to measures that help maintain or lower carbon dioxide and
other greenhouse gas emissions, while adaptation refers to adjusting to the
current consequences of climate change (National Aeronautics and Space
Administration, n.d.). Over the past few decades, the Maldives has implemented
several mitigation and adaptation
measures with the purpose of overcoming the effects of climate change, and in
particular global warming, in order to protect
Maldivians from rising sea levels and flooding.

Subsequently, one major focus of the Maldives' mitigation measures
has been promoting “low carbon development” as a means to
help decrease carbon emissions (Climate and Clean
Air Coalition, 2015). According to information gathered by the Global
Climate Change Alliance Plus Initiative, a climate focused project funded by
the European Union, the Maldives has prioritized “leveraging public-private
partnerships” in order to manage energy efficiency and support further
development of renewable energy sources [i.e. wind,
solar, hybrid, etc.] on the islands (Climate and
Clean Air Coalition, 2015).

In addition, the government has collaborated with local private
resorts to create new finance frameworks which would help decrease carbon
emissions produced by the country’s popular
tourism sector (Global Climate Change Alliance Plus (Climate
and Clean Air Coalition, 2015). Moreover, in 2019, the Maldives
introduced its National Action Plan on
Air Pollutants, a comprehensive scheme that details twenty-eight different
mitigation measures “across three priority source sectors: waste, electricity
generation, and transport” (Climate and
Clean Air Coalition, 2015). According to the United Nations Development Programme, the plan “is viewed as a landmark initiative
within the disaster risk reduction and adaptation communities” (United Nations
Development Programme, n.d.). Among the suggestions
made, the most notable ones are: advancing existing
and improving access to “public transport, bicycle lanes, and footpaths”;
making electric cars or other electric vehicles
tax-free; pledging to discontinue the development and sale of
hydrofluorocarbons [HFCs] in favor of
the more sustainable method, district cooling; and even banning future sales of
cars older than five years in the country (Climate and Clean Air Coalition,
2015). According to the Climate and
Clean Air Coalition at the United Nations Environment Programme
[UNEP], if this National Action Plan
is fully carried out, the Maldives would see a “forty percent reduction of
black carbon and a twenty-seven percent reduction of nitrogen oxide…emissions”
by the year 2030. Arguably, this
would be an incredible outcome, considering that the Maldives already only
contributes “0.003% to global emissions” (Climate and Clean Air Coalition, 2015).

Nevertheless, how do these mitigation measures connect to migration,
and more specifically, climate forced migrants? According to the United Nations
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s report on Mitigation of Climate
[2014], the aim of mitigation is to ensure that development is consistent with
sustainability (National Aeronautics and Space Administration, n.d.). Bearing
this aim in mind, it is important to reiterate that if the world continues to
follow an unsustainable path through development, which then increases carbon
emissions, the consequences would be severe for people living in SIDS, which
are dramatically affected by rising sea levels. Thus, countries like the
Maldives enact mitigation measures because while they unfortunately can’t
always influence other more powerful states to take climate action, they can
take their own steps to reduce their likelihood of climate forced migration in
the future.

Adaptation
Measures

Naturally, mitigation measures are often not sufficient for
countries to prepare for the effects of climate change, which is why the
Maldives has also implemented adaptation measures. Such efforts are not only
designed to help the Maldives adjust to climate change, but to also “take
advantage of any positive opportunities that may arise” (The European Climate Adaptation Platform Climate-ADAPT,
2020). There are different types of adaptation techniques which have
been grouped into the following classifications by the European Climate
Adaptation Platform: “gray, green, and soft measures” (The
European Climate Adaptation Platform Climate-ADAPT, 2020). Gray measures
are “technological and engineering solutions” designed to generate new types of
infrastructure and land management in order to adapt
to climate change challenges (The European Climate
Adaptation Platform Climate-ADAPT, 2020). Green measures strengthen the
“resilience” and “adaptation capacity” of a country through an “ecosystem-based
approach”, and soft measures may include “legal, social, financial” or
governmental policies which can reinforce adaptation capacity as well as
mobilize awareness on the effects of climate change (The
European Climate Adaptation Platform Climate-ADAPT, 2020).

Wetland
Conservation

One green measure which constitutes a significant feature of the
Maldives’ Climate Change Adaptation
Project [CCAP] has been conserving the country’s wetlands (Ali, 2018). The importance of protecting these
areas cannot be understated, as wetlands “can store several tens of millions of
cubic meters of water”, providing a powerful flood management tool which act as
natural “barriers against rising sea levels” (Ali, 2018). Wetlands also help to purify the
groundwater flowing through the ecosystem and manage erosion of shorelines (Ali, 2018). Thus, in
order to protect these important areas, the Maldives has begun carrying out new solid waste management projects to
safeguard the wetlands from illegal waste dumping practices (Ali, 2018). The
purpose of such initiatives is to bolster already occurring phenomena in the
hydraulic cycle like groundwater recharge, which can “restore groundwater
levels and store water for later use” as well as “reduce flood risk” (Escriva-Bou et al., 2021).

Moreover, such a project can also be considered a soft measure for
its boost to the wider population’s
awareness of climate change. In the interest of “biodiversity conservation”,
the Maldives is using the protection of the wetlands to increase its nature based
tourism by making the areas more enticing to tourists (Ali, 2018). This will be achieved by defining spaces as national
parks for hiking activities, building bird observatories for bird-watching
enthusiasts, and building more pathways along the coast for visitors who wish to experience the Maldives’ grand
views (Ali, 2018). The revenue generated from this development in the tourism
sector can then be used to renovate infrastructure for climate change
resilience, while simultaneously bringing attention to a new feature of the country,
notwithstanding its beaches or coral reefs (Ali, 2018). More
importantly, though, these developments will not only benefit tourists but
Maldivians too, as protecting the wetlands
will also support their livelihoods. One of the plants native to the Maldives’ wetlands, taro, is considered both
an important source of food, but is also used as a “medicinal herb” and a
material used in traditional “embroidered handicrafts” such as mats and baskets
(Ali, 2018). Safeguarding the wetlands means that the supply of taro will be
protected against illegal cutting of the plants, which is a growing concern
among the islands’ artistic communities. It also
provides visitors with an opportunity to view first-hand how protecting the
islands from the effects of climate change is crucial to maintaining the
locals’ way of life and why it is fundamental
for the world to invest in SIDS such as the Maldives.

Sea Wall
Infrastructure

However, protecting the wetlands is only the ‘tip of the iceberg’ in
terms of the Maldives’ adaptation measures. One adaptation measure which is not
only a possible solution for the Maldives, but one which the island state is
actively implementing, is the building of sea walls to deal with rising sea
levels (Kapoor, 2020). Sea walls are defined by the National Maritime
Foundation as “heavily engineered inflexible structures which…prevent sliding
of the soil” and are helpful in acting as a defensive barrier against flooding
(Kapoor, 2020). The Maldives has been exploring the use of sea walls for
decades, but it recently began increasing production of the barriers, which are
usually made of concrete or mortar (The European Climate Adaptation Platform
Climate-ADAPT, 2020), following the El Niño phenomenon in 2016, a “warming of
the equatorial Pacific Ocean” that led to one of the most damaging losses to
coral life via “mass bleaching” in the Maldives since 1950 (Stockdale et al.,
2017). Sea walls are incredibly useful to coastal communities for several
reasons: they are designed to be storm-resistant; they preserve eroding cliffs
and other rock structures; and they shield the land from “wave overtopping” as
their heights can secure the distance between the mainland and the beach level,
also called the dune (The European Climate Adaptation Platform Climate-ADAPT,
2020). According to the Maldives’ current Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abdulla
Shahid, building more sea walls is fundamental to protecting the country’s
coasts from the ravaging effects of climate change, as highlighted by his quote
in an interview with the Reuters news agency in 2020: “In order to protect the
islands, we need to start building sea walls…It’s expensive, but we need
[them]. We can’t wait until all of [the islands] are
being taken away” (Pal & Ghoshal, 2020).

Fortunately, some larger states have already stepped up to help
develop the Maldives’ sea walls. For instance, Japan had finished constructing
a six kilometer long sea wall in 2002 along the
Maldivian capital of Malé which ended up protecting
the city considerably “from the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami” (Kapoor, 2020), one
of the deadliest underwater earthquakes ever documented. Such a sea wall is not
only useful for protection against natural disasters in the short-term, but
perhaps long term defense as well, particularly
against rising sea levels and increased flooding resulting from global warming.

Nevertheless, it is important to note that the building of sea wall
infrastructure does have disadvantages, some of which may arguably outweigh any
previously referenced benefits. One disadvantage is that focusing too much on
building sea walls or other types of “hard
infrastructure” might divert attention and resources away from soft adaptation
measures which can be just as critical for building a climate resilient country
and economy,
i.e. training policymakers or supporting
climate action education for local communities (Kapoor,
2020). Another disadvantage is that sea walls are not completely
sustainable in the long term for the preservation of the local environment,
especially in relation to beaches. Although sea walls serve as excellent defensive
barriers, they have been “reported to aggravate
the problem of beach erosion” (Kapoor, 2020),
a process which has severe consequences on the animals who have made the
beaches their home. For example, sea walls may
block sea turtles from “nesting sites” and can even be trapped by them (Kapoor, 2020). Subsequently, the repercussions of
the structures on erosion and animal habitats raise
concerns on whether sea walls are sufficiently environmentally friendly
to justify their continued production, or if alternative, less damaging options
need to be emphasized.

Floating City
Model

Another innovative adaptation measure the Maldives has begun
implementing is the development of
waterfront residences for the purpose of building a “floating city” (Marchant, 2021). The project is being designed by
the Maldivian government in collaboration with the Netherlands to develop “thousands of waterfront residences
and services floating along a flexible,
functional grid across a 200-hectare lagoon” (Marchant,
2021). These residences will form the basis of an “island city” that
will be located in a “warm-water lagoon” about ten minutes from Malé by boat (Marchant, 2021). The reasoning behind such a
design is rooted  in a focus on sustainability
and protecting the islands from rising sea levels. The Maldives is hoping that
by modeling the Netherlands’ innovative production of “floating social
housing”, it can create unique aquatic, urban grids which can meet the growing
needs of its population (Marchant, 2021).

One reason why the floating city model might be preferable to the
production of sea wall infrastructure
is that it has “minimal impacts” on the local environment in that it doesn’t contribute to beach erosion or
destruction of the coral reefs (Marchant, 2021).
The waterfront residences can also be created independently, meaning that no
existing land needs to be used for the model to work. More importantly, though,
rising sea levels would not be as great of a concern as the residences would
rise along with the waves (Marchant, 2021).
Such an outcome could be groundbreaking for the Maldives, as the presumption of
climate forced migration from the country is generally based on rising sea
levels making the lands uninhabitable in the future. However, if the floating
city model allows the state to adapt with the sea while maintaining the population’s
quality of life, this migration would not have to take place.

Another benefit to the floating city model is that the
interconnectedness inherent in the model’s plan would not only help
Maldivians deal with issues from climate change, but
could also propel the country further towards more sustainable
development. The idea is to construct
a chain of connecting water channels, bridges, and docks that would make it
easy for locals to go to businesses, houses, and other facilities across the
floating city (Marchant, 2021). Moreover,
the city would run on energy derived from renewable resources such as solar,
wind, and aquatic power, making the country less reliant on fossil fuels or
other sources contributing to the
climate crisis.

Artificial
Islands

Likewise, a third adaptation measure which could be a powerful
solution for the Maldives if further developed is the construction of
artificial islands. This plan goes a step further beyond the floating city
model, as building new islands means physically raising the height of the existing land to make the environment more flood-resistant. While the plan might seem difficult to
execute at a first glance, the Maldives had already begun building such an
island in 1997. Known to the locals as Hulhumalé,
this artificial island was built in order to “relieve
overcrowding in Malé”, and today it is the
“fourth-largest island” in the country with a population of over 50,000 people (Voiland & NASA Earth Observatory, 2021). Hulhumalé
was constructed by “pumping sand from the seafloor onto a submerged coral
platform”, allowing it to rise about two meters above sea level, which is about
twice the height of Malé (Voiland & NASA
Earth Observatory, 2021). While the island had not initially been developing with
climate-resilience in mind, Hulhumalé has the
capacity to inhabit or house other
groups of the population who might need to evacuate there in case of natural
disasters such as earthquakes or tsunamis (Voiland & NASA Earth
Observatory, 2021), providing
the government to with an opportunity to already begin moving people from smaller islands which are more
vulnerable to flooding.

In addition, locals who now inhabit Hulhumalé
prefer living on the raised island for the following reasons: it “has wide sand
beaches instead of a concrete sea wall” (Hamilton,
2008), due to the lack of a need for a physical barrier; there is more
space for individuals and families, alleviating the congestion that locals
previously living in Malé had to deal with; and it’s
clean because the government could already build modern sanitation systems from
the initial phase of the development.

Following these positive reactions, one recommendation for the
Maldivian government would be to not only help more locals move to Hulhumalé, but to focus on the expanded development of
artificial islands. Further land raising would help protect the Maldives against rising sea levels and
could be a long-term climate-resilient solution combined with the floating city
model. It would also support urbanization and greater sustainable development
in the country. Of course, there are some considerations which need to be
accounted for in such planning. For example, the extent of “the height
allowance over time” would need to be thought through in relation to variables
such as “flood hazard e.g.
sea levels, waves, surges, tides, and
exposure e.g. land use and defenses” (Brown
et al., 2020). Naturally, the higher the allowance for sea level rise,
the better, as the higher the islands rise in height, the lower the chance would be
of those islands having to face flooding (Brown
et al., 2020). There are also some
challenges which arise from this practice; for instance, even if the rising sea levels do not directly
impact the raised islands, the “secondary effects of sea level rise such as groundwater stalinization”
would still have to be dealt with (Brown et
al., 2020). A more significant challenge,
moreover, would be the costs involved in such a project. The following question
remains: Who would be paying to build these raised islands? Well, according
to the Maldives, other countries, particularly those which are higher emitters
of carbon dioxide and thus larger contributors to global warming, should be
responsible for contributing the
funds (Hamilton, 2008). While these countries would be hesitant to help, it is arguably in their best interests to do
so, as the lack of long-term solutions like the floating city model and
artificial islands could mean that planned relocation, albeit a gradual, phased one, might be the only option for
the Maldivian population.

Future
Floating

Although it has already begun implementing various mitigation and
adaptation measures, the Maldives is
not the only island state which has developed new ways of tackling the effects
of climate change. One method which Maldivians or other SIDS could learn from,
and possibly apply to their own populations, is the ‘future floating’ model
created in Bangladesh. According to Johannes Luetz, a
social scientist specialized in human climate migration, Bangladesh’s
“revolutionary solution” to intense annual floods involves a “flat-bottomed fleet of 42 boats that are school bus and
schoolhouse in one, providing education and other services to more than 1,500
students in nearly 400 villages…” (Luetz, 2008). The
main benefit of this model is that the students who live in coastal areas would
not be forced to relocate to urban communities to pursue their secondary
education [or even basic schooling, in many cases].

Nevertheless, there are numerous other advantages which not only
protect these students from the
impacts of rising sea levels, but even increase accessibility and promote
sustainable development. For instance, many Bangladeshi students in coastal
communities would drop out during monsoon season because taking a flooded route
to school for a couple months was extremely dangerous (Luetz,
2008). However, the boats created for the ‘future floating’ model allowed these
students to continue their education during monsoon season, preventing
disruptions which would have otherwise limited their opportunities in the future. In addition, the Bangladesh
government worked with indigenous communities to ensure that the production of
the boats was done by indigenous manufacturers, supporting local development.

What is important to take away from the ‘future floating’ model, and
other innovations similar
to its design, is that mitigation and adaptation measures should not
only be focused on climate action. As well, governments should consider how to
implement policies which increase
sustainable development and make the lives of their peoples better than before.

Planned
Relocation and Its Challenges

However, why might planned relocation be
considered a last resort option for the Maldives? Firstly, it is important to
explain what exactly the term implies. Planned relocation does not mean moving
to a new island within the Maldives as the artificial island developments are
trying to achieve, but instead refers to moving to an entirely different country or territory. Thus, the
reasons for the hesitance to implement such a system are varied, but one
significant factor lies with the hardships associated with the moving process itself. For islanders in the
Maldives, the land they live on is often considered a natural extension of
their cultural identity. To leave
their home behind as a result of climate change disruption would arguably be a
traumatic experience, and would mean that communities
formed over generations in ancestral lands would have to ‘start over’ in a
place they’ve never been to before. Another challenge would be the “extent to which the needs of affected populations and the impact of
planned relocations on them are taken into account” (Gallo,
2019). Moving an entire country’s population to another territory would
have significant impacts on the lives of the population already living there,
and if the relocation is not planned out carefully, the possibility for
violence, xenophobia, discrimination, and perhaps even armed conflict
between the two groups could be high. Moreover, a relevant concern would be
“land tenure issues in terms of evacuated areas, land acquisition, [and]
relocation sites” (Gallo, 2019). Not only
would finding available land to house such a large population be difficult but obtaining that land
legally and ensuring that the relocated population is recognized under domestic laws, as well as public
international law, would be a major challenge. An
additional challenge would relate to governance; for instance, how would the Maldives govern its population and
form the basis of a country if its population was living in a new territory?

Subsequently, in such discussions about the challenges of planned
relocation, it is critical to point out that current international law is often
insufficient to resolve such issues, as the scope is neither large enough nor
fully developed. For example, according to international
environmental lawyer Sumudu Atapattu, the application
of international legal principles, such as the right to self-determination, to
contexts of planned relocation has never been thoroughly investigated,
especially on such a large scale with regards to entire populations from SIDS
(Atapattu, 2014). In her paper titled Climate
Change: Disappearing States, Migration, and Challenges for International Law published
by the Washington Journal of Environmental Law and Policy, Atapattu further explains that it
is not yet known if populations from a disappeared state would govern
themselves, or even if they could use the right
to self-determination in order to demand territory
from other states for their own sovereignty (Atapattu, 2014). Of course,
self-determination is not the only defining principle of international law at
play here; according to researcher Jeremy Keller, the right to nationality is also an important
entitlement in international law, regardless
of whether the territory of one’s nation
has disappeared (Kelley, 2011). Essentially, international law does not have adequate frameworks to
unravel this dichotomy, as even existing legislation such as the Law of the Sea Convention does not
articulate what would happen to maritime zones associated with disappeared
states. As such, SIDS may have to rely on the goodwill of larger, more powerful states to support
their enduring existence.

How, then, is the Maldives planning to execute
planned relocation? And how should SIDS implement this process in order to account for the needs of all populations
involved? First, the Maldivian government has been considering which countries
are prime locations for planned
relocation for over a decade, with Australia, India, and Sri Lanka having been considered due to proximity and
similarity in culture (Ramesh, 2008). In fact, the government has already “set up a sovereign
savings account, funded by revenue from tourism” to purchase a new homeland in
one of these countries (Burgess, 2012).
Although other SIDS such as Kiribati and Tuvalu have held talks with the Australian
government to “discuss the possibility
of immigration assistance”, the Maldives has created their fund with the hope that by owning their land, the government
will not “require the bureaucratic generosity of other nations” (Burgess,
2012). However, such a solution is not feasible for
all countries considering planned relocation.

Further
Recommendations

In addition, a recommendation for SIDS who
don’t have the funds to purchase land in another
country and are also facing bureaucratic resistance to requests for future humanitarian assistance, would be
to propose setting up an autonomous state, similar to the governance structure of First Nations
in Canada and Native American tribal reservations in the United States. In both countries mentioned, all members of
the autonomous states living in these territories, i.e.
Navajo Nation in southwestern U.S., Métis
Nation in eastern Canada, etc., pay federal income taxes to the respective
government (United States
Department of the Interior Bureau of Indian Affairs, 1991). By following a similar model, island nations could be contributing to the economy of
the host country while maintaining their own sovereignty. Naturally, though,
binding agreements would need to be developed between the two countries that meet the requirements of
human rights and other cornerstones of international law. Protecting the SIDS’ government’s sovereignty would be
vital to the success of such a process,
however, meaning that political and social considerations would need to be comprehensively accounted for.

Finally, it cannot be overemphasized that a
planned relocation should be implemented in phases, and that it should only be
considered if all other initiatives fail as adaptation measures. If countries
such as the Maldives find planned relocation to be necessary, groups in the
smallest or most vulnerable islands should be prioritized in a gradual movement
towards the host country’s territory. This phased relocation should be spread
out over every couple of years in order to
sufficiently take care of the needs of each group. This will not only reinforce
the host government’s effort to properly welcome the new inhabitants,
but will allow the respective SIDS government to identify how much land
and resources are required to support the growing populations.

Main Priority

Firstly, it is important to emphasize that when discussing
initiatives such as planned relocation, the priority should be preparing for
realistic outcomes. For instance, some  scholars
might argue that the best solution for SIDS would be to collaborate with the United Nations, or perhaps other
intergovernmental organizations to produce new and/or binding frameworks for
climate forced migrants within international law.
Realistically, though, small states such as the Maldives will have to
confront the fact that more powerful states might not feel responsible for providing territory or aid with
relocation, regardless of any prior commitments expressed in climate frameworks
like the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCCC]
(Atapattu, 2014). Moreover, even if land has already been bought for a planned
relocation, concerns relevant to cost, governance, and naturally the maintenance of cultural integrity remain.

Furthermore, it is also crucial to recognize the dangers of allowing
panic to influence major public policy making, rather than focusing on
pragmatic solutions. Throughout the sphere of media, and even in discussions
amongst politicians and environmental scientists, there is often a tendency to
adopt an alarmist perspective “by invoking a policy discourse of immediacy and
urgency” (Arnall and Kothari, 2015). These representations of a “climate
apocalypse” are problematic for two reasons. First, they create a notion that
developing states are helpless
without the support of the Western World, adding to stereotypes of victimhood
and reinforcing the idea that SIDS lack the independence required to solve such
problems (Arnall and Kothari, 2015).
Second, these representations portray climate threats with such a strong sense of “immediacy” that may distract
governments from their populatuon’s more pressing concerns, such as the
economy, healthcare, or political freedoms (Arnall and Kothari, 2015).

However, the alarmist voice often used in the media and politics
isn’t necessarily the right one. Planned relocation is not the only solution to
climate change for SIDS, and subsequently, should not be considered unless all
other viable alternatives have demonstrably failed. Adaptation measures such as
artificial islands and floating cities won’t be easy to implement, but they
will support the sovereignty of SIDS as well as the cultural integrity of the
populations living there. As such, these types of measures need to be
prioritized over planned relocation schemes which may only serve as
distractions from the current issues that islanders are facing. Of course, this
doesn’t mean that adaptation measures should be implemented in place of planned relocation; this
scenario isn’t necessarily an ‘either-or’ situation. Unfortunately, not every
project can be invested into, and therefore, governments would be more
proactive by investing in initiatives that further develop their economies.

Conclusions

In conclusion, the Maldives is one of many countries whose survival
is being threatened by climate
change. As the global temperature increases and sea levels rise, many states,
particularly SIDS, must confront the possibility of planning for a future where
their islands may be submerged in one hundred years. Fortunately, there are
several measures used by the Maldives that can be duplicated by other countries
to protect populations from flooding and natural disasters. Mitigation measures
such as developing the use of renewable energy sources, and adaptation measures
such as the construction of floating cities and raised, artificial islands can
be used in conjunction with phased planned relocation to serve populations’
short-term as well as long-term needs. However, what is most important to take away
from this analysis is that SIDS considering a planned relocation need to
primarily focus their attention and resources on adaptation measures.

While planned relocation is an option, its feasibility is
questionable, and such an initiative
would upend the lives of populations who may feel a strong cultural connection to their native homelands and would
require national restructuring on a massive scale. Moreover, adaptation
measures support countries in maintaining their sovereignty, and offer a current alternative to supporting
sustainable development while tackling the effects of climate change. If policy
officials work together now to protect their nations from the effects of climate change, they may prevent forced
climate migration from occurring and ensure a more sustainable and hopeful
future for all islanders.

Acknowledgments

This work was written with support from Patrick A. Taran, Invited Co-Editor of the RTE Special Issue International Migration. The author wishes to express her gratitude
to Mr. Taran for all of his support with this paper.

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