https://doi.org/10.37815/rte.v34n1.856
Original paper - English
Has Anti-Migration and Anti-Refugee Discourse Hampered Progress aga=
inst
Child Labour?
¿Ha obstaculizado
el discurso antimigración y antirrefugiados el progreso contra el trabajo
infantil?
Simon
Steyne1 https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2870-62=
38
1
Sent: = 2021/08/24<= o:p>
Accepted: 2022/01/25
Published: 2022/03/15
Abstract
The chequered applicati= on, since 2000, of integrated policies to eradicate the intersectional root cau= ses of child labour sits more recently in a wider political context of recrudes= cent populist ethnonationalism accompanied by weakened respect by the government= s of many countries for the rules-based international system and rights-based development. The author suggests that (apart from Northern-centric trade and policy interests) influential populist-nationalist governments (including t= hose of the United Kingdom (linked to Brexit), and Australia (linked to the “Bali Process”) have contributed to diverting global attention from the largest cohort intended to benefit from Sustainable Development Goal Target 8.7 - t= he 160 million children now in child labour - by conflating forced labour with trafficking and trafficking with migration and asylum. This conflation seek= s to demonise asylum-seekers, refugees, and economic migrants. It is an important element of the discourse of populist-nationalist ruling parties in their se= arch for continued electoral support and reflects a willingness to violate international law protecting human rights.
=
Keywords: Fundamental principles and rights at work (FPRW); employment, worker=
s,
child labour, forced labour, trafficking, migration, asylum, UN Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs), ethnonationalism, xenophobia, antisemitism,
exploitation, Brexit, Windrush Scandal, the Bali Process, human rights.
Summary: Introduction;
Trends, What Went Wrong? Populist Ethnonationalism: The English “Examp=
le”
– Racism, the
“Hostile Environment`”, Brexit, and the Nationality and Borders Bill; =
Northern-Centrism
and SDG Target 8.7 and Conclusions and Proposals. How
to cite: Steyne, S. (2022). Has Anti-Migration and Anti-=
Refugee
Discourse Hampered Progress against Child Labour? Revista Tecnológica - Espol, 34(1), 113-135. http://www.rte.espol.e=
du.ec/index.php/tecnologica/article/view/856
Resumen
La aplicación accidentada, des=
de
2000, de políticas integradas para erradicar las causas fundamentales
interseccionales del trabajo infantil se sitúa más recientemente en un cont=
exto
político más amplio de recrudecimiento del etnonacionalismo populista
acompañado de un respeto debilitado de los gobiernos de muchos países por el
sistema internacional basado en reglas y desarrollo basado en derechos. El
autor sugiere que (aparte de los intereses políticos y comerciales centrado=
s en
el norte), al combinar el trabajo forzoso con la trata y la trata con la
migración y el asilo, gobiernos populistas-nacionalistas influyentes, en
particular los del Reino Unido (vinculados al Brexit) y Australia (vinculad=
os
al “Proceso de Bali”), han contribuido a desviar la atención mundial de la
mayor cohorte destinada a beneficiarse de la Meta 8.7 del Objetivo de
Desarrollo Sostenible: los 160 millones de niños que ahora se encuentran en
situación de trabajo infantil. Esta fusión busca demonizar a los solicitant=
es
de asilo, refugiados y migrantes económicos. Además, es un elemento importa=
nte
del discurso de los partidos gobernantes populistas-nacionalistas en su
búsqueda de apoyo electoral continuo y refleja la voluntad de violar el der=
echo
internacional que protege los derechos humanos.
Introduction
In June 2021, the ILO a=
nd
UNICEF jointly published global child labour estimates for 2016-2020 (ILO a=
nd
UNICEF, 2021). The number of children concerned had risen from 152 million =
to
160 million. This was before the COVID-19 pandemic wrought havoc on the glo=
bal
economy and despite the global consensus proclaimed in the UN Sustainable
Development Goal Target 8.7 to eliminate all forms of child labour by 2025,=
as
well as all forms of forced labour by 2030. It was the first increase since
quadrennial estimates began in 2000.
This
setback should not surprise us. This article, based on the first-hand
experience of a now-independent specialist on child labour, and the
intersectionality of fundamental principles and rights at work (FPRW), expl=
ores
some possible reasons for the chequered application, since 2000, of integra=
ted
policies to eradicate the intersectional root causes of child labour. The
article is not, primarily, an essay about migration, nor is the Author a
migration specialist. It seeks to reflect on how the recrudescent juggernau=
t of
ethnonationalist populism and, especially, its conflation of forced labour =
with
trafficking and trafficking with migration and asylum (as well as
Northern-centric trade and policy interests), and related policies violating
the rights of migrants and asylum-seekers, may have contributed to deflecti=
ng
global attention from the largest cohort supposed to benefit from SDG Target
8.7: children in child labour.
Because, just as the fo=
ur
categories of FPRW - freedom from discrimination, from child labour and from
forced labour, and freedom to organize and bargain collectively - are
mutually supportive and interdependent, so too are violations of these righ=
ts
“mutually aggravating”. The context of reversal of progress against child
labour includes: the rejection of the global trade unions´ proposal for an
integrated Alliance 8 to drive the 2015 Sustainable Development Goal on dec=
ent
work for all, which derived from the established ILO position that FPRW were
indivisible and interdependent; the establishment instead of an Alliance 8.=
7 intended
to concentrate only on forced labour and child labour; and the narrow focus=
of
certain influential governments, notably of the U.K. and Australia (both
self-proclaimed leaders of the Alliance), whose xenophobic anti-migration a=
nd
anti-asylum discourse and policies were central to their populist,
ethnonationalist project. This was epitomized in Australia by the Bali Proc=
ess
and the incarceration of men, women and children on Nauru and Manus: and, in
the U.K., by the racist “Hostile Environment” policies that led to the Wind=
rush
Scandal, and which contributed to the little-England exceptionalism of the
Brexit campaign and to a determination to violate the 1951 Geneva Conventio=
n: its
most recent consequence was the death of 27 mainly Kurdish asylum-seekers,
including three children, in November 2021, in the English Channel.
The article seeks to
contribute to an analysis of why, for the first time in two decades, child
labour is increasing. It explores some of the lexicon of the discourse
concerning “modern slavery” (a term that appears nowhere in relevant
authoritative international instruments) and its common reduction to
trafficking. It also considers the unhelpful but increasingly common misuse=
of
the term “exploitation” to imply that it takes place only in conditions of
forced labour, rather than being the essential economic relationship between
labour and capital in the capitalist mode of production, which organized la=
bour
seeks to moderate through collective bargaining.
<= o:p>
Tren=
ds
A summary of the latest
estimates and the chequered progress against child labour since 2000,
especially the stagnation and regression since 2016 is the best introductio=
n.
The global estimates for 2016-2020 (ILO and UNICEF, 2021) show that:
·<=
span
style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'> =
160 million children ar=
e in
child labour: eight million more than in 2016 and the first increase since =
the
first global estimates in 2000.
·<=
span
style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'> =
The Covid pandemic could
prompt a further 8.9 million increases by late 2022.
·<=
span
style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'> =
79 million children (49
percent) are in hazardous work.
·<=
span
style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'> =
Progress continued in t=
he
Asia and the Pacific Region and in Latin America and the Caribbean, but
sub-Saharan Africa saw a further rise, accounting now for more than half of=
all
child labour.
·<=
span
style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'> =
Child labour among
five-to-11-year-olds rose by 17 million; among 12- to-17-year-olds it conti=
nued
to decline.
·<=
span
style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'> =
97 million boys and 63
million girls are in child labour but, among five- to-14-year-olds, the gap
halves if we consider household chores performed by girls for more than 21
hours weekly.
·<=
span
style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'> =
123 million children in
child labour are in rural areas, a prevalence (13.9 percent) almost three t=
imes
higher than in urban settings.
·<=
span
style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'> =
112 million children
perform child labour in agriculture (70 percent worldwide; 81.5 percent in
sub-Saharan Africa; and still 44 percent in Europe and North America). ·<=
span
style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'> =
·<=
span
style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'> =
More than a quarter of
five- to-11-year-olds in child labour and a third of 12- to-14-year-olds are
out of school.
·<=
span
style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'> =
The 2020 estimates did =
not
provide a figure for forced labour: of 152 million children in child labour=
in
2016, 4.3 million were estimated to be in forced labour.
It is pertinent to note
that the concept of “modern slavery” appears nowhere in the relevant
Conventions. Its usage entered forced labour phraseology only recently, dur=
ing
passage of UK Prime Minister-to-be Theresa May’s 2015 Modern Slavery Act,
partly to broaden the ambit of forced labour to include forced marriage.
Crucially, populist-nationalist governments’ discourse commonly deploys “mo=
dern
slavery” as a synonym for trafficki=
ng.
From 2000 to 2004, the
number of children in child labour fell by 23 million. From 2004 to 2008 it
fell by only seven million. Yet, between 2008 and 2012, greatly accelerated
progress reduced child labour by 47 million: a sevenfold improvement on the=
previous
four years.
The
Third Global Conference on the Sustained Eradication of Child Labour (the T=
hird
Global Conference), hosted by the ILO’s tripartite Brazilian constituents in
2013, followed that extraordinary period of progress and consolidated global
consensus on the need for integrated policies to eradicate all forms of chi=
ld
labour. (Global Conference on Child Labour, 2013; ILO, 2014). Previously, t=
he
worldwide movement had talked of eliminating child labour, yet some had foc=
used
only on its worst forms, deviating from the intersectional premise of the 1=
998
ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work (the 1998
Declaration).
Four things had become
clearer in the run-up to Brasilia:
First, short-term direc=
t-beneficiary
measures, simple to attribute and report to donors, had not supported
sustainable eradication - “pulling up the roots” - of child labour. Such
measures, often not consonant with nationally-established development
priorities, dominated international development assistance-funded projects =
on
child labour in the first decade of the century.
Second, measures direct=
ed
only at worst forms, not least in global supply chains (a small if important
proportion of child labour), ignored the wider context of movement of the s=
ame
child, siblings, and children in the same community between non-worst and w=
orst
forms and, perhaps, different sectors, seasons, and places. These
considerations drove development of the Integrated Area-Based Approach to
create communities free of all forms of child labour (ILO, 2017; ILO, 2018a=
).
Third,
ILO Convention No. 138 (1973) on the minimum age for admission to employment
explicitly links the minimum age for work with the minimum school-leaving a=
ge.
The worldwide movement was increasingly clear that children’s human rights =
to
education and the eradication of all forms of child labour were indivisible.
Indeed, millions of younger children in non-worst forms of child labour are
still unable to go to school, attend irregularly, or are prevented by their
child labour from benefitting fully from their attendance.
Fourth, seeking to tack=
le
child labour in isolation from other fundamental rights was not only
unsustainable, it entailed great risks. This had been illustrated dramatica=
lly
in sporting goods manufacturing in Sialkot, Pakistan (a centre of activities
against child labour) when a major multinational enterprise threatened to
terminate contracts, endangering thousands of jobs, because of persistent
violations of trade union rights. Tragically,
the resulting tripartite Sialkot agreement on child labour and decent work
(which the Author helped negotiate) was blown off course after Benazir Bhut=
to’s
assassination.
The principal root caus=
es
of child labour – family and community poverty – derive from an
interrelated complex of social exclusion and unequal distribution of power =
and
wealth not restricted to low-income countries. Child labour also persists in
emerging and richer economies where political will has been lacking or stym=
ied,
notably among migrant worker families in the United States. Meanwhile,
governments of some less developed or emerging economies, notably India and
Brazil between 2008 and 2012, had sought to adhere to international
standards and implemented successful nationally-determined policies. Sadly,=
not
all donors followed the Brasilia consensus by supporting systemic change in
other, still largely donor-dependent countries.
By 2017, only 43 percen=
t of
child labour was in low-income countries. 55 percent was in lower- and
upper-middle-income countries, including the seven largest emerging economi=
es
in which half the world’s people live. Today’s figures (41 and 58 percent
respectively) perhaps reflect the reversal of progressive policies in key
middle-income countries. Approximately 14 percent of the world’s people liv=
e in
the 80 high-income countries, where 1.6 million children still perform child
labour. The least unequal countries, like some in the European region, have
largely eradicated child labour. However, there are high-income countries –
most obviously under the Trump presidency – where super-concentration of we=
alth
accompanies systemic poverty, weakened social protection, and deficient
protection in law and practice of FPRW.
Several matters should =
be
borne in mind when considering the roller-coaster up to 2012 and developmen=
ts
since then, as reflected in the ILO’s comparable quadrennial estimates since
2000. Among them are: the need for integrated approaches against child labo=
ur;
that poor and emerging economies can adopt and apply sound policies; and th=
at misdirected
donor conditionalities can hinder the development and piloting of such poli=
cies.
Figure 1
Trends in global progress against child labour,
2000-2020[1]
Source: ILO and UNICEF
(2021).
Between 2000 and 2012,
child labour fell by 78 million and hazardous child labour by 85 million. T=
here
are several reasons why the hazardous figure exceeds the total:
·<=
span
style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'> =
Children above the mini=
mum
age for work are considered to be in child labour only if it is a worst for=
m:
hazardous work is used as a proxy;
·<=
span
style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'> =
At 18, children exit the
child labour statistical pool;
·<=
span
style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'> =
Children between the
minimum age and 18 years might move from hazardous child labour into accept=
able
youth employment;
·<=
span
style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'> =
Convention 182 on the w=
orst
forms of child labour requires children in worst forms to be removed from c=
hild
labour altogether but, without integrated implementation of Conventions 182=
and
138, children below the minimum age removed from hazardous work might conti=
nue
to perform non-hazardous child labour. This appeared to have been the case
particularly between 2000 and 2004: hazardous child labour fell by 43 milli=
on
while the total child labour number fell by only 23 million; and
·<=
span
style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'> =
Similarly, from 2004-20=
08,
the number of children in hazardous work fell by 13 million, while the over=
all
number fell by only seven million.
The worldwide movement
re-emerged in the 1990s in the form of the Global March Against Child Labou=
r,
campaigning for what in 1999 became Convention 182. It was further
reinvigorated by the adoption of the Convention, which also encouraged many
more ratifications of Convention 138.
Nonetheless, in the dec=
ade after
the adoption of Convention 182:
·<=
span
style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'> =
An overwhelming focus on
worst forms meant young children below the minimum working age continued to
enter child labour and few were removed from non-worst forms.
·<=
span
style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'> =
A widespread US-donor b=
lock
on funding public services left their capacity, in general, weakened.
·<=
span
style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'> =
Instead, major donors’
conditionalities on direct beneficiary projects required NGOs (accountable =
to
donors but not local communities) to deliver simple-to-report, short-term
benefits to limited numbers of selected children or families.
·<=
span
style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'> =
Most project funding we=
nt
on short-term service delivery and reporting, rather than confronting syste=
mic
economic and governance root causes or promoting social dialogue; and trade
unions were not always treated as key partners.
·<=
span
style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'> =
Political considerations
often took precedence over data and evidence. While not all donors pursued =
the
direct beneficiary approach, it involved most of the funding of the ILO’s
International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour (IPEC). ·<=
span
style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'> =
Although the Author and
others proposed that an ILO Regular Budget Supplementary Account should be
established to align development cooperation funds to the Governing Body’s
agreed strategies, the narrow focus on hazardous child labour in global sup=
ply
chains often diverged from the principle that nationally established
development priorities should prevail. Child labour numbers fe=
ll
by 23 million from 2000 to 2004 and by only seven million from 2004 to 2008.
Then, despite the 2008 financial crisis, progress accelerated remarkably. F=
rom
2008 to 2012, the number of children in child labour fell by 47 million and=
, for
the first time, not only among children in hazardous work: at least 17 mill=
ion
children too young to work but not in worst forms also benefited. Further research might
explain this remarkable surge, but our knowledge of two countries that
contributed significantly to it supports some hypotheses. Lower-middle-income Ind=
ia
is around the middle of the Gini income inequality index, while upper-middl=
e-income
Brazil (with the world’s sixth largest population) is among the least equal.
During this period both governments pursued trilateral South-South child la=
bour
cooperation with South Africa. These three, then progressive, administratio=
ns
asserted their sovereignty, pursuing nationally-determined priorities to
accelerate equitable development, combat income and social wage poverty in =
the
rural and informal economies, and, with varying commitment, to strengthen
protection of FPRW. The ILO constituents in the three countries also enjoyed
close and friendly collaboration with the ILO’s child labour programme. The three countries’
determination found expression in India’s Convergence Model (with parallels=
in
Brazil) and Brazil’s 2013 hosting of the Third Global Conference. (ILO-IPEC,
2013). Convergence sought to combine relevant national policies to create a=
multiplier
effect. The constitutional amendment on the right to education, the midday
meals scheme, and specialised bridge schools for children leaving child lab=
our
boosted school attendance and retention. The Mahatma Gandhi National Rural
Employment Guarantee Scheme and extension of social protection curbed family
and community poverty in the rural and informal economy and supported
child-friendly infrastructure improvements. Similar approaches emerged, for example, =
in
Pakistani Punjab, while Ghana’s Torkor Model achieved international acclaim=
. While labour ministries
maintained their leading/convening roles, national tripartite child labour
committees increasingly co-opted other relevant authorities, converging
policies on labour markets, infrastructure, education, social protection and
health services, law enforcement and access to justice, labour inspection a=
nd
agricultural extension, antidiscrimination, and food security. Convergence =
also
supported local government authorities to fulfil their crucial roles in
delivering services to the population. This included community child labour
monitoring and remediation systems, which (unlike supply chain social audit=
ors)
could provide permanent oversight, identify children in or at risk of child
labour, and refer them to relevant public services. In 2014, Kailash Satyar=
thi
and Malala Yousafzai shared the Nobel Peace Prize. Kailash and Nitte Adyant=
haya
of the Indian National Trades Union Congress (the Author’s successor as the=
ILO
Governing Body Workers’ group spokesperson on child labour) worked behind t=
he
scenes with committed civil servants towards India’s 2017 ratification of b=
oth
ILO child labour Conventions. This brought the vast majority of the world’s
children under their ambit. Following the 2012
International Labour Conference resolution on FPRW, the ILO endorsed an
integrated, intersectional approach to child labour as part of an integrated
fundamental rights policy (ILO, 2016) and established an integrated Fundame=
ntal
Rights Branch. (ILO, n.d.) Ratifications of Conventions 138 and 182 continu=
ed:
in 2020, Convention 182 became the first to be universally ratified by all =
187
ILO member States. And, in 2013, Brazil’s brilliant influence on the Third
Global Conference (Global Conference on Child Labour, 2013) supported a broad=
and
incisive declaration targeting systemic root causes. Perhaps it was “of its
time and place.” If so, there are still lessons to learn, because the Brasi=
lia
Conference followed the period of greatest progress. Recalling the 47 million
reduction between 2008 and 2012, including 17 million children by definition
below minimum age (in child labour but not in worst forms) what happened af=
ter
Brasilia? The title of REF _Ref982398=
43 \h \* MERGEFORMAT Figure
1, taken from the ILO
estimates, suggests progress stalled only after 2016, but it had already
stalled for the youngest children from 2012 to 2016: ·<=
span
style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'> =
152 million children we=
re
still in child labour. ·<=
span
style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'> =
The reduction of 16 mil=
lion
was almost all among older children in worst forms. ·<=
span
style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'> =
The number of
five-to-11-year-olds (73 million) stayed unchanged. ·<=
span
style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'> =
Worse, among these youn=
gest
children hazardous child labour increased. ·<=
span
style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'> =
And while other regions
advanced, child labour numbers grew in sub-Saharan Africa, agriculture now
accounting for 80 percent. What
caused the dramatic stall? There is no “authorised” version of what happened
after 2012 and further research is required, but there are possible
explanations. The
ILO’s member States bear primary responsibility for eliminating child labou=
r. However,
the changes in government in India (2014) and Brazil (2019) cannot alone
explain the 2012 to 2016 regression, nor should we underestimate the import=
ance
of ILO development cooperation with constituents, particularly in least
developed countries. Unfortunately, after 2011, direct funding for integrat=
ed
ILO support to strengthen constituents’ capacity to combat child labour
declined and IPEC’s presence in member States shrank greatly (ILO, 2016). Among
Northern NGOs and donors (Ireland and Norway being notable exceptions) two =
principal
emphases re-emerged: global supply chains and enforcement against trafficki=
ng
from the global South to the global North. First,
however, most child labour is not in global supply chains. Also, despite the
Rana Plaza disaster, too many actors still seek to hinder workers’ fundamen=
tal
rights to organise and bargain collectively, arguing that supply chain prob=
lems
can be resolved by snapshot social audits and conversations between
multinational enterprises and NGOs. These two emphases – global supply chains=
and
enforcement against trafficking – emerged in a wider political context: the
recrudescence in many countries of populist ethnonationalism alongside weak=
ened
respect for the rules-based international system and rights-based developme=
nt.
The Author suggests that, rather than accelerating progress against child l=
abour
as SDG 8.7 demanded, influential populist-ethnonationalist governments, by
conflating forced labour with trafficking and trafficking with migration and
asylum, and by seeking electoral support by demonising refugees and economic
migrants, contributed to slowing progress against child labour. In
September 2017, at a side meeting at the United Nations in New York, the ILO
launched its 2012-2016 global estimates on child labour and forced labour. =
152
million children were in child labour, of whom 4.3 million were in forced
labour (as were 21 million adults). Several
things stood out at that meeting, including crucial trends that subsequently
continued unchecked and contributed to the recent increase in the number of
children in child labour. The 2017 estimates showed that progress among the
youngest children (aged five to 11) had stalled, and more of them were in
hazardous work. Moreover, despite the efforts of the International Partners=
hip
for Cooperation on Child Labour in Agriculture and the Global March Against
Child Labour to draw more attention to child labour in agriculture (includi=
ng a
major conference in Washington DC in 2012), the number of children concerned
grew substantially. In addition, sub-Saharan Africa was the only region to
experience an increase in child labour overall and not just in agriculture.=
One
might have expected that these figures would have focused discussion on what
had become the predominant typology of child labour (accounting perhaps for=
40 million
or more): the African child of primary school age, as likely to be a girl a=
s a
boy, working unpaid alongside their parents on a small family farm producing
for local markets. Such expectation, while justified, would have been dashe=
d.
ILO Director General Guy Ryder (a stalwart supporter of the movement against
child labour) presented the key statistics and called for the necessary act=
ion,
yet most of the other speakers barely mentioned child labour, let alone its=
largest
category. Those
with a feel for the politics and protocol of the discussion might have noted
the dominance of speakers from Australia and the UK and Ivanka Trump’s
silent presence. They would also have noted that the Australian chair (of t=
he
meeting and the new Alliance 8.7) did not give the last word to the ILO
Director General (the most senior person in the room[2]=
).
He gave it instead to Australian m=
ining
magnate Andrew Forrest, whose Minderoo Foundation funded the Walk Free
Foundation[3]
=
Australia
had by then already sought to deter migrants and refugees by incarcerating
adult and child migrants and asylum-seekers in detention camps on Nauru and
Manus with scant concern for their physical or mental health or rights under
international law. Few Asia-Pacific countries have ratified the 1951 Refugee
Convention. Indeed, Professor Susan Kneebone (2017) had been warning about =
the
securitisation of refugee and migrant border control in the Asia-Pacific re=
gion
through the Bali Process (the “Regional Conference on People Smuggling,
Trafficking in Persons and Related Transnational Crime” co-chaired by Austr=
alia
and Indonesia), and long before the Australian government sought (and faile=
d,
thanks to International Trade Union Confederation’s alertness) to have it
listed as good practice in the Fourth Global Conference on Child Labour out=
come
document (Global Conference on the Sustained Eradication of Child Labour, 2=
017).
Commercial
sexual exploitation of children (CSEC) and recruitment of children for armed
conflict – both specifically referenced in Convention 182 – attract justifi=
ed
moral outrage and varying degrees of vitally important and useful intervent=
ions.
Such moral and religious outrage, however, often narrowed the focus at the
expense of the wider, complex political economy of child labour (ignoring, =
for
example, life-shortening hazards faced by children exposed to dangerous
chemicals). This narrow focus on CSEC and trafficking for CSEC has also bee=
n misused
by some who conflate all trafficking with sex work, and who also commonly: =
reject
the evidence that constrained economic choices by working people within the
continuum of freedom and lack of freedom in labour markets do not always result in forced labour as
defined by international instruments; deny the agency of adult sex workers =
as
rights holders; and oppose their right to organise and defend their interes=
ts
through collective representation. (In so doing, of course, they also reject
ILO Convention 87’s essential principle that the inalienable right of freed=
om
of association applies to all workers without distinction).
It
appeared that the Australian government’s main aim at the Fourth Global
Conference in Buenos Aires was to gain support for its migration and asylum
policies by conflating forced labour with trafficking and trafficking with
migration and asylum. However, it was not alone in its eagerness to ignore =
its
international obligations towards migrants and to demonise and victimise ad=
ults
and children seeking safe haven. While Canberra proselytised the Bali Proce=
ss,
Britain’s Conservative government, in a (still persisting) display of kith =
and
kin proximity, had already enshrined the same conflation in then-Home Secre=
tary
Theresa May’s “Hostile Environment” against migrants, refugees and asylum
seekers. The Hostile Environment, launched in 2012, was a major cause of the
Windrush Scandal that led to Black British
citizens being unlawfully deported, and it legitimised the ethnonationa=
list
xenophobia and racism which contributed to the Brexit “mix” (Joint Council =
for
the Welfare of Immigrants, n.d.). Other countries across Europe and Asia we=
re
also falling prey to resurgent populist-nationalist Islamophobia and
antisemitism: in some, the parties concerned assumed control of government.=
The
US, meanwhile, was also adopting harsh anti-migrant measures and, after 201=
7,
began to withdraw from the multilateral system.
Populist Ethnonationalism: The English
“Example” – Racism, the “Hostile Environment`”, Brexit, and the Nationality=
and
Borders Bill
Perhaps
most notable at the New York meeting (although some might consider it an ab=
use
of the agenda), was the statement of Britain’s (then) International Develop=
ment
Secretary Priti Patel that “open borders facilitate crime.” This undisguised
piece of Brexit propaganda reflected the leitmotiv of the UK and Australian
governments’ putative support for SDG Target 8.7 and for the Alliance
established to campaign for it.
Most
recently, Patel as Home Secretary (Interior Minister) moved the UK National=
ity
and Borders Bill, which would reduce support for victims of human trafficki=
ng
(including children) and weaken systems for identifying them. Criticised for
“excessive cruelty to asylum seekers,” she and the Government have faced
multiple challenges to their attempts to justify the Government’s willingne=
ss
to depart from international norms (Townsend, 2021b).
During
2021, more than 28,000 people crossed the English Channel in small boats; a=
small
number compared to those crossing the Mediterranean (Similarly, far fewer p=
eople
seek asylum in the UK than in Germany, France or Spain).
In
a statement on March 20, 2021, the Home Office claimed an “alarming rise in
people abusing our modern slavery system by posing as victims in order to
prevent their removal and enable them to stay in the country” (Home Office,
2021). First leaked to the Sun (a right-wing tabloid in Rupert Murdoch’s me=
dia
empire) Patel said: “Our generous safeguards for victims are being rampantly
abused by child rapists, =
people
who pose a threat to national security, and failed asylum seekers with no r=
ight
to be here.” Patel’s revolting conflation of victims of trafficking for for=
ced
labour with child rapists - almost harking back to the medieval antisemitic
blood libel - echoed Trump’s racist electoral campaign trope that Mexican
migrants were drug dealers, criminals and rapists and, indeed, the prurient
rants of Islamophobic racists in England and their counterparts in the RSS =
in
India - the paramilitaries backing Narendra Modi (whom Patel so admires).
Yet a Freedom of Information (FoI) Act
response to queries by ECPAT (Every Child Protected Against Trafficking) UK,
revealed that the Home Office’s Modern Slavery Unit could not provide data =
on
child rapists, national security threats or failed asylum seekers referred =
to
the modern slavery system since 2017[4]
(Townsend, 2021b).
The
response, that compiling the data would require trawling individual case fi=
les,
suggested Patel’s claims and policies lacked evidence.
In June, the High Court ruled that Patel =
had
acted unlawfully in detaining, in former military barracks (which also fail=
ed
to meet minimum safety standards during the Covid pandemic), six asylum-see=
kers
who had been victims of trafficking and/or torture. Her process for selecti=
ng
people to be held there was also deemed unlawful (Taylor, 2021b).
In
October, barristers’ legal opinion commissioned by NGO Freedom from Torture
concluded the Bill breached domestic law, articles 31 and 33 of the 1951
Convention, and articles 2, 3, 4, 8 and 13 of the European Convention on Hu=
man
Rights, in at least ten ways (Syal, 2021a).
In
November, Patel was exposed as having misled Parliament by seeking to justi=
fy
inhumane deterrence measures with false claims that the majority crossing t=
he
Channel were not asylum-seekers but single young migrant men seeking
employment. While refusing a Freedom of Information request to reveal its m=
ost
recent “evidence” about asylum-seekers’ motivations (Townsend, 2021c), the
Government also falsely claimed it had reached an agreement with Albania to
“offshore” asylum-seekers while their claims were considered.=
[5]=
This was denied by Albania’s Prime Minister, Foreign Minister and Ambassado=
r to
the UK who, in a BBC Newsnight interview on 19 November, dismissed it as “f=
ake
news”. Analysis by the Refugee Council and Médecins sans Frontiers of Freed=
om
of Information and Home Office statistics from January 2020 to May 2021 sho=
wed
that 91 percent of asylum-seekers were from ten countries riven with confli=
ct,
human rights abuse and persecution; that 98 percent of those crossing the
Channel applied for asylum; 61 percent of those from the ten key countries
would have been granted refugee status following their initial claim (88
percent in the case of Syrians); and of the 39 percent whose initial claim =
was
refused, 59 percent were likely to be granted on appeal.
From
this research, the Refugee Council concluded that the Government should:
=
·<=
span
style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'> =
Rapidly expand exis=
ting
safe routes including both resettlement schemes and refugee family reunion;=
=
·<=
span
style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'> =
Establish a humanit=
arian
visa system to allow people to apply for a visa to enter the UK safely for =
the
purposes of claiming asylum;
=
·<=
span
style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'> =
Recognise that many=
people
seeking asylum have no option other than an irregular journey as recognised=
in
the 1951 Convention, and therefore should be treated fairly and humanely by
being granted a fair hearing on UK soil; and that
=
·<=
span
style=3D'font:7.0pt "Times New Roman"'> =
The government shou=
ld put
in place an efficient, effective, high-quality and timely asylum
decision-making system so people do not have to wait for months or years fo=
r an
outcome (Refugee Council, 2021).
Following
an attempted bombing in Liverpool on 17 November, and despite calls for cal=
m by
politicians and police and warnings that she was inflaming tensions and ris=
ked
inciting violence, including against lawyers acting for asylum-seekers, Pat=
el
nonetheless blamed the incident on what she described as an asylum system t=
hat
had been broken “in the past” (her Party has been in Government for 11 year=
s).
She also added a clause to the Nationality and Borders Bill giving her
unprecedented power to remove without notification UK citizenship fr=
om
dual UK citizens born and raised in the UK, a measure the Race Relations
Council concluded would be used disproportionately against British Muslims.=
Other
clauses would also violate international norms, “…including rendering claims
from anyone arriving in the UK by an illegal route inadmissible, while
criminalising them and anyone who seeks to save their lives, and giving Bor=
der
Force staff immunity from prosecution if people die in the Channel during
“pushback” operations” (Siddique, 2021). Trade
unions representing UK Border Force staff stated that a policy of turning b=
ack
small boats, already rejected by France, would violate maritime law and be
unworkable. In November 2021, the Public and Commercial Services Union anno=
unced
it might seek judicial review to challenge its lawfulness (Syal, 2021b). The
Home Office’s lawyers advised that such a challenge would be highly likely =
to
succeed, and that the union might also take industrial action and support
individual claims under section 44 of the Employment Rights Act, 1996.[6] The
“culture war” now ran so deep that, in August, Nigel Farage and the British
right-wing media dared criticise the Royal National Lifeboat Institution (R=
NLI)
for rescuing people – including children – from small boats in distress. The
public, however, responded with vastly increased donations to this venerable
(voluntarily-funded) service.
Also in November 2021, the UK Government sent mili=
tary
advisors to assist Poland in its enforcement of Fortress Europe borders aga=
inst
migrants and asylum-seekers who had become victims of the machinations of
Lukashenko’s Belarus regime. In late November, 27 asylum-seekers, mostly Ku=
rds,
drowned trying to cross the English Channel to reach the UK. A week later, =
the
RNLI website came under cyber-attack and its staff received threatening ema=
ils.
In the July 2021 parliamentary debate on Patel’s B=
ill,
former Prime Minister Theresa May admitted that as Home Secretary she would
have proposed similar measures to deter asylum-seekers by sending them to a
“safe third country” had it not been for “practical concerns.” Whatever May=
’s
credentials as EU Remainer and intellectual author of the UK Modern Slavery
Act, as author of the Hostile Environment she contributed to the xenophobic
rhetoric of othering that nourished the recrudescence of populist English
nationalism.
This rhetoric is ever more familiar in today’s
“culture wars”. The ethnonationalist political forces seeking to close bord=
ers
against migrant workers and refugees and deny family reunion to unaccompani=
ed
children are precisely those that are also promoting neo-colonialist
revisionism - decrying as “woke” and unpatriotic critical historical analys=
es
of the transatlantic slave trade, colonialism, Empire, post-Civil War
segregation in the United States, and their links to contemporary migration=
and
refugee flows.
Speaking
to Conservative Party Conference after the 2016 Brexit referendum, May had
derided mobile people with multiple cultural, linguistic, and ethnic herita=
ge
who identified as Europeans. She said:
Today,
too many people in positions of power behave as though they have more in co=
mmon
with international elites than =
with
the people down the road, the people they employ, the people they pass on t=
he
street ... but if you believe you are a citizen of the world, you are a cit=
izen
of nowhere. You don’t understand what citizenship means (D=
avis
and Hollis, 2018; Merrick, 2017; The Spectator, 2016; Author’s italics)=
.
Besides
the obvious irony of a Conservative prime minister criticising elites, her
choice of language and (hopefully genuine) ignorance of European history and
the analogy of “international elites” and “cosmopolitans” was chilling. In
November 1933, at the Berlin Siemens Dynamo Works, Hitler had derided:
[the]
clique ... people who are at home both nowhere and everywhere, who do not h=
ave
anywhere a soil on which they have grown up, but who live in Berlin today, =
in
Brussels tomorrow, Paris the day after that, and then again in Prague or Vi=
enna
or London, and who feel at home everywhere[7] (O
Karlsson, 2018).
Within
15 years, “rootless cosmopolitan” became Stalin’s synonym for Jew.
Evidently,
racism and xenophobia alone did not cause Brexit, nor were they sentiments
shared by much of the UK population. However, while other member States
educated children as EU citizens (and publicly celebrated EU membership and
structural and regional fund projects), successive UK governments had fanned
the Brexit flame by blaming the EU for their own failure to respond to
globalisation and deindustrialisation with appropriate industrial strategies
and by failing to highlight the peace, prosperity, and acquis of labour and other rights the EU had underpinned for
decades.[9]
Nonetheless, this foul and foolhardy language contributed to releasing the
racist genie from the bottle, to the Windrush Scandal, and to the toxic
ethnonationalism and xenophobia that, playing on ahistorical delusions of
English exceptionalism, helped build the slight majority[10] in
England and (among non-Welsh voters) in Wales in the (advisory) Brexit
referendum. As the writer and critic Will Self said in March 2019, when
challenged that he was accusing all pro-Brexit voters of racism: “You don’t
have to be a racist or an antisemite to vote for Brexit; it’s just that eve=
ry
racist or antisemite in the country did” (Gelblum, 2019).
The propagandist conflation of
migration and asylum with trafficking is just one aspect of the growing wav=
e of
populist ethnonationalism around the world led by a New Right. However, it =
is central
to our discussion because it contributed significantly to diverting attenti=
on
from the ten percent of the world’s children still in child labour. Indeed,=
in
July 2021, amid the pandemic, Britain’s “get Brexit done” government
reconfirmed its disdain for the world’s poorest children by cutting
international development assistance, hitting child nutrition and girls’
education and health, both essential elements in the struggle to end child
labour (McVeigh, 2021).
Northern-Centrism and SDG Target 8.7
Let
us return now from the downward spiral of the UK Government’s
populist-xenophobic rhetoric and (anti-)asylum legislation to the internati=
onal
stage of the SDGs. Target 8.7 aims=
to
“eradicate forced labour, end modern slavery and human trafficking and secu=
re
the prohibition and elimination of the worst forms of child labour, includi=
ng
recruitment and use of child soldiers, and by 2025 end child labour in all =
its
forms” (United Nations, 2015).
With
hindsight, it was probably unwise to put child labour and trafficking (as a
subset of “modern slavery”) together, not least when (to borrow Bertolt
Brecht’s reference to war and the rise of Hitler from his 1941 play, The
Resistible Rise of Arturo Ui) the ethnonationalist “bitch that bore him was=
on
heat again” (Brecht,
1978).
In
the late 1990s, some international trade union colleagues feared Convention=
182
might be applied in isolation from or even supersede Convention 138. Indeed,
although member States continued to ratify the Convention - and despite
criticism by the ILO supervisory bodies of the Bolivian government’s attemp=
t to
reduce the minimum age to ten years (ILO, 2019) – a coalition of NGOs and
academics still campaigns against Convention 138 and its principle of a
minimum age for work, which is inextricably linked to that of universal
compulsory education. It was, perhaps, inevitable that Target 8.7, when put
alongside the 2014 Protocol to Convention 29 on forced labour, could face
similar risks and that this resurgent populist-ethnonationalist discourse w=
ould
distort the crucial campaign against forced labour by conflating forced lab=
our
with trafficking and trafficking with migration and asylum, while the waters
were being muddied further with the newly-invented category of “Modern Slav=
ery”
and misuse of the term “exploitation”.
Unfortunately,
the discourse swirling around the anti-migration juggernaut may also have
sideswiped the campaign for ratification of the 2014 Protocol, despite its
excellent content. The fact that some perceived it as a “trafficking protoc=
ol”
probably did not help. The vocal support of the UK and Australian governmen=
ts
and the UK’s incessant promotion of its enforcement-centric Modern Slavery =
Act
– fell on barren ground in some developing countries with bitter experience=
of
UK migration policies (views imparted to the Author by parliamentarians from
South Asia). Protocols are rarely rapidly ratified, although this one
supplemented the second-most ratified ILO Convention. The aim of 50
ratifications by 2018 was not reached until 2020. By comparison, in a simil=
ar
period following its adoption, Convention 182 had gathered 157.
Several
factors might have contributed to the formulation of SDG Target 8.7. Of the=
152
million children in child labour in 2017, as defined by the Conventions and=
the
International Conference of Labour Statisticians (ILO, 2018b), 4.3 million =
were
in forced labour. Some wanted attention focused on child marriage, others on
forced child labour - or “child slavery” as they called it. Although their
narrow concern about what they considered the most egregious form of child
labour was understandable, it risked undermining the strategic, integrated
policy approaches required to deal with the intersectional root causes of a=
ll
forms of child labour. Sadly (and mostly unintentionally) it also boosted t=
he
populist-nationalist enforcement discourse. Criminal sanctions against “evil
traffickers” (including those who are not traffickers but facilitate irregu=
lar
crossing of closed borders)[11]<=
/span>
sit far more comfortably with populist-ethnonationalist propaganda than com=
plex
discourse on the intersectionality of human rights and sustainable and
equitable socioeconomic development.
True,
some influential colleagues who were not child labour policy specialists er=
roneously
believed all child labour was forced labour and so both belonged in a single
SDG target. Indeed, until the ILO Convention 182 was adopted, and while
Convention 138 had few ratifications, the ILO Committee of Experts on the
Application of Conventions and Recommendations had derived its child labour
jurisprudence mainly from member States’ reports on the application of the
widely ratified Convention 29. The Experts had held that, because a child c=
ould
not give free consent, all child labour was forced labour. However, this
jurisprudence obtained before the adoption of Convention 182, before IPEC
became the ILO’s largest single development cooperation programme, before t=
he
first quadrennial global estimates in 2000 were developed, and before the g=
rowing
understanding of the political economy of child labour.
Dominant
Northern perceptions of child labour fuelled by global supply chain campaig=
ns
also showed scant interest in the wider child labour economy. It was and is
right to condemn child labour performed for third-party employers, for exam=
ple,
in the production of garments, sports goods, surgical instruments, or
agricultural commodities like bananas, tobacco, cotton, and prawns (although
perhaps not pure coincidence that the US initiated some such campaigns when=
US
farmers or prawn fishers were clamouring for support, as after the 2010 Gul=
f of
Mexico oil spill). Yet these campaigns were often predicated on the
misapprehension that all children in child labour were under direct,
unscrupulous control of an identifiable enterprise. Although often true, th=
is
narrow focus largely ignored what was and remains the predominant mode of c=
hild
labour: unpaid work alongside parents in family farms and micro-enterprises
producing primarily locally-traded goods and services. That (despite its wi=
despread
use of bonded labour of entire families) included brick-making, a textbook
local manufacture. The exception, perhaps, was child labour in domestic wor=
k,
although it still accounts for seven million children (2.5 million of them
girls under 11).
One example of conflating forced labour a=
nd
child labour in a global supply chain was the headline-grabbing claim that
children trafficked from neighbouring countries produced all West African
cocoa. Untrue when the campaign began in the USA (quickly followed by Europe
and Japan), and still today, it nonetheless sparked the Harkin-Engel Protoc=
ol,
which sought to impose measures, especially on Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire. Alt=
hough
the US ambassador to Ghana stated publicly that the nationally-determined c=
hild
labour priorities were fishing, domestic service, and artisanal mining, the=
US
maintained pressure on the cocoa/chocolate industry and on the two other go=
vernments.
Furthermore, it supported the establishment of a monitoring body operating
separately from the national child labour monitoring system, while rejecting
proposals for tripartite, tri-national oversight.
Significant
funding for IPEC work accompanied this campaign. However, it mostly went to
direct beneficiary projects, partly because the US Government Performance a=
nd
Results Act required simplistic correlation of expenditure with results. Th=
e US
then had (and still has) not ratified Convention 138 and was focusing
exclusively on the worst forms of child labour (which it unhelpfully termed=
“exploitative”
child labour, an adjective explicitly rejected by the ILO Conferences in
1998-99). Despite President Obama’s unequivocal call on World Day Against C=
hild
Labour in 2009 for the “elimination of child labour in all its forms” (Pete=
rs
and Woolley, 2009), and Senator Harkin’s support for integrated interventio=
ns
to tackle the root causes of child labour, resistance came from within the
Administration to integrated fundamental rights and decent work approaches
targeting all forms of child labour and to support for worker and small far=
mer
self-organisation. This general exclusion of support for public services and
for generalised benefits to communities meant root causes remained largely
untouched.
It
became clear that most children performing child labour (even if hazardous)=
in
cocoa production had not been trafficked and were not in forced labour. Mos=
t were
working on family farms run by their parents as owners, tenants, or
sharecroppers (although, in the last two, conditions could approximate to
forced labour), and might also be engaged in producing other crops or in ot=
her
types of labour like domestic work or artisanal mining.
The
“modern slavery” and Target 8.7 discourses deployed another damaging
conflation, perhaps unintentional and based on common but inexact usage: “e=
xploitation”
became a synonym for forced labour. By repeatedly referring to exploitation=
as
if it existed only in conditions of forced labour, this further hindered
understanding of the mutually supportive and interdependent nature of FPRW =
at the
heart of the 1998 Declaration and of the mutually aggravating nature of
violations of those rights.
The
Marxist definition of exploitation – extraction of surplus value by capital
from labour, the essential relationship of the capitalist mode of productio=
n –
is not universally accepted. However, suggesting that exploitation takes pl=
ace only
in conditions of forced labour (or to use the term exclusively or primarily=
in
that context) undermines the struggle for universal realisation of all four
interdependent categories of FPRW: freedom from child labour, forced labour=
and
discrimination, and, particularly, freedom of association and the ri=
ght to
bargain collectively. Indeed, the 2012 ILO Conference made clear that freed=
om
of association and the right to collective bargaining are primus inter pares among these rights. The 1998 ILO Declaration=
Preamble
proclaims that the purpose of universal realisation of these rights is to
“enable the persons concerned to claim … a fair share of the wealth they ha=
ve
helped to generate” (ILO, 1998 and 2010). However, if only people in forced
labour are exploited, then all others (including garment, plantation, and
food-processing workers; teenagers in fast-food restaurants and “gig econom=
y”
delivery services; and migrant workers cleaning offices and hotels) must be
receiving their ‘fair share’, and therefore do not need collective bargaini=
ng,
and neither do small farmers need associations or cooperatives to negotiate
fair prices.
Abuse
of the specific meanings of the distinct economic and legal concepts exploitation and forced labour not only risks disdain for the universal rights to
freedom of association and collective bargaining. The intrinsic overlap bet=
ween
denial of these rights and discrimination, social exclusion and disempowerm=
ent
on one hand, and forced labour and child labour on the other is effectively
universal (unlike the, mercifully, comparatively small overlap between child
labour and forced labour). The narrow misuse of “exploitation” therefore al=
so undermines
the strategic understanding - enshrined in the 1998 Declaration and subsequ=
ent
ILO resolutions - that forced labour, child labour, and discrimination will=
not
be eradicated without universal realisation of freedom of association and
effective recognition of the right to collective bargaining.
Moreover,
several other related and erroneous beliefs are incompatible with an
understanding that the struggle against the root causes of forced labour and
child labour in the real economy requires the collective agency and representative voice of rights holders (if that conc=
ept
is understood at all). Prominent among those ideas are that employer
paternalism, “corporate social responsibility”, and social auditing render
trade unions and small producers’ organisations and their principal collect=
ive
bargaining function redundant, and that forced labour and child labour can =
be
eliminated by a combination of donor-funded NGOs, philanthropic noblesse-oblige, draconian migrati=
on
curbs, and blunt-instrument law enforcement. Billionaires’ proclamations&nb=
sp;–
as heard by the Author – that philanthropy would end forced labour in =
the
21st Century are symptoms of an ahistorical, neo-colonialist pathology
(‘Wilberforceitis’?) clustered in the global North. This peddles the delusi=
on
that white benefactors alone ended transatlantic slavery; denies the collec=
tive
agency of enslaved workers; and
ignores their struggle for self-organisation and their rebellions from anci=
ent
Mesopotamia to the Americas and the Caribbean of the 18th and 19th centurie=
s[12] (and
the centuries since, during which slave-owners´ descendants were paid
compensation for “loss of their property”).
Today’s
UK Government appears to be seeking the permanent renewal of
populist-nationalist xenophobic support. It does so by attacking people “tr=
affickers”
alongside seeking to deport “illegal” migrants and “return” “illegal
asylum-seekers” to “safe countries” through which they have passed (although
there is no such thing as an illegal asylum-seeker, and none of those count=
ries
has agreed to accept them); and by stating its intentions to copy the
Australian practice of offshore detention. Thus, the government signals its
intent to breach its obligations arising from ratification of the 1951
Convention, the ILO 2014 Protocol, and Convention 182 to protect child and
adult victims of trafficking, and under the law of the sea (See, inter alia, IMO-UNHCR-ICS, 2015; Røsæg=
, 2020).
The
UNHCR criticised Australia’s deliberate separation of family members as a
breach of fundamental human – and children’s – rights (Doherty, 2021). The =
UN
Special Rapporteur on Racism and a large coalition of migrants’ and refugee=
s’
rights organisations have also criticised the policies of the present UK Ho=
me
Secretary as incompatible with international law (See, inter alia, Taylor, 2021a; Grierson and Marsh 2021; Townsend, 2=
021a).
Perhaps
when Alliance 8.7 was established it was no surprise that vocal support for=
“stopping
trafficking” ran alongside hostility by some governments to migrants,
asylum-seekers and refugees, despite the clear evidence that protected migration and safe route=
s to
asylum help prevent the vulnera=
bility
to trafficking for forced labour to which migrant workers, asylum-seekers, =
and
their families may be exposed when denied safe passage. Despite the UN Gene=
ral
Assembly’s adoption in 2018 of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Reg=
ular
Migration (but see the record vote: UN Digital Library (2018)), tens of
thousands of people, including infants and children, among them unaccompani=
ed
child refugees, have since died trying to reach safe shores.
Why
pay such attention to this conflation and the wider context of weakened
commitment to international norms in a discussion about child labour trends?
Foremost, because despite some crossovers, forced labour and child labour a=
re
not the same thing. Of the 160 million children in child labour, 155 million
are not in forced labour.
Deficits
in rights-based development make people vulnerable to forced labour, and pe=
nal
sanctions against the criminal offence of exacting forced labour are also
essential. However, for most children in child labour, who are working unpa=
id
in their family’s small farm or micro-enterprise, rights-based development,
social protection, and formalisation of the locally traded informal especia=
lly
rural – economy are far more appropriate responses than sanctions against t=
heir
parents. Indeed, while there is som=
e
crossover between child labour and forced labour, both are consistently interwoven with discrimination and with denial of
freedom of association and the right to bargain collectively.
The author has attended
every Global Child Labour Conference since the First (Oslo 1997). The Fourth
(Buenos Aires, 2017), followed a severe reduction in progress against child
labour but also the adoption of SDG Target 8.7, becoming a conference on ch=
ild
labour plus forced labour, plus youth employment. The outcome document
maintained the language of the forced labour Conventions and of the sustain=
ed
eradication of child labour; indeed, it was more detailed than the strategic
conclusions of Brasilia. Yet, child labour received slightly fewer referenc=
es
than forced labour and trafficking, and the document inadequately
differentiated these ills and their required solutions.
The global trade union
movement had proposed an integrated Alliance 8 on decent work, explicitly r=
ecognising
the interdependence of all four categories of FPRW. This being denied, and
despite considerable efforts to persuade them to join, key global union
federations declined to bring their crucial sectoral mandates to Alliance 8=
.7. Indeed,
without the IUF, the global union federation with competence for agricultur=
e,
the Alliance could not convene a credible rural economy working group.
Child labour and forced
labour, with trafficking delineated specifically, were put together and, after the SDGs were adopted, it appeared
that more attention was paid to trafficking than to child labour (indeed,
Australia, Alliance 8.7’s first chair, has still not ratified Convention 13=
8).[13]<=
/a>
This was, in part, fuelled by the policies of ruling parties which, conflat=
ing
forced labour with trafficking and trafficking with migration and asylum,
sought electoral support by demonising migrants and asylum-seekers. Future
global estimates on forced labour might indicate whether that has helped or
hindered the fight against “modern slavery”. Already, however, continuing
attacks, in government policies and on the street, on migrants, asylum-seek=
ers,
refugees and people from ethnic minorities, and, in the USA, an attempted
insurrection by white supremacists indicate that the racist genie is now tr=
uly
out of the bottle.
The result is an
interesting intersectional equation illustrating how, in an era of
populist-nationalist identity politics and othering, violation of one
fundamental right further hinders the realisation of the others. In this
crucial example, child labour is relegated as certain forces prioritise the=
ir
discrimination against migrants,
asylum-seekers, and refugees on the pretext of combatting trafficking. Such
discrimination prevents safe passage and makes trafficking for forced labour
more likely, not less, but is also a tool to divert attention from social a=
nd
economic injustice. This weakens opposition to policies that increase wealth
disparities: policies that in turn thrive when freedom of association and
collective bargaining are hindered rather than promoted.
The author is not
suggesting a conscious plot to side-line child labour, although some
governments and some (certainly not all) NGOs in Alliance 8.7 displayed lit=
tle
interest in the topic. However, the lower priority it received stemmed part=
ly
from the anti-migration and anti-asylum stance of influential governing par=
ties
that deny the interdependent nature of FPRW. In the ethnonationalist discou=
rse,
child labour has no electoral value, unlike children seeking asylum, who ga=
in
it when governments boast fortress borders, denying them safe haven,
incarcerating them, or letting them drown.
In 2013, the author hop=
ed
that replicating the 2008 to 2012 success of Brazil, India and others might
eradicate child labour by 2030. The remarkable absence of detailed analysis=
of
that extraordinary progress persists. Numerous conflicts - not least in
Afghanistan, Libya, Syria, Yemen, Myanmar, the Sahel, and the Great Lakes
region, the climate emergency, and the Covid pandemic have increased the
challenge. Today 800 million children may be partially or wholly out of sch=
ool,
many vulnerable to child labour. Families are thrown into poverty: in the
global North queuing at food banks; in the global South, sometimes fleeing
violent persecution, returning from an imploded informal urban economy to s=
eek
food security in home villages.
More recently, the urge=
ncy
of SDG 8.7 and the pandemic might have encouraged greater commitment by some
actors to pursue both elements of the target. New national policy initiativ=
es
against child labour are emerging, including in rural Africa. The concept of
SDG 8.7 pathfinder countries, [14] which require support =
to
demonstrate concrete results, is advancing. There are widespread (though not
universal) efforts to implement the integrated area-based approach against
child labour in supply chains.
Furthermore, given thei=
r primus inter pares role in the can=
on of
FPRW, President Biden’s vocal support for all working people to enjoy their
rights to freedom of association and collective bargaining is encouraging
(Biden, 2021). This could help recreate a climate in which mature labour
relations are understood as normal and essential for social and economic
justice and well-functioning democracies, in turn helping to renew support =
for
the interwoven promotion of all FPRW.
Targeting the root caus=
es
of child labour has been a powerful convening and entry point for successful
integrated activity to promote all - mutually supportive - fundamental righ=
ts
at work. Following the International Year for the Elimination of Child Labo=
ur,
(ILO, 2021) with the Fifth Global Conference in Durban pending in 2022, the
2025 SDG target demands reinvigorated multilateralism, international
solidarity, tripartite consensus, and partnership to pursue accelerated
implementation of integrated fundamental rights policies to eradicate all child labour. Durban could also
provide an opportunity to promote a wider coalition with the International
Partnership for Cooperation on Child Labour in Agriculture, directing great=
er
attention to the great majority of child labour in locally traded goods and
services in rural economies (E=
stablished
in 2007, the IPCCLA comprises the ILO, FAO, IFAD and the IUF. See
The nine-year-old African girl working unpaid alongside her parents on
the family farm, producing mainly for local markets, perhaps occasionally g=
oing
to school but prevented from exercising her right to fulfil her potential,
might not move Northern consumers. Yet, unless we reject the racist diversi=
on
caused by the populist-nationalist conflation of trafficking with migration=
and
asylum, and refocus attention on her and her parents’ fundamental rights, we
will be unable to resume the integrated strategies required to eradicate ch=
ild
labour. Instead, we will need to apologise, yet again, for breaking the sol=
emn
promise to the world´s children, repeated time and time again and to which,=
in
2015, we attached a deadline: to eradicate all forms of child labour by 202=
5.
Refe=
rences
Biden, J. (2021, March 1). Presi=
dent
Biden on Workers’ Rights to Organize and Unionize. https://www.yout=
ube.com/watch?v=3DaZpUD9KgYc4
Brecht, B. (1978). Die Stücke von
Bertolt Brecht in einem Band. Suhrkamp.
David, M. E. & Moos, M. (Eds.).=
(2021) Debating
the Zeitgeist and Being Second Generation. Valentine-Mitchell.
Davis, J. & and Hollis, A. (201=
8,
October 12). Theresa May’s Brexit speech had shades of Hitler. The
Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/oct/12/theresa-mays-brexit-=
speech-had-shades-of-hitler
Doherty, B. (2021, May 1). The R=
efugees
torn from Loved ones by Australia’s ‘Cruel’ Family Separations. The
Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2021/may/02/the-refugees-t=
orn-from-loved-ones-by-australias-cruel-family-separations?CMP=3DShare_iOSA=
pp_Other.
Domarus, M. (1973) Hitler, Reden=
und
Proklamationen 1932-1945. Pamminger & Partner
https://archive.org/details/max-domarus-hitler-reden-und-proklamationen-193=
2-1945
FAO, IFAD, ILO & IUF. (2020). <=
i>The
International Partnership for Cooperation on Child Labour in Agriculture
statement on the impact of COVID-19 on child labour in agriculture. Rom=
e,
FAO. https://doi.org/10.4060/ca9516en
Geary. (2016). Slaves and Social=
Protest
in Brazil 1780-1850. https://essaydocs.org/slaves-and-social-protest-in-brazil-1780-1850-d=
ick-geary-unive.html
Gelblum, B. (2019, March 8). Who wo=
n this
epic stare off between Will Self and Tory Brexiteer Mark Francois? The London Economic.
Global Conference on Child Labour. =
(2013). Outcome
document of the III Global Conference on Child Labour, Brasilia, 8-10
October 2013. (Brasilia Declaration on Child Labour). https://www.ilo.org/ipec/Informationresources/WCMS_IPEC_PUB_23480/lan=
g--en/index.htm
Global Conference on the Sustained
Eradication of Child Labour. (2017). Buenos Aires Declaration on Child
Labour, Forced Labour and Youth Employment. 16 November 2017.
Government of the U.K. Employmen=
t Rights
Act 1996. https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/18/section/44
Grierson, J. & Marsh, S. (2021,=
March
24). UN refugee agency hits out at Priti Patel's plans for UK asylum
overhaul. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2021/mar/24/priti-patel-defends-i=
nhumane-overhaul-of-uk-asylum-system?CMP=3DShare_iOSApp_Other
Home Office (U.K.) (2021, March 20)=
. Alarming
rise of abuse within modern slavery system. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/alarming-rise-of-abuse-within-mode=
rn-slavery-system
ILO. (2014). Follow-up to the Br=
asilia
Declaration on Child Labour. ILO Governing Body 320th Session, Geneva,
13–27 March 2014. https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---relconf/docume=
nts/meetingdocument/wcms_235401.pdf
ILO. (2010) ILO Declaration on
Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work and its Follow-Up, 18 June 1998
(Second edition with revised annex, 15 June 2010)
https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---declaration/document=
s/publication/wcms_467653.pdf
ILO. (2016). Follow-up within th=
e Office
to the resolution concerning fundamental principles and rights at work adop=
ted
by the 101st Session of the International Labour Conference (2012). Governi=
ng
Body 328th Session 27 October–10 November 2016. https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---relconf/docume=
nts/meetingdocument/wcms_531682.pdf
ILO. (2017). Ending child labour=
by
2025: A review of policies and programmes. International Labour Office
(ILO), Geneva, 2017. https://www.ilo.org/ipecinfo/product/download.do?type=3Ddocument&=
id=3D29875
ILO. (2018a). Ending child labou=
r by
2025: A review of policies and programmes. Second edition. International
Labour Office (ILO), Geneva, 2018. https://www.ilo.org/ipec/Informationresources/WCMS_653987/lang--en/in=
dex.htm
ILO. (2018b). Resolution to amen=
d the
18th ICLS Resolution concerning statistics of child labour. 20th Internatio=
nal
Conference of Labour Statisticians Geneva, 10-19 October 2018. https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---dgreports/---stat/documen=
ts/meetingdocument/wcms_667558.pdf
ILO. (2019). CEACR Observation: =
Minimum
Age Convention, 1973 (No. 138), Bolivia. Committee
of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations=
.
https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=3DNORMLEXPUB:13100:0::NO::P131=
00_COMMENT_ID:3956605
ILO. (2020). Covid-19 Impact on =
Child
Labour and Forced Labour: The Response of the IPEC+ Flagship Programme.=
https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/---ed_norm/---ipec/documents=
/publication/wcms_745287.pdf
ILO. (2021). 2021 International =
Year for
the Elimination of Child Labour. https://www.ilo.org/global/topics/child-labor/int-year/lang--en/index=
.htm
ILO. (n.d.). Fundamental Princip=
les and
Rights at Work Branch. https://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/how-the-ilo-works/department=
s-and-offices/governance/fprw/lang--en/index.htmt
ILO & UNICEF. (2021). Child =
Labour:
Global estimates 2020, trends and the road forward. International Labour
Office and United Nations Children’s Fund. https://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_norm/@ipec/documents/pub=
lication/wcms_797515.pdf
ILO. (1973). ILO Minimum Age Con=
vention,
1973 (No. 138). https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=3DNORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO:12100=
:P12100_INSTRUMENT_ID:312283:NO
ILO. (1999). ILO Worst Forms of =
Child
Labour Convention, 1999 (No. 182). https://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=3DNORMLEXPUB:12100:0::NO:12100=
:P12100_INSTRUMENT_ID:312327:NO
ILO-IPEC. (2013). Good practices=
and
lessons learned - Converging against child labour: Support for India's mode=
l. International
Labour Organization, ILO International Programme on the Elimination of Child
Labour (IPEC); ILO DWT for South Asia and ILO Country Office for India – New
Delhi: ILO, 2013. https://www.ilo.org/ipec/Informationresources/WCMS_IPEC_PUB_23895/lan=
g--en/index.htm
IMO-UNHCR-ICS. (2015). Rescue at=
Sea: A
Guide to Principles and Practice as applied to Refugees and Migrants. T=
he
International Maritime Organization - The Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees- The International Chamber of Shipping.
Joint Council for the Welfare of
Immigrants. (n.d.). Windrush scandal explained. https://www.jcwi.org.uk/windrush-scandal-explained<=
span
lang=3DEN-US style=3D'font-size:10.0pt'>
Karlsson O, (2018 October 10) Hi=
storiker
kritisieren auf fragwürdige Weise Gauland-Artikel in FAZ. Berliner
Tageszeitung. https://www.berlinertageszeitung.de/politik/24017-histori=
ker-sehen-parallelen-zwischen-gauland-artikel-in-der-faz-und-hitler-rede.ht=
ml
Kershaw, I. (1999). Hitler 1889-=
1936
Hubris. W. W. Norton & Company.
Kershaw, I. (2001). Hitler: 1936=
-1945
Nemesis (Allen Lane History S.) W. W. Norton & Company.
Kneebone, S. (2017). Australia a=
s a
powerbroker on refugee protection in Southeast Asia: the relationship with
Indonesia. The Free Library. Retrieved Dec 15 2021 from https://www.thefreelibrary.com/Australia+as+a+powerbroker+on+refugee+=
protection+in+Southeast+Asia%3a...-a0491909268
McVeigh, K. (2021, May 8). UK aid c=
uts will
put tens of thousands of children at risk of famine, says charity. The
Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/may/08/uk-aid-cut=
s-will-put-tens-of-thousands-of-children-at-risk-of-famine-says-charity?CMP=
=3DShare_iOSApp_Other
Merrick, R. (2017, July 5). Ther=
esa May
speech 'could have been taken out of Mein Kampf', Vince Cable says. The
Independent. https://www.independent.co.uk/new=
s/uk/politics/theresa-may-mein-kampf-adolf-hitler-nazi-vince-cable-liberal-=
democrat-conservatives-a7825381.html
Peters G. and Woolley J. the Americ=
an
Presidency Project (2009) Barack Obama, statement on World Day against Child
Labour (and quoted in a letter from Secretary of Labor, Hilda Solis, June 2=
009,
in possession of Peters).
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/statement-world-day-against-child=
-labor-0
Refugee Council. (2021, November 17=
). New
Refugee Council analysis shows most people arriving by small boats across t=
he
Channel are likely be fleeing persecution. https://www.refugeecouncil.org.uk/latest/news/new-refugee-council-ana=
lysis-shows-most-people-arriving-by-small-boats-across-the-channel-are-like=
ly-be-fleeing-persecution/
Røsæg, E. (2020). The Duty to Re=
scue
Refugees and Migrants at Sea. University of Oxford. https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/c=
entreborder-criminologies/blog/2020/03/duty-rescue =
Siddique, H. (2021, November 17). <=
i>New
bill quietly gives powers to remove British citizenship without notice.=
The
Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2021/nov/17/new-bill-quietly-giv=
es-powers-to-remove-british-citizenship-without-notice?CMP=3DShare_iOSApp_O=
ther
Syal, R. (2021, October 12). Pri=
ti
Patel’s borders bill ‘breaches international and domestic law’. The
Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/oct/12/priti-patel-borders-bil=
l-breaches-law-human-rights?CMP=3DShare_iOSApp_Other
Syal, R. (2021b, November 14). U=
nion
considers legal action over Channel refugee ‘pushbacks’. The Guardian. =
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2021/nov/14/union-considers-legal=
-action-over-channel-refugee-pushbacks
Taylor, D. (2021, June 3). Calls=
to
close Napier barracks after asylum seekers win legal case. The Guardian=
. https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2021/jun/03/napier-barracks-asylu=
m-seekers-win-legal-challenge-against-government
Taylor, D. (2021a, May 6). Judge
criticises Priti Patel over policy for asylum seekers in pandemic. The
Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2021/may/06/judge-criticises-prit=
i-patel-over-evictions-of-asylum-seekers-in-pandemic?CMP=3DShare_iOSApp_Oth=
er
The Spectator (2016, October 5) Ful=
l text:
Theresa may’s conference speech.
https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/full-text-theresa-may-s-conference-spee=
ch
Townsend, M. (2021a, July 18). P=
riti
Patel ‘misled’ MPs over plans for protest crackdown. The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2021/jul/18/priti-patel-misled-m=
ps-over-plans-for-protest-crackdown?CMP=3DShare_iOSApp_Other
Townsend, M. (2021a, May 9). EU
countries snub Priti Patel’s plans to return asylum seekers. The Guardi=
an.
https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2021/may/09/eu-countries-snub-priti-pat=
els-plans-to-return-asylum-seekers?CMP=3DShare_iOSApp_Other
Townsend, M. (2021b, November 20). =
Home
Office ‘covering up’ its own study of why refugees come to the UK. The
Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2021/nov/20/home-office-covering-=
up-its-own-study-of-why-refugees-come-to-the-uk
Trilling, D. (2021, November 30). <=
i>Draconian
border security doesn’t work and costs lives. Why is Britain pushing it? The
Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/nov/30/channel-crossin=
gs-british-politicians-smuggling-migration
United Nations (2015) Transformi=
ng our
world: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development A/Res/70/1.
https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/content/documents/21252030%20Agenda%2=
0for%20Sustainable%20Development%20web.pdf
UN Digital Library (2018). Global
Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration: resolution / adopted by the
General Assembly: Voting Summary. https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/1656414
[1] The title could be clearer: key trends for the youngest children in agriculture and in Africa began to stall from 2012.
[2] By custom, the tripartite ILO being the UN’s “senior service” established with the League = of Nations in 1919, its Director General comes second to the UN Secretary Gene= ral
[4]=
Formerly
End Child Prostitution and Trafficking, ECPAT UK is a valuable ally seeking=
to
situate its central campaign within a broader context, and vocal critic of =
the
British government’s failure to fulfil its obligations to protect child
migrants, asylum-seekers, and child victims of trafficking. See =
https://www.ecpat.org.uk/
[5] In the same vein, some government sources had suggested offshoring asylum-seekers on the Falkland Islands/Malvinas or Ascension Island.
[6] Section 44 provides employees with the right to withdraw f= rom and to refuse to return to a workplace in which – in their opinion – the prevailing circumstances represent a risk of serious and imminent danger wh= ich they could not be expected to avert; and permits claims for Constructive Dismissal and unlimited compensation in the event that an employer fails to maintain safe working conditions. Cf: https://section44.co.uk for a simple explanation. Full text at https://www.legi= slation.gov.uk/ukpga/1996/18/section/44.
[7] On Hitler and antisemitism see inter alia (and especially): Kershaw (1999 and 2001). Domarus’ Hitler Reden und Proklamationen 1932-1945 includes only an edited version of Hitler’s 1933 Siemenswerk speech. However, the full quote used here was cited by O. Karlsson in an article in the Berliner Tageszeitu= ng (10.10.2018) reporting criticism by historians Wolfgang Benz and Michael Wolfssohn of German AfD leader Alexander Gauland for using similar language resonant of that speech.
[8] Declaration of interest: the Author’s father and other family members were refugees from Nazi occupation; the few survivors in post-War Czechoslovakia became victim= s of Stalinist antisemitism. The reactions of other “Second Generation” children= to this ethnonationalist-populist “Zeitgeist” are reflected in David and Moos (2021). In November 2021, the Author chaired an online conference on this subject: Lord Alf Dubs (leading advocate for child refugee rights in the Ho= use of Lords), Moos and David were principal speakers.
[9] The Author would also argue that, compared with other EU member states, widespr= ead (English) monolingualism hindered more people in the U.K. from using their freedom of movement to work and explore their shared European culture.
[10] The 52 per cent who voted Leave was 37.5 per cent of the registered electorate.=
[11] How easy it seems f= or some to forget resistance networks in Nazi-occupied Europe that delivered p= ersecuted Jewish adults and children, resistance fighters, members of the Allied forc= es, UK SOE operatives and others to safety across closed borders. The Calais Wo= rld War II museum dedicates a room to them. (Trilling, 2021)
[12] See, inter alia, the work on slavery and slave resistance in Brazil = by the late Prof. Dr Dick Geary, former director of the Nottingham University Institute for the Study of Slavery, and his colleagues: Geary (2016)
[13] The other ILO member
States that have not yet ratified Convention 138 are Bangladesh (believed
to be in process), the Cook Islands, Iran, Lesotho, Marshall Islands, New
Zealand, Palau, St Lucia, Somalia, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Tuvalu, and the USA<=
/span>
[14] On Pathfinder count= ries and the response to the pandemic’s effect on child labour see, e.g.: ILO (2020)
5
Has Anti-Migration and Anti-Refugee Discourse
Hampered Progress against Child Labour?