https://doi.org/10.37815/rte.v37n1.1292

Original articles

Is the State of Morocco a Social State?

¿Es el estado en
Marruecos un estado social?

Mehdi Lahlou1, 2 https://orcid.org/0000-0001-9113-9582

1National Institute of Statistics and Applied Economy (INSEA), Rabat, Morocco

2Global Migration Policy Associates (GMPA), Geneva, Switzerland

[email-masked]

Sent:       2025/03/18

Accepted:       2025/06/20

Published:       2025/06/30

Abstract

The human development situation in Morocco
in 2025 has evolved from the relative euphoria that characterized this North
African country in the early 2000s.  The
National Initiative for Human Development (INDH), launched in 2005 by King
Mohammed VI was intended to spread a social safety net under Moroccans
left behind by "growth finally on track".  The Fiftieth Anniversary Report took
stock of the country's 50 years of independence since 1956 and
indicated paths for developing its economy and transforming its society by
2025. The report assessed that the country was at a crossroads and had the
means to embark on the path of national ambition shared by all, articulated
around human development. This article reviews the social
state as a framework for analyzing the subsequent discourse and practice of
the social state in the Kingdom of Morocco. It presents two definitions of a
social state, and draws on a wide range of economic and social data to examine
in depth the socio-economic realities of the country's population. The analysis
compares and contrasts those realities with the government's stated intentions
and public policies to highlight significant gaps in obtaining social justice
for a large proportion of the population. Based on comparative analysis of data
referencing the definitional framework, the article demonstrates that, despite
strong rhetoric promoting inclusion and human development, government plans and
programs on the ground fall short of their proclaimed goals. The conclusions
identify factors for the lack of progress towards a more socially just country
and society.

Keywords: State,
social justice, human development, women,
unemployment, social deficits.

Summary: Introduction, Methodological note, What is the social state?, Morocco in economic
figures and social conditions, Conclusions.

How to cite: Lahlou, M. (2025).
Is the State of Morocco a Social State? Revista
Tecnológica - Espol, 37(1), 174-193. https://rte.espol.edu.ec/index.php/tecnologica/article/view/1292

Resumen

La situación del desarrollo humano
en Marruecos en 2025 evoca la relativa euforia que caracterizó a este país
norteafricano a principios de la década de 2000. La Iniciativa Nacional para el
Desarrollo Humano (INDH), lanzada en 2005 por el rey Mohammed VI, pretendía
establecer una red de seguridad social para los marroquíes que se habían
quedado del “crecimiento por fin en marcha”. El Informe del Cincuentenario
realizó un balance de los 50 años de independencia e indicó vías para
desarrollar su economía y transformar su sociedad para 2025. El informe
argumentó que el país se encontraba en una encrucijada y contaba con los medios
para emprender el camino de la ambición nacional compartida por todos,
articulada en torno al desarrollo humano. Este artículo presenta dos
definiciones de estado social y reúne un amplio panorama de datos económicos y
sociales para examinar en profundidad la realidad socioeconómica de la
población. El análisis compara esa realidad con las intenciones y políticas
públicas declaradas por el gobierno, destaca importantes brechas en el logro de
la justicia social para una gran proporción de la población. Con base en el
análisis comparativo de datos, el artículo demuestra que, a pesar de la firme
promoción de la inclusión y el desarrollo humano, los planes y programas
gubernamentales en la práctica distan de lograr lo que proclaman. Las
conclusiones identifican los factores que explican la falta de progreso hacia
una sociedad más justa.

Palabras
clave: Estado, justicia social, desarrollo humano,
mujeres,  desempleo,  déficits sociales.

Introduction

The human
development situation in
Morocco in 2025 harkens
back to the relative euphoria that characterized this North African country,
located just 14 km from Europe, in the early 2000s.  At the time, the National Initiative for
Human Development (INDH), launched in May 2005 by King Mohammed VI, was
supposed to spread a "social safety net" under the feet of Moroccans
left behind by "growth finally on track". That same year, a summary
document known as the "Fiftieth Anniversary Report" took stock of the
country's 50 years of independence (acquired in 1956) and, above all, indicated
possible paths for developing its economy and transforming its society by 2025.
The report argued that the country was at a crossroads and had the means to
embark resolutely on the path of a great national ambition, shared by all, and
centered on human development. Now, 20 years later, despite vocal promotion of inclusion and human
development, government plans and programs on the ground continue to fall short
of their declared objectives.

Among Arab
countries, and in the Maghreb region itself, Morocco is often portrayed as an
exception, as a democracy. An economic and social democracy, with a
"multi-party system", periodic local and national elections, and a parliament
that has formally functioned since the early 1960s, even if it lacks
significant political power and control.

However, real powers in the country are held
by the King, who is neither subject to election nor politically accountable, even though he presides over the Council of
Ministers - which decides the State's economic and social policies – and he is the head of the army, the head of the
justice authority and the head of the National Security Council, etc. (Royaume du Maroc, Constitution of 2011,  Art.
41 - 59)

Another
manifestation of this "Moroccan exception" was illustrated by the
form and consequences of what has been called the "Arab Spring",
which was initiated and led in Morocco in early 2011 by the "February
20" movement.  This movement -
supported by socialist opposition parties and numerous human rights
associations, as well as some associations for the unemployed - led major
demonstrations in almost 150 cities, particularly in the most important ones
such as the capital Rabat, Casablanca, Fez and Tangiers.

The
demonstrations denounced situations of precariousness and social exclusion that had become untenable for a large part of the population across the country,
in both urban and rural areas. The main demands of the demonstrators were
political. These included reform of the state, independence of the judiciary,
separation of politics from business and politics from religion at the head of
the state - in other words, the creation of a civil state. They were also of a
social nature, aiming to reduce inequalities within Moroccan society, notably
with less injustice, more jobs, more schools and health care centers, more
dignity, less corruption, less inequality between men and women, and so on.

In this
article, we present the definition of a "social state"and review the
main economic and social data in Morocco, along with their political
underpinnings. Such data indicate that, while the
country's leaders proclaim
inclusion and human
development, government
programs/plans on the
ground have, to date, led to nearly the
opposite of what they proclaim to achieve.

Methodological
note

This
article examines the nature of the social state as a framework for analyzing
the discourse and practice of the social state in the Kingdom of Morocco. It
brings together a broad panorama of economic and social data to examine in
depth the socio-economic reality of the country's population, comparing it with
the official discourse of the government. The analysis compares and contrasts
the reality represented by the data with the government's stated intentions and
public policies, to highlight significant gaps in real efforts to promote
social justice for a large proportion of the country's population. Based on
this in-depth comparison, the conclusions identify the factors responsible for
the lack of progress towards a more socially just country and society, as well
as the situation of a long-developing country.

What is the
social state?

In the following section, we briefly present two models of the social
state as well as the Moroccan model.

The welfare-state
model

This is a model of political and economic organization
in which the State plays a central role in the protection and well-being of its
citizens. In addition to the so-called regalian missions of internal and
external security, such a state performs three major functions:

1.      Social protection: The State
guarantees social assistance and benefits (unemployment benefits, pensions,
family allowances, RSA, etc.) to reduce inequalities and protect the most
vulnerable, thereby guaranteeing social cohesion.

2.      Access to public services: The state
finances, or guarantees the financing of, and organizes essential services such
as health (social security), education (public schools, universities) and
essential infrastructure (roads, railroads, ports and airports, electricity,
water and sanitation networks, etc.).

3.      Economic regulation: the State
intervenes in the economic sphere to limit market excesses, impose rules on
companies (minimum wage, safety regulations, labor laws) and reduce initial
inequalities in the distribution of national income through the redistribution
of wealth, notably via a progressive, fair and efficient tax system.

This model developed especially after the
Second World War, with states assuming greater responsibility for the process
of economic development and the well-being of their citizens[1]. However, since the 1980s, many countries have reduced the role of the
welfare state under the influence of so-called neo-liberal policies (notably
under Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in the UK - 1979-1990, and Ronald Reagan
in the USA - 1981-1989).

The social-democratic (or universalist) state
model

It is characterized by:

·
A
high level of social protection that covers the entire population, regardless
of an individual's labour market status or family situation;

·
A
wide range of public and social services;

·
A
major demarketing effort (i.e., making non-tradable goods and services
available to the population, such as water, health and education), through
compensation systems (redistribution of wealth) and the setting of strict rules
- in terms of wages, social protection and working conditions - for economic
players;

·
The
aim is to achieve greater equality between citizens, so as to reduce social
stratification and ensure a degree of social justice.

In reality, these two models are hardly
dissociated from each other, and in any case, they converge in the sense that
both aim - at a given stage of development of the liberal market economy - to
ensure social cohesion, a basic immaterial factor necessary for the development of any economy. alongside the physical factors of labor, capital and natural resources.

The Moroccan model

Without referring ideologically or
theoretically to either of the above two models, the social state, as supported
by the liberal government that the King of Morocco has put in place from
September 2021, boils down to a Government Program comprising a set of promises. The latter ''indicate the
social dimension of future public policies, which can be deduced from the
government's commitments to create one million net jobs over the next 5 years
(between 2021 and 2026), activate comprehensive social protection, lift one
million families out of the cycle of poverty and fragility, the protection and
expansion of the middle class, the creation of economic and social conditions
for the emergence of a middle class in the rural world, and the
universalization of primary education for the benefit of all children from the
age of four, with the establishment of permanent and effective governance for
quality control; and the reduction of social and spatial
disparities''(Akhannouch, 2021).

A review at Morocco's economic and social
performance up to the year 2024 reveals the gap between the commitments made
and the results achieved over the years. In other words, a fragile economy,
dependent on variations in annual rainfall levels, and a precarious, highly
unbalanced social sphere.

Morocco
in economic figures and social conditions

Assessing the human development situation in Morocco in 2025 requires any objective observer, or
researcher in the economic and social sciences, to take account of the relative euphoria that characterized
this North African country in the early 2000s.

At the time, the National Initiative for Human Development (INDH),
launched in May 2005 by King Mohammed VI - who came to power following the
death of his father in 1999 - aimed to create a social safety net for
marginalized populations, at a time when it was felt that economic growth was
finally beginning to take a stable course. In the same year, a synthesis
document, known as the "Human
Development Report" or "Fiftieth Anniversary Report",
drawn up by a host of economists, sociologists and other academics, took stock
of the country's 50 years of independence (gained in 1956) and, above all,
indicated possible paths for developing its economy and transforming its
society by 2025.

In its foreword, the report argued that "Our country (Morocco) is at a crossroads.
It now has the means to embark resolutely on the path of a great national
ambition, shared by all, and built around human development. To achieve this,
the national community has an ardent obligation to make coherent choices,
accelerate the pace and deepen the scope of reforms, and make a definitive
break with the practices and behaviors that have hitherto thwarted its
development'' (Royaume du Maroc, 2005, p.31).

Morocco's economic figures:
weak growth over the long term, uneven growth in the short term

As the graph below shows, Morocco's Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) - the total wealth produced by the country - is estimated to have risen by
almost 36% in 8 years. In 2023, average GDP per capita will be just over 3,700
dirhams, or around 3,500 euros. This corresponds to 1/35th of the
GDP per capita in Switzerland, and 1/9thof the average per capita in
the European Union. However, price rises have exceeded 30% over the same
period, with food price inflation of over 20% in 2022 alone (HCP, 2024). This
has had a direct impact on the purchasing power of the poorest and most
vulnerable sections of the population, estimated to number over 20 million.

Figure 1

Gross domestic product
(GDP) in current dirham between 2015 and 2023

Source: www.hcp.ma

Furthermore, as shown in the table below, the annual growth rate of
overall GDP remains strongly correlated with agricultural GDP. The latter
remains totally dependent, year after year, on the evolution of rainfall. In
other words, the evolution of the Moroccan economy's main aggregate - where
agricultural value added accounts  less
than 13% of GDP - remains intimately linked to changes in climatic conditions. Nature, that is.

Table 1

GDP growth between 2017 and
2023

Year

Agricultural GDP

Non-agricultural GDP

Total GDP

2017

+21,5

+3,2

+5,2

2018

+5,6

+2,8

+3,1

2019

-5,0

+4,0

+3,0

2020

-8,1

- 6,9

-7,0

2021

+17,8

+6,6

+7,8

2022

-11,3

+3.4

+1,5

2023

+ 1,4

+3,5

+3,4

Source : Bank Al Maghrib. https://www.bkam.ma/

In parallel with this finding, a national survey of household incomes
carried out between 2019 and March 2020 - just before the Covid 19 health
crisis - highlighted a marked inequality in the distribution of per capita
income, according to living environment and population category. In 2020, per
capita income in rural areas represented less than 2/3 (62%) of per capita
income in urban areas, while the wealthiest 20% of the population had more than
half (53.3%) of national income, compared with 5.6% for the least well-off 20%
(HCP, 2024).

Such magnitudes - with their continued dependence on climatic hazards,
their absolute and dynamic weakness and their unbalanced structure between
regions and social categories - speak volumes about the financial capacities
that the Moroccan public authorities have given themselves to achieve the work
of a "social state", i.e. human development.

So, broadly speaking, nothing very significant
in terms of social development seems to differentiate the periods before and
after 2000. Above all, Morocco, now with a population of almost 37 million
(HCP, 2024), has remained under constant threat of "the occurrence of a
serious external or internal crisis" (according to the same fiftieth
anniversary report), as happened with the global financial crisis of 2008/2009,
with the Arab Spring movements of 2011,
with the Coronavirus crisis – first identified in China at the
end of 2019, and began to affect North Africa on March 2, 2020, when the first
case of contamination by the virus was confirmed in Morocco - or with the
inflationary effects that followed the start of the Russian (and
Western) military intervention in Ukraine in February 2022.

Morocco's social
shortcomings: the consequences of the government's economic and political
choices

Despite the economic weaknesses mentioned
above, or because of them - as a kind of projection towards a dreamed-of but
still unattainable future - Morocco adopted a constitutional text 15 years ago,
following the "Arab Spring" protests in its cities, making social
issues a cornerstone of state action.

Also, it is specified in Article 31 of the Constitution adopted on 1
July, 2011 that:

''The State, public
institutions, and local authorities endeavour to mobilise all available
resources to ensure that all citizens, irrespective of gender, have equitable
access to the conditions necessary for the full enjoyment of their rights:

-
to health care;

-
to social protection, medical coverage and
mutual or state-organized solidarity;

-
to modern, accessible, quality education;

-
to education on attachment to Moroccan
identity and unchanging national constants;

-
to vocational training and physical and
artistic education;

-
to decent housing;

-
to the work and support of public authorities
in the search for employment or self-employment;

-
to access to public office based on merit;

-
to access to water and a healthy environment;

-
to sustainable development.’’

The health crisis of 2020/2021: a full-scale
revelation of Morocco's social deficits

The apparent courage of such a constitutional
proclamation - in which the State undertakes to do everything in its power to
give the population access to the essentials of basic services and benefits,
education, employment and water - will quickly come up against the wall of the
country's social reality, and the contradictory nature of the policies pursued
there over previous years/decades.

The closure of all land borders by the
Moroccan authorities, and the concomitant suspension of air and sea transport
of people, suddenly turned Morocco into a kind of island where all its
inhabitants found themselves locked in, forced to live in autarky.  All of a sudden, this gave rise to a
widespread fear of their country's weaknesses, of its dependence on foreign
countries, which had extraverted its economy and made openness to foreign
markets a dogma. But it also made many citizens realize that they belong, in
the final analysis, to the same human and social group, and that none of them
can find - at least for a while - an escape elsewhere, whether for healthcare,
study or work.

As a result, the perception of society as a
whole has suddenly become different, a mixture of fear and empathy towards
those living in confined conditions made extremely difficult by the state of
financial and social precariousness in which they were already living before
the crisis. A state covered by what looks like political propaganda through
recurring tunes of "everything's fine", and in any case,
"everything's better than with our neighbors". (In the Maghreb and
the rest of Africa).

And it is precisely in the context of this new
perception that many Moroccans have begun to understand, for example, that the
informal sector is far too predominant in the country's economy, and that most
of the jobs available are informal, insecure, low-skilled and low-paid. The
same Moroccans have also begun to feel that the imbalances in the distribution
of the wealth produced by the country are very great. Far too great to be
sustained indefinitely. And, intuitively - as if scalded by the upheavals of the
Arab Spring - the State perceived the danger that the strict confinement of the
entire population, decided on from mid-March 2020, could result in violent
movements by the poorest sections of the population, effectively unemployed
and/or without sufficient income, Hence the huge deployment of security forces
all over the country's main cities, where citizens also noticed the sporadic
presence of army tanks, a sort of confirmation that it's not far from social
injustice and deficits to violence and revolt (Lahlou et al, 2022).

The faces of social fault lines in Morocco

In 2005, a summary of the aforementioned
fiftieth anniversary report stated that: "An uncompetitive economy, with a
volatile and insufficient rate of growth, would lead to a worsening of unemployment
at national level, with strong repercussions on poverty, vulnerability and
exclusion. In urban areas, one working person in four and one graduate in three
would be unemployed in 2025 if the growth rate remained at its trend level.
Unemployment would continue to affect more women and young people. The informal
sector would develop in response to the shortcomings of the modern sectors of
the economy and as an alternative means of regulating the effects of
globalization. Budgetary room for manoeuvre is likely to shrink, especially as
the windfall from privatizations gradually dries up. This could have an even
greater impact on government investment spending and progress in
infrastructure" (Royaume du Maroc, 2005).

And in fact, for the purely economic aspect,
as mentioned above, as for employment and unemployment, health, schools,
migration or basic public services such as access to water, the a priori
"pessimistic" predictions set out in part here have been met with
short-term policies. These were (are) carried out under the supervision of the
administration, broken down by sector, with no overall coherence and, above
all, never subject to control.

In what follows, we briefly review relevant
data relating to employment and unemployment, health, education, migration and
access to water.

Employment and unemployment

As a link between economic growth and
employment trends in an economy, the prevalence or otherwise of unemployment
indicates both the success and failure of the policies pursued at both levels.
In Morocco, both the persistence of a high unemployment rate, and even its
worsening over the last period, as well as its structure by category, express a
situation of failure to absorb the demand for labor expressed by the
population. This is despite the fact that the activity rate (people actually
employed or looking for work as a proportion of the total population) at
national level is just under 43%, and that the rate for women is just over 18%
(18.3%), i.e. just under one woman in five is actually employed or looking for
work.

Overall, by the end of 2024, the number of
unemployed people in Morocco had risen to 1.645 million (13.7% of the working
population), compared with 1.549 million (12.9% of the working population) in
2023. This level of unemployment, the highest ever recorded in the country, has
risen over the past seven years by almost 30%, from 10.2% in 2017 to 13.3% in
2024 (and even to 13.7% in December of the latter year – see Figure 2 below).

Figure 2

Unemployment rate in
Morocco between 2017 and 2024 by place of residence (in %)

Total

Source: HCP, Rabat. 2024

As for Figure 3 below, it shows two important facts, both of which are imbalances to
the detriment of young jobseekers, as well as women. While the national average
unemployment rate was 13.3%, the unemployment rate for 15-24 year-olds was
almost triple that in the same year, at 36.7%.

In 2024, the female employment rate stood at almost 20% (19.4%), i.e.
one woman in five. Taking into account the female activity rate, itself below
20%, this means that less than 16% of Moroccan women of all ages are actually
employed.

Figure 3

Unemployment rate between
2023 and 2024 for certain categories of the population (in %)

Source: HCP, Rabat. 2024

Figure 4 below shows two concomitant elements. In fact, two constants in the
Moroccan labor market. These are the unemployment rates among "no
diploma" holders and among holders of vocational training or higher
education certificates or diplomas. In the former case, the unemployment rate,
which can be described as full-employment, stands at just over 5%, while in the
latter it averages over 25%, and reaches over 31% for specialized and higher
technicians.

Figure 4

Unemployment rate by degree
between 2023 and 2024 (%)

Source: HCP, Rabat. 2024

Such a configuration, while explaining the low level of labor
productivity in the Moroccan economy and, incidentally, part of the slow growth
in value-added generated by it, also means that the national education system
is operating at a loss. This is because the education system produces
unemployed people, either because the training it offers does not match the
needs of the job market, or because the latter is reluctant to take up skilled
jobs.[2]

This observation, fraught with consequences, leads us to the deficits in
the Moroccan education system. Another social flaw in Morocco's public
policies.

Morocco's education and vocational training system,
the country's other millstone around its neck

The Moroccan government has made a
considerable financial effort in the field of education. Until the end of the 1970s,
the national education system generally fulfilled its missions. Despite the
considerable deficits inherited from the colonial period - lack of financial
and human resources; large numbers of young and not-so-young people left
behind; linguistic problems, with a strong tug-of-war between the Spanish and
French languages of the former colonists, and the local Arabic dialects and
Amazigh (Berber) languages, etc. -
and despite the strong demographic growth of the 1970s-1980s, it succeeded in
widening Moroccans' access to education. It also provided the administration
and the national economy with the managers needed to replace the foreign
managers who left after independence in 1956. Moreover, for a time, education
was a real channel for social mobility, opening up to the world, access to
modernity and the production/strengthening of social ties" (Chakhrati
& Amsidder, 2025).

However, from the early 1980s onwards, "the education system
entered a long crisis, the most obvious symptoms of which are school wastage,
the relapse of school leavers into illiteracy, the decline in civic sense and
critical thinking, unemployment among university graduates, and the weakness of
basic learning (reading, writing, arithmetic, languages, communication).
Despite, and sometimes because of, a series of reforms, sometimes improvised
and more often than not incomplete, the education system has become a heavy,
unprofitable machine, producing graduates ill-prepared for the changes and
demands of the modern economy and society. The system has ended up producing a
multi-speed school, whose performance deteriorates the further you move away
from the centers of major urban agglomerations" (Royaume du Maroc, 2005).

In fact, in addition to the observation made in the section above that,
in the final analysis, "the less training you have in Morocco, or the less
progress you make in training, the more likely you are to find a job". Two
other observations are worth highlighting when discussing the failure of
education policies in Morocco.

Thus, while the Moroccan government spends nearly 5% of the country's
GDP (Ministry of Finance, 2024) on national education, i.e. more than the
average for Arab countries or countries with similar economic development,
only:

-
The illiteracy rate is still high in the country. In 2023, one in three
Moroccans over the age of 15 (around 34.2%) was illiterate, i.e. unable to
read, write or do simple calculations, according to the Cour des Comptes annual
report for 2023-2024. However, this rate represents a relatively significant -
albeit very slow - reduction compared to 2004, when it stood at 47.7% (Tel
Quel, 2024).

In addition, there's a
strong imbalance here, with more emphasis on injustices against women.

As shown in the table below
for the illiterate population aged 10 and over, the average illiteracy rate
among women is almost double that of men. Even so, this rate has fallen sharply
for both sexes since 1982.

Table 2

Illiteracy rates by gender
- trends between 1928 and 2024

Years

Male

Female

Total

2024

17,20

32,40

24,80

2004

30,80

54,70

43,00

1994

41,00

67,00

55,00

1982

51,00

78,00

65,00

Source: HCP, Rabat.  https://www.hcp.ma/Taux-d-analphabetisme-de-la-population-agee-de-10-ans-et-plus-selon-le-sexe_a3323.html

-
Furthermore, in 2023, the HCP
recorded that almost half (48.2%) of the working population in Morocco (and
71.6% of the working population in rural areas) had a level of education equal
to or lower than that of basic schooling, i.e. a level devoid of any cognitive
or professional aptitude.

-
According to the HCP, one in four young
Moroccans aged between 15 and 24 will be NEET (Not in Education, Employment or
Training) in 2022, i.e. 1.5 million people. This figure underlines the
inadequacy of public strategies and policies dedicated to the socio-economic
integration of this particularly sensitive and vulnerable category. Such
vulnerability is linked in particular to two determining factors, the first of
which is school drop-out between primary and secondary school levels. In 2022,
it was estimated that an average of over 331,000 pupils left school prematurely
each year, without any diploma or educational qualifications, which represents
a loss of both financial resources allocated to schools and human capital. The
main reasons for this are failure at school, difficulties in accessing
educational establishments (lack of roads, water and heating in schools,
extreme poverty among parents, especially in rural areas, etc.), as well as a
significant lack of vocational training opportunities. The second is when
school-leavers enter the job market, where first-time job-seekers account for
nearly 6 out of every 10 unemployed.

The healthcare system: a qualitatively and
quantitatively deficient system, reinforcing/prolonging regional imbalances

The number of beneficiaries of the Compulsory Health Insurance (AMO)
scheme, introduced in 2021, and of the National Social Security Fund (CNSS),
has reached more than 24.7 million people, according to a communication made by
the Moroccan government in February 2025. This number includes 3.1 million
people in the public sector, as well as more than 11 million newly insured
people who are unable to pay into the health insurance system, and whose
contributions have been paid by the public authorities through an annual budget
of 9.5 billion dirham, or almost 900 million euros (h24 info, 2025).  Such an announcement expresses the social
commitment of the Moroccan authorities. It is, however, weighed down by certain
highly restrictive features of the Moroccan healthcare system.

Thus, in parallel with the low per capita national income and its highly
unequal distribution between different regions and social categories - as
mentioned above - it should be stressed that, until recently (i.e. the year
2021, when AMO was introduced), the burden of healthcare expenditure fell
largely on households.

In this sense, according to a Ministry of Health report on the subject,
it appears that households' direct contribution towards covering their
healthcare costs amounted to 45.6% in 2018 (Ministry of Health, 2019). Adding
the same households' health insurance contributions (14.3%), their share of
healthcare expenditure rises to 59.7% of their disposable income.

Excluding social security contributions, the total individual
expenditure on healthcare in Morocco in 2018 was 489 US dollars. By
international comparison, this represented less than half the healthcare
expenditure of a Lebanese person.

Table 3

Comparison of individual expenditure on healthcare between Morocco and 4
countries with different levels of development

Country

Individual
healthcare expenditure (in US dollars)

Share
of total individual expenditure

France

5.250

9,2%

United States of America

10.624

10,8%

Turkey

1.171

17,5%

Lebanon

1.080

33,2%

Morocco

489

45,2%

Source: WHO. Reprinted in
''National health accounts''. 2018. Ministry of Health, Rabat.

This financial situation is made even more restrictive to access to
healthcare in Morocco by the low number of doctors per capita in the country.
The country has just 8 doctors per 10,000 inhabitants, compared with a world
average of 17.2 doctors per 10,000 inhabitants (OMS, 2022).

Table 4

Regional distribution of
Moroccan doctors, 2022

Regions/Doctors

Public

Private

Total

Number

%

Number

%

Number

%

Cumulative

Casablanca-Settat

3.400

23.7

5.192

35,72

8.592

29,73

29,73

Rabat-Salé-Kénitra

1.900

13.23

2.990

20,57

4.890

16,92

46,65

Marrakech-Safi

2.174

15.14

1.459

10,03

3.633

12,57

59,22

Fez-Meknes

2.297

15.99

1.303

9,2

3.600

12,46

71,68

Tangier-Tetouan

1.582

11,02

1.270

8,73

2.852

9,87

81,55

Total 5 regions

11.353

79,06

12.214

84,05

23.567

81,57

81,55

7 other regions

3.006

20,94

2.319

15,95

7,162

18,43

100

Total

14.359

100

14.533

100

28.892

100

100

Source: Ministère de la Santé – Santé
en chiffres. Rabat, 2022.

https://www.sante.gov.ma/Documents/2024/02/Sante%20en%20chiffre%202022%20VF1.pdf

For the rest, the table above shows that, more than the relatively small
number of doctors available per capita, it is the highly unbalanced
geographical distribution of these doctors across the country that makes
healthcare services difficult to access for a large proportion of the
population. Those living in rural areas, far from the main cities, are
generally the poorest. Overall, Morocco is a medical desert, extending beyond 5
regions/urban centers where more than eight out of ten doctors are based nationwide.

This situation of regional
under-medicalization is further exacerbated by the fact that almost ten
thousand Moroccan doctors work outside the country. This has fuelled migratory
movements - including of skilled workers - making Morocco one of the most important
emigration countries in the region. This phenomenon adds to the very unsocial
nature of the country's public policies, as well as to the dependence of its
economy, which continues to be financed to the tune of 8% by savings transfers
from its citizens living abroad.

Emigration from Morocco, another facet of exclusion
and the failure of social policies

From the early 1960s onwards, Morocco became a country of emigration,
due to its historical ties with France and Spain, the two powers that occupied
the country between 1912 and 1956. Secondly, because of the convergence between
the great need for manpower expressed by certain European countries such as
France (ILO, 1963) and Belgium (RTBF, 1964) - and the country's own economic
and social policies. In the 1970s (Ministère du Plan, 1973), these policies had
explicitly incorporated emigration as a means of limiting the pressure of job
demand on the local labor market, and as a source of financing for the national
economy.

Until the mid-1990s, there was no methodical monitoring of, and therefore
no precise statistics on, emigration from Morocco to Europe. Until then Europe
had been the main  destination for
Moroccan emigrants. However, according to estimates published by the OECD
(OECD, 2017), the number of Moroccans born in Morocco and living abroad was
around 650,000 in the 1960s, rising to around 800,000 in the following decade,
before reaching just over 1.5 million in 2000 and 3 million in 2010, or almost
9% of the country's total population that year. These data reveal a very sharp
acceleration in Moroccan migration from the beginning of the current century,
with between 120,000 and 150,000 Moroccans leaving Morocco each year between
2000 and 2010.

For its part, the HCP, in charge of collecting statistics in Morocco,
claims that there were 3.3 million Moroccans living abroad (Marocains résidant
à l’étranger - MRE) in 2006, a figure that would have risen to 5.4 million by
2020, an increase of over 63% in the space of 14 years.[3]

Table 5

Number of Moroccans living
abroad, 1998-2006

Year

Number of Moroccans
living outside Morocco (in millions)

1998

1,66

2000

2,98

2002

2,55

2005

3,18

2006

3,30

2020

5,40

Source: HCP. Effectif des
Marocains résidant à l’étranger.

https://www.hcp.ma/Effectif-des-Marocains-residant-a-l-etranger-MRE_a705.html

These data, as presented above, show a very sharp acceleration in
Moroccan migration over the last two decades, with, in particular, the number
of residence permits (corresponding to regular migration) granted to Moroccan
migrants in European Union countries varying between 120,000 and 150,000
annually, since the 2000s (Eurostat, 2019).

In a survey carried out between 2018 and 2019 by the HCP (HCP, 2020), it
emerged that the continued departure in numbers of Moroccans abroad over the
years is due to three main reasons: 1) the search for employment and better
working conditions; 2) studies and, 3) family reunification and marriage.
According to the same survey, more than half of MREs (53.3%) left Morocco for
economic reasons, and almost a quarter (23.4%) to pursue their studies abroad.
The remainder left for social reasons (mainly family reunification and
marriage) or political reasons (lack of political and/or religious freedoms,
lack of respect for individual rights, etc.).

The numbers and other quotients quoted above speak for themselves when
it comes to economic and social policies which, over 60 years ago, saw
emigration as a temporary solution, but which ended up becoming a subject of
conflict with Europe, particularly in terms of the "irregular
migration" of Moroccans seeking a "better life elsewhere".

The latter remains relatively high, and even seems to have worsened with
the health crisis of 2020, as shown in the table below, which shows that the
number of Moroccan migrants attempting to leave Morocco irregularly increased
by more than 3.5 times between 2016 and 2021.

Table 6

Interceptions of Moroccan
emigrants presumed in irregular situations, 2013 -2021

Year

Interceptions
of Moroccan emigrants presumed in irregular situations

2013

7.359

2014

11.586

2015

7.273

2016

7.064

2017

13.261

2018

18.190

2019

17.134

2020

20.243

2021

30.612

Source: Ministère de
l’Intérieur, Rabat, Maroc.

Access to water

The ideologically and financially asocial nature of public policies in
Morocco is particularly striking in the case of a basic service that is vital
to the population: access to water and sanitation. In this sector, there is a
complete gap between the rights proclaimed, both inside and outside the
country, and what is actually applied.

Until the last decade (2010-2020), Morocco was one of only 13 countries
worldwide (Water words, 2023) to have constitutionalized the right of access to
water (see article 31 of the constitution, mentioned above).  In the same vein, and both before and after
the constitutionalization of access to water for all citizens, Moroccan
lawmakers held, in the country's first water law, published in 1995, and then
in a second, published in 2016, that ''water is a public good that cannot be
subject to private appropriation'' (Ministry of Finance, 1995), ''nor to
transaction by sale and purchase'' (Official Bulletin, 2016). Morocco also
joined the community of nations when, on July 28, 2010, the United Nations
General Assembly recognized "access to quality water and sanitation as a
human right" (Nations Unies, 2010).

In practice, however, a completely different approach was followed, that
of the State's offloading of this basic public service. In this context, the abandonment by the State of water, sanitation and
electricity distribution services in Morocco took the legal form, from 1997
onwards, of "Delegated Management". Although there was no legal
framework in place at the time (CESE, 2015), this was to result in the gradual
transfer to private capital - in this case, to two major French groups - of the
distribution of the relevant services in three of Morocco's largest urban
centers, Casablanca, Rabat-Salé and Tangier-Tetouan.

Thus, in 1997, Lyonnaise des Eaux took
control of the public water company (Régie Autonome de Distribution - RAD) in
Casablanca; the former RAD became Lydec. In 1998, the same operation was
carried out in Rabat for the benefit of Spanish and Portuguese investors, who
had never before been involved in the water sector, even in their own
countries.

That same year (2002), Veolia
Environnement-Maroc took over management of the two water utilities in the
northern cities of Tangier and Tetouan. Thus, in the space of 6 years
(1997-2002), public service delegation for water (and electricity) covered 50% of
the volume of water distributed - and wastewater treatment - in Moroccan
cities.

Introduced for essentially economic, financial and ideological reasons,
delegated management was intended to "relieve the State" of the
financial and "managerial" burden associated with urban water and
electricity distribution, reduce the time it takes to connect
"users/customers", and facilitate and reduce collection times.

Very quickly, however, the economic and "social" principles
behind the decision to use the legal mechanism of delegated management - which
in effect amounts to privatization of the service - came up against the poverty
of the population, especially in the outlying districts of the urban centers
concerned. And the principles of consent to pay, full cost recovery and
"water pays for water" were applied to all subscribers. This
application was made all the more painful for the population by the fact that,
at the same time, the State introduced VAT on water and sanitation in 2006
(Ministry of Finance, 2006). The opérations de branchements sociaux (costing
rates, technical measures, and regulations to ensure utility service
connections for all) which were intended to facilitate access to the network
for the poorest, failed to deliver the expected results. In the country's
economic metropolis, Casablanca, for example, 10,000 new connections per year
were announced annually, but the number of new connections actually made did
not exceed 1,250 between 1997 and 2007.

It's as if the discourse around the right of access to water, water as a
common good, and water as a non-market good, which can be "neither bought
nor sold", is aimed at international public opinion. And it is invited
only to better cover the liberal bias of public policies in Morocco, which are
more focused on "covering costs" and the financial profitability of
the actions undertaken than on their social effects.

And, in fact, these policies - with regard to distribution services as
with any other basic service - take the exact opposite direction to the
official proclamations of faith. The latter appear, in the final analysis, to
be no more than a cover for the true ideological foundation of the Moroccan
state. That of a liberal state acting in the social sectors, or qualified as
such, only to better serve the interests of private capital.

In fact, if we omit this, we wouldn't understand why the management of
water and liquid sanitation and the distribution of electricity have been
delegated to private capital in some of the country's major conurbations,
namely Casablanca-Mohammadia/Rabat-Salé/Tanger and Tétouan. Nor do we
understand why freshwater springs - community resources for centuries - have
been handed over to private individuals without further ado (in 2006/2007, in
the case of Aïn Sultan, in the Fès region, and in 2010, in the case of Ben
S'mime, in the Ifrane region. These two springs, whose water abstraction
represents a veritable spoliation of the populations who used to live on them,
come on top of, for example, the more ancient transfers of the natural waters
of Oulmès/Sidi Ali, in the Middle Atlas, Sidi Harazem or Aïn Fès, in the center
of the country (Lahlou, 2024).

Conclusions

Morocco - a country with 3,500 km of coastline
among the world's richest in fish, the world's richest phosphate reserves, the
fastest train on the African continent, inexhaustible solar energy potential,
one of the largest ports in the Mediterranean and a motorway network that
compares favourably with many European networks, etc.... - despite all this, occupies
an unenviable position when it comes to the human development indicator
presented as a benchmark for social development by the UNDP.

A review of the country's 7 key social and
socio-economic sectors and their situation in 2025 provides ample evidence of
this, while confirming the most pessimistic projections announced by the
authors of the Fiftieth Anniversary Report of 2005,
referred to several times in this text.

This report also stated
that ''The uncertain effectiveness of governance (could) be detrimental to the
country's development if the shortcomings inherent in the public management
system are not corrected: corruption, dysfunctional justice system, lack of
program evaluation culture, compartmentalization and dispersion of sectoral
solutions and ministerial departments, lack of planning and time management in
public policies'' (Royaume du Maroc, 2005).

''The scale of deficits could be exacerbated.
A financial crisis or social crises would become likely. A financial crisis,
which could take the form of a deterioration in the current account of the
balance of payments or an accumulation of record budget deficits, in the
absence of alternative budget revenues, would place Morocco under international
conditions (adjustment programs). As for social crises, they would be triggered
in particular by a succession of worsening droughts, persistent and worsening
unemployment, deepening inequalities, a decline in freedoms and the rise of
fundamentalism. The consequences for human development are far from
positive" (Royaume du Maroc, 2005).

Now, 20 years later, and since before the Covid-19 pandemic added its devastating economic and social
effects to those of the drought and
other crises -
double-digit inflation, disruption of commodity imports, rising prices for
energy and certain basic materials, etc. it is evident that
the "coherent choices" referred to in 2005 have not been made. Or
they have been incoherent choices, in any case economically and socially
inefficient. And even when some have been made, they have not been followed by
effective policies or operational projects, or they have been sidetracked by
poor political and administrative governance. In many cases, they have also
been undermined by a lack of oversight on the part of the authorities
responsible for implementing them, or by the persistence of contingent
phenomena that continue to plague Moroccan society, notably corruption and/or
nepotism.

Over the years, these trends became
so obvious that the Head of State was compelled to voice
it himself, announcing in a speech to parliament in 2017 the failure of the
"Moroccan development model" followed until then. Thus, according to
him, "the last few years have revealed the inability of our development
model to satisfy the growing needs of some of our citizens, and to reduce
social inequalities and spatial disparities" (Maroc Diplomatique, 2017).

The Human Development Index (HDI), a summary
indicator that ranks countries worldwide according to their social performance
in the broadest sense, shows that Morocco has
been treading water, or nearly so, since 2005. In that year, its HDI was equal
to 0.631, and in 2018 it was still only 0.676 - an increase, in 13 years, of
0.045 points - and in 2022 (UNDP, 2024), the same HDI was 0.698, ranking it 120thin
the world (among 193 countries), behind Palestine (111th) ,
over-populated Egypt (105th) or war-torn Arab countries such as
Iraq, Libya or Lebanon, and many other Arab countries as poorly endowed with
energy and natural resources as Jordan or Tunisia.

Such a position on the international social
scene means that Morocco has not moved in the direction of the necessary
changes demanded of it by some of its own human skills at the start of the
current century. In 2005, these experts stated that "Morocco is at a
crossroads. It is facing a historic situation of great choices and great goals,
which boil down to two fundamental and contrasting options. On the one hand,
the country can resolutely embark on a virtuous dynamic of renewal and development,
seizing the opportunities open to it and making the reform process a permanent
and structural one. On the other hand, resolving the knots of the future that
stand in the way of development can be postponed indefinitely. These are the
two paths that Morocco faces over the next two decades. One is regressive, lax
and demobilizing, while the other is backed by a far more ambitious and
proactive vision, commensurate with the strengths of the Moroccan people. The
success of future generations and the consolidation of human development gains
will necessarily require adherence to a proactive vision, based on overcoming
the knots of the future, that of a desirable and possible Morocco'' (Royaume du
Maroc, 2005).

In fact, exactly 20 years (2005-2025) after
such an observation/prophesy, the "regressive path", as predicted,
seems indisputable. This is as true in terms of the purely economic framework,
when it comes to the single variable relating to national income, as it is in
terms of the social data that are the benchmark, such as employment and
unemployment, education, migration and access to certain basic public
services/goods such as health, water and sanitation.

At this level, it's clear that there's a huge
gap in Morocco between the political rhetoric that puts the government's
"social action" at the forefront of its priorities, and the realities
on the ground, as well as those supported by some of these policies. A
discrepancy that a new report - published in the spring of 2021 and referred to
as the New Development Model (NMD) Report - has been unable to explain or
justify. The report, for its part, postponed the deadline for
overcoming the crisis to the 2030s. And that with a growth projection
of 6.5% annually, between 2019 and 2035 (Kingdom of Morocco, 2021).
That's almost 4 points more, on average per year, than between 2005 and 2019.

There are many factual and political reasons
for all this, which are difficult to analyze here, but which can be summed up
in three major blocking factors, in addition to the ambivalent role of
the central administration and its territorial machinery.

As highlighted by the fiftieth anniversary
report, "The administrative machine has shown little concern for the poor,
even though it was the only actor in human development. While it has shown
itself capable of building telecommunication networks, energy infrastructures,
various industrial projects, dams, ports, freeways and airports, it has
nonetheless suffered from a lack of listening, dialogue, proximity, delegation
of responsibility and initiative''. But this same machine has functioned under
the supervision of the political system in place, and has acted in its own
interest and security.

In this sense, the political institutions in
place in Morocco, and the mode of governance that prevails there, have a lot to
do with the findings of social deficits presented successively in this paper.
These institutions and governance have not fundamentally changed since the
1960s. Even if they have modernized their means and structures, they have
remained little inclined to scrutiny and questioning, even though they are at
the origin and delivery of everything that
is important in political, judicial, economic and social terms, etc., in the
country.

Secondly, at the same time,
the failure of the education system to integrate the entire school-age
population, to retain it, and to train it on the basis of programs open to
progress, particularly social progress, has contributed to the continued lack
of emancipation of institutions. It has also allowed the continuation of
blockages in terms of the nature of investment, labor productivity, the
organization of production and the distribution of added value within the
economy. As a result, today's economy is still on the "road to
development", dependent on foreign countries, international markets and
the level and annual distribution of rainfall.

This failure, combined with the persistent
precariousness of a large part of the population, was at the root of violent
religiosity and terrorist acts, during the years 2000 and 2010, the like of
which Morocco has never experienced in its modern history (GREASE, 2018-2022).

Finally, in this synthesis, the place accorded
to women in Moroccan society has made them both victims of social policies and agents
of continuation of negative repercussions of these same policies and
perpetuators of their negative effects. Moroccan women are the first to suffer
the effects of all the social deficits mentioned in the various sections of
this paper, including difficult access to school, employment and the healthcare
system. Access is even more difficult in rural areas and far from major cities,
where religious and social conservatism still prevails. It is also subject to
an injustice that can be described as "endemic". That of access to
wealth - and potentially to the means of investment - through the first form of
its distribution, that of inheritance. Yet, until now, in a Morocco described
as modern compared to other Arab-Muslim countries, no reform has dared to put
an end to the absolute injustice of only entitling half as much property
inheritance for a female heir as for a male heir.  The "family code," in a reform
project announced for the end of 2024 (Lemonde.fr, 2024), still only barely
authorizes parents to make gifts during their lifetime to their daughters, even
minors.

Acknowledgements

I express gratitude to my friends at Global
Migration Policy Associates, particularly to Patrick Taran and Olga Kadysheva,
who encouraged me to write this article and supported me throughout its
development, translation from the original French version and finalization,
making this in many respects a collective text. I extend my sincere thanks and
appreciation as well to the reviewers and editors.

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[1] Such
characteristics are generally attached to the economic school referring to the
British economist John Meynard Keynes. J.M. Keynes (1883-1946) rose to fame
with his book "The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money"
(1936), which led to his appointment as Financial Adviser to the Crown and
Governor of the Bank of England. As head of the British delegation, he played a
decisive role in the Bretton Woods conference, which led to the creation of the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, and thus to today's
global financial system.

[2] Due to the
predominantly informal nature of the national production system, or the
generally family/traditional way in which production units are organized within
it, or both.

[3] Or to more than 5
million people in 2024, according to the King, in a speech on November 6, 2024.
Maroc.ma https://www.maroc.ma/fr/activites-royales/sm-le-roi-adresse-un-discours-la-nation-loccasion-du-49eme-anniversaire-de-la